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University of Nebraska-Lincoln

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CREATURES OF INCOHERENCE:
DISSECTING THE DRIVERS, HISTORY, AND COGNITION
OF ATTITUDINAL INCONGRUENCE IN THE AMERICAN BODY POLITIC

by

Timothy P. Collins

A DISSERTATION

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Under the Supervision of Professor John R. Hibbing

Lincoln, Nebraska

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CREATURES OF INCOHERENCE:
DISSECTING THE DRIVERS, HISTORY, AND COGNITION
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Timothy P. Collins, Ph.D.

University of Nebraska, 2014

Advisor: John R. Hibbing

Most American conservatives and liberals wield contradictory political attitudes. This dissertation explores what drives this “attitudinal incongruence.” First, I define and operationalize my terminology and situate the topic within social and political psychology to formulate my central model and theory of ideologically asymmetrical application of (1) individuals’ psychological and cognitive traits, and (2) individuals’ social identity and environmental traits. This leads to the overarching hypothesis that conservatives’ incongruities are more strongly driven by internal forces, and liberals’ by external forces. The central model is then demonstrated in a broad historical overview of attitudinal incongruence in America. The central tenets of my theory are upheld in subsequent quantitative analyses of psychological, cognitive, and biological traits of subjects, but not in a cognitive dissonance experiment—albeit nevertheless demonstrating that psychological traits are likely the strongest drivers of incongruence overall. I eventually conclude that, although in strictly objective terms, liberals tend to be more attitudinally congruent than conservatives, for more “external” reasons, this fact—a common political attack—is not itself a normative negative, but a necessary and *positive* function of ideologies’ belief systems operating within the structures of the American political system.

Acknowledgements

This work was only possible because of the generosity, support, work, and love of a lot of people—all of whom deserve thanks.

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PROLOGUE:
THE ORIGINS OF THIS IDEA
AND WHAT TO EXPECT FROM THIS DISSERTATION

When I was in high school, I became fascinated by my state senator. She was becoming known around the state for being vehemently opposed to gay rights—regularly calling on the government to step in and prohibit gay people from having the same rights as heterosexuals. Yet, she also frequently espoused the virtues of a small, limited government, and the ideas of individual freedom and personal liberty.

Moreover, a similar effect was apparent in one of my U.S. Senators, who believed in the positive force of government intervention and action as a means of protecting people and reducing income inequality. Yet, he rejected the use of government when it came to military action in Iraq, and wanted the government uninvolved in social issues like abortion.

Did these politicians not realize that, sometimes even in the same literal breath, they were contradicting themselves so explicitly? Why *were* they so contradictory? Or, is this not actually contradiction?

As time went on, and I become more attuned to politics, it became clear that State Senator Michele Bachmann was not an outlier among conservatives, and U.S. Senator Paul Wellstone was not an outlier among liberals—these hypocrisies were a regular feature of those who adhered to those respective political ideologies.

This dissertation serves as an examination and analysis of those hypocrisies—where they originate, what drives them, and whether ideologues understand that it is, objectively, logically inconsistent and hypocritical to have certain attitudes that contradict other attitudes. By dissecting this anatomical system of the American body politic, I make the case that this incongruence of attitudes is not a net negative for individuals or the state; rather, it is a mostly necessary by-product of the machinations behind individuals' attitudes interacting with the American political system.

Chapter 1 provides a conceptual overview of how I will define political attitudes and ideologies, and how I will operationalize what I come to call “attitudinal incongruence.” In accordance with the anatomical theme of the dissertation’s title, and in an attempt to use a colorful metaphor, the chapter is the *pre-surgery checkup and physical*.

Chapter 2, which can be conceived to be the *anesthesia administration* of this dissertation, takes those conceptualizations and places them within the lenses of political psychology and behavior scholarship, and uses the lenses to elucidate my central theoretical framework—the Internal-External Model—and the hypotheses that follow from that framework.

Chapter 3 uses that model in providing a qualitative historical and historicist overview of the past half-century of attitudinal incongruence in American politics. It is a longitudinal *clinical trial* of sorts for the Americans undergoing this treatment—the titular creatures of incoherence.

Chapter 4, or *exploratory surgery*, utilizes statistical analyses of different sample populations in America to demonstrate how the model works, and does not work, quantitatively.

Chapter 5, or *comparative surgery*, takes a page from social psychology literature and uses a common research procedure to demonstrate what happens when people are made aware of their own incongruence. How they do or do not react serves as an empirical demonstration of my model in action.

Chapter 6, or a *full-body MRI scan*, is an application of the up-and-coming academic field of biology and politics, using physiological, hormonal, and genetic metrics to explore both potential correlates of attitudinal incongruence and the dispositional drivers thereof.

Finally, Chapter 7 fits everything together—demonstrating the potential for explanatory power of my model and partially confirming my central hypotheses, and pointing out where and why the theory falls short—and concludes normatively by pointing out the fact that, even though most Americans are, indeed, political hypocrites, this is not a bad thing. Attitudinal incongruence actually serves an important systemic purpose that goes beyond its current employment as a common rhetorical attack. This *heart surgery* toward which the rest of the dissertation has been working turns out to be successful: the American body politic is strong, albeit with a few logical cuts and rational bruises.

CHAPTER 1

WHAT IS ATTITUDINAL INCONGRUENCE AND WHY DOES IT MATTER?

Americans are not creatures of coherent, wide-ranging ideologies. But their ideas do reflect, in complex ways, numerous preferences of more modest scope. In this sense, Americans' political beliefs *are* ideological. It is an ideology of many and diverse pieces, a mosaic of partisan attachments, social relations, values, personality, and history.

—Donald Kinder and David Sears (1985, p. 682)

1.1.1. What is Attitudinal Incongruence?

A healthy majority of conservatives in America believes that the federal government is too large, prefer a small government with fewer services (Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 51), and oppose most government regulation of business (p. 98) and the environment (Jones, Cox, & Navarro-Rivera, 2013, p. 35). But, a healthy majority *also* believes that the federal government should prevent abortions (Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 77), gay marriages (p. 78), marijuana use (p. 86), and physician-assisted suicide (Jones et al., 2013, p. 35). It can be said, then, that most conservatives want a libertarian economic government and an activist—that is, authoritarian—social government.

A majority of liberals, meanwhile, prefer a larger government with more services (Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 51), support government regulation of business (p. 98), strict regulation of the environment (p. 99), and believe the government should play a “significant role” in reducing childhood obesity (p. 87). But, they *also* believe that the

government should be ostensibly uninvolved in the first trimester of a pregnancy (p. 77), uninvolved in the bedrooms of consenting adults (p. 77), and that the military is too large (p. 34). Most liberals, then, want an authoritarian economic government and a libertarian social and military government.

Upon reading the two preceding paragraphs, I expect that adherents to both ideologies will take issue with the assertions about their own ideology—perhaps accusing me of bias in one direction or the other or taking polling data out of context, and denying that the issue stances are comparable at the outset. I also expect that adherents to the ideologies will take pride in the assertions about the other ideology, contending that *of course the other ideology is inconsistent and hypocritical, although what is asserted about my ideology is not true.*

Conservatives and liberals, in all of these instances, exemplify a common quirk of American political orientations: they wield attitudes about when the government should and should not act—a direct reflection of political ideology and subsequent stances on political issues—that do not comport with each other, and survey data demonstrates this regularly. Conservatives tend to want an uninvolved financial government but an activist cultural and military government, while liberals tend to want an energetic economic government but a more limited cultural and military government.

This is the definition of attitudinal incongruence, and the purpose of this dissertation is to explore it at every potential explanatory level, and discern how people confront their own incongruity.

In studying the logical incongruence between a person's political attitudes, this dissertation gets at the heart of a series of questions that are commonly asked in American politics (e.g., Baumeister, 1991, p. 65; Lakoff, 2008, p. 75):

- Why do modern conservatives preach the virtues of a small and limited government, especially with regard to the economy, but demand *action* from the federal government when it comes to social/cultural issues and militarism?
- Why do modern liberals demand the use of government as a tool for ensuring civil equality and economic fairness, but vacillate between rejecting and supporting using it as a tool of militarism and social freedom?
- What makes consistently “small-government” libertarians and “big-government” populists so congruent?

I seek to better understand attitudinal incongruence not *just* for the simple sake of learning more about how people think politically—although learning-for-the-sake-of-learning is a worthwhile pursuit. This topic is also important because it serves as a window into an often overlooked aspect of political attitudes and ideologies in terms of their conscious and non-conscious roots, and serves to demonstrate that logically contradictory attitudes are a side-effect of those roots. Subsequently, understanding what drives attitudinal incongruence—that is, having contradictory attitudes and being, essentially, hypocritical in one's personal politics—could help to reduce the negative notion and disparaging effect of *being* discrepant, both in terms of how people view others' and their own incongruence. This notion would be especially true if I find what I ultimately predict: that people *have* contradictory attitudes because people's attitudes are

driven in large part by forces outside of their control, and the contradictions are a side-effect of those non-conscious forces.

In other words, it may not be a person's *fault* if they are hypocritical in terms of their political stances, and it may not even be a logical, political, or philosophical *fault* if they *are* hypocritical, in spite of the fact that this is a near-daily attack lobbed at virtually everyone at every level of politics who may espouse political attitudes that contradict each other in some way.¹

In any case, this chapter will first define and operationalize attitudes and ideologies, and then fit them into a context that allows for the understanding of attitudes as potentially incongruent with each other, especially as a function of different political orientations and ideologies.

1.2.1. Operationalizing and Classifying Political Attitudes

First, to answer my central questions, it is necessary to settle on an operationalization and classification paradigm of political attitudes in America, as, ultimately, having an arithmetic representation of attitudes will obviously allow for the subsequent quantitative analysis of attitudinal incongruence.

Typically, attitudes are seen as a function of *systems* of beliefs, and classified accordingly—especially with respect to a liberal-conservative, left-right continuum (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960; Jost, 2006). The modern liberal-


¹ Although even a cursory familiarity with the last two decades of American politics may bring to mind charges of hypocrisy in the personal lives of specific political figures—to give just two brief examples, (1) liberal attacks on social conservative politicians for sexual indiscretions (see Rhodes, 2009), and (2) conservative attacks on liberals for decrying the state of campaign finance and utilizing its loopholes themselves (see Van Natta, 2002)—this dissertation will only discuss hypocrisy of attitudes, or incongruence of attitudes, to maintain objectivity and civility. The point is to advance knowledge and understanding; not bring people down.

conservative divide is colloquially, and, occasionally, academically conceptualized as a singular left-right axis, with liberals on the left and conservatives on the right (Geser, 2009; Jost, 2009). But, although there is *widespread* agreement, there is no universally-agreed-upon academic or empirical explanation as to what “left” and “right” mean, and in what context (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003; Knight, 1999; Wildavsky, 1987).


Many researchers have moved away from this model—especially those doing research on and in two-party states like the United States, as the two parties’ platforms can generally be constructed without referring to larger models of ideology (Geser, 2009, p. 243)—with critical scholars citing its inherent problems and contradictions, and the fact that its utility may be limited to a superficial perception of a few political attitudes (Feldman, 2003; Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Wildavsky, 1987).

For the purposes of exploring attitudinal incongruence, the colloquial left-right framework would need to be accurate, exude full academic agreement, and illuminate something unique about political attitudes that would justify using an ideological framework as opposed to a more simple operationalization. Thus, even if scholars of American politics and political psychology *were* in widespread agreement as to what the definitions of “left” and “right” are, and what their respective likely attitudes are, the agreement would need to be near-universal to truly warrant employment of a “left-right” model—as demonstrated by the disagreement between two of the most well-known scholars of political attitudes and beliefs (Feldman, 2003; Jost, 2009). The importance of objectivity in the study of political behavior, or any science for that matter, is second to none; in the absence of objectivity, biases are able to bubble up to the empirical surface and have the subsequent potential to take hold of and cloud results.

Meanwhile, likely the most common method of demonstrating and, consequently, operationalizing what equates to people's brandishing of contradictory political attitudes is the operationalization of social and economic ideological spectra, or dimensions (as shown below in Figure 1.1), with conservatives being economic libertarians and, ostensibly hypocritically, social authoritarians, and vice versa for liberals (see Feldman & Johnston, 2014). In other words, it is about conceiving of political orientations as existing along an economic dimension of egalitarianism-versus-laissez-faire, and a social dimension of authoritarianism-versus-libertarianism (see Achterberg & Houtman, 2009, p. 1650). Whether ideologies are, indeed, best operationalized in terms of one or two dimensions is the subject of "considerable debate" (Koleva & Rip, 2009, p. 242). The larger, multifaceted problem for both conceptualizations is the same: which issue attitude goes with which side of which spectrum? In terms of specifically exploring *attitudes*, this dissertation will take a different approach.



Instead, in operationalizing simple political attitudes—and, eventually, the wielding of attitudes that are incongruent with each other—the focus in this dissertation will be narrowed to focus specifically on **support** or **opposition** to any government involvement or action. In other words, the *general conceptualization* of political attitudes, beliefs, considerations, and stances for this dissertation will be a single scale that measures the degrees of support for government involvement, with *involvement* including the use of government resources to **either** *promote* or *prohibit* specific behaviors or sets of behaviors. Essentially, then, this operationalization is a strictly **libertarianism-authoritarianism** lens of political attitudes (see Figure 1.2)



There are two primary reasons for this conceptualization. First, for both the reviewing of existing literature and future experimentation, it enables efficient and parsimonious quantification of political attitudes and, consequently, of the magnitude of attitudinal incongruence—especially with regard to the way attitudinal incongruence is ultimately operationalized in this dissertation (see section 1.3.1).

To illustrate, if someone indicates attitudes that are consistent in their application of when they want the government involved in something—for example, if they did not want the government involved in stem cell research, abortion, or the death penalty—they would be congruent in their attitudes, and be positioned either high or low on, again, what

equates to an overall libertarian-authoritarian scale. If they indicate differential applications of support for government involvement, however—for example, if they wanted the government to prohibit abortions and the death penalty, but also wanted the government uninvolved in stem cell research—they would be indicating incongruent attitudes. Consequently, then, the magnitude of incongruence could be easily quantified (see section 1.3.1 and section 1.3.2), and, subsequently, tied to other variables—for example, psychological trait scales (see section 2.1.1).

A common alternative to this approach would be through the use of classifying attitudes based on ideological scales, either through participant self-identification, post-hoc calculation based on participant responses to survey items, or a combination of the two (e.g., Federico, Deason, & Fisher, 2012). For example, someone may have “conservative” attitudes on financial regulation and social issues, but “liberal” attitudes on immigration—a pattern of attitudes often applied to President George W. Bush, which led to him being considered a hypocrite by other conservatives (see Lakoff, 2008, p. 72).

The primary advantage of this alternative approach would be the deeper conceptualization of political ideology, and keeping study within the realm of the popularly- and academically-understood conservative-liberal dichotomy (Jost, 2009), and at least allowing for conceptualizing ideologies’ attitudes as something deeper than a one-dimensional construct—a common argument of those who criticize a one-dimensional model, especially those who criticize it when it is used in attitudinal incongruence literature (see Knight, 1985, p. 384)

But, with that deeper conceptualization comes a risk of misappropriating the objective definitions of deeper ideologies, those ideologies’ respective attitudes, and,

eventually, what *drives* the *contradictions* within those ideologies. Again, the one-dimensional conservative-liberal dichotomy—and, consequently, scholarship that explores its dispositional origins and interrelationships—is imperfect at the outset due to the lack of a separate placement for other ideologies, like “small-government” libertarians and “big-government” populists (Carmines, Ensley, & Wagner, 2012; Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Holsti & Rosenau, 1996). This means that, as one example, people who qualify as “conservatives” will run the gamut from strict libertarians to Evangelical conservatives, two groups that are multitudinally different and often at-odds (Zumbrunnen & Gangl, 2008), even though *both* groups will usually *identify* themselves as conservatives (Holsti & Rosenau, 1996; Weber & Federico, 2013). While this ailment can be alleviated by pulling ideology apart into two dimensions, as mentioned above, this is a mere treatment of a symptom, and it not only ignores the larger problem—that is, many people will not fit *cleanly* into one of the four figurative quadrants (Cole, 1995)—but it also begs the question of, again, what qualifies as a social issue versus an economic issue, and what qualifies as “conservative” or “liberal,” as those labels are fairly dynamic and not perfectly settled (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003; Knight, 1999).

Obviously, no framework is perfect. Aside from the oft-mentioned inherent difficulties in attempting to measure an abstract concept like attitudes (Petty, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 1997, p. 613), each framework is subject to definitions and social compositions of different ideological groups that have both changed dramatically since the end of the previous decade, let alone in the last *five* decades (see Chapter 3), not to mention their respective incomplete abilities to demonstrate logical incongruence between attitudes—an obvious need for this dissertation.

This illustrates the second reason for conceptualizing sets of specific political attitudes in this fashion: it allows for full objectivity, independent of the current definition of each ideology. *It is a simple matter of whether a person supports or opposes the government acting.* From there, then, it is a question of who that person is, how *that* impacts their attitudes and attitudinal incongruities, and, perhaps, how their attitudes and attitudinal incongruities impact who that person is (see Chapter 2, Chapter 3, Chapter 4, Chapter 5, and Chapter 6).

Therefore, while this libertarianism-authoritarianism lens is certainly narrow in scope, it is undeniably objective, situated in pure logic, and parsimonious—a person either supports government involvement in a specific issue or they do not. While libertarians and populists may rejoice at this news, as it makes them seem, at the very least, less hypocritical and contradictory than conservatives and liberals, use of the terms “hypocrisy” and “contradictory” is only used objectively and without judgment. The purpose of the lens is to understand what drives how contradictory a person is; it is certainly not about philosophically understanding why one group may be “better” than another.

The libertarian-authoritarian lens’s objectivity and strict focus on government intervention also sets it apart from the occasionally-employed “libertarian-totalitarian” scale of Mehrabian (1996)—totalitarianism differs from authoritarianism in several ways that vary depending on who is being asked, but according to Mehrabian, totalitarianism is simply the strictly political form of authoritarianism (p. 471), which is quite terminologically broad—who includes items related to personal values. My lens is not a scale at the outset, and, again, it only deals with political attitudes in terms of whether

they endorse or reject government action and not their ties to larger, abstract political values.

Really, looking at attitudes in this narrow way is operationally similar to other types of conceptualizations in academia in that it is admittedly imperfect, but gets the job done at least in terms of illustrating an *idea*. Along those lines, my lens is somewhat analogous to the Bechdel Rule² (see Tolmie, 2011) and the Four Humors Model³ (see Abrams & Harpham, 2011, p. 57) used in literary studies, in terms of my lens's application to political science; both of those models are, indeed, flawed methods of viewing feminism and character archetypes respectively, but are still empirically useful and meaningful, and provide, at the very least, indirect methods for viewing and measuring their targets. Again, this analogy is not perfect, as the libertarian-authoritarian lens actually has a great deal of direct empirical support at the outset due to its operationalization within an established *scientific*—rather than literary or philosophical—paradigm (see Knight, 1999). This puts it an experimental and academic step above the Bechdel Rule and Four Humors model. I explicate the analogy above in order to illustrate the lens's potentially powerful role in the examination of a larger, somewhat murky concept.

² When attempting to determine whether a book, film, or television series is pro- or anti-woman, the Bechdel Rule essentially assigns a 0, 1, or 2 to a piece based on whether it features two or more women talking to each other (+1) about something other than a man (+2). In other words, if a piece does not feature two or more women talking to each other, chances are strong, but not perfect, that the piece is not particularly pro-woman; the more women who talk to each other, and the more they talk about something other than men, the more likely it is that the piece is more in line with pro-woman feminist thought.

³ This common media trope is the notion that, essentially, each time there are four characters in a piece, more often than not, they fit within four general archetypes due not only to general temperament and personality traits that are reflected in the general population, but also due to the idea that these four characters feed off of each other in an interesting and entertaining way. To illustrate, the four main characters from the *Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles* comic books and television series are archetypically and temperamentally identical to the four main characters from *Seinfeld*.

Therefore, when possible, analyses of attitudes will be limited to attitudes only as they strictly relate to government intervention versus government non-intervention. For example, the oft-used Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory (1968)—likely the most common measure of conservatism in the literature (Knight, 1999, p. 109), and since modified to be less out-of-date (Smith, Oxley, Hibbing, Alford, & Hibbing, 2011)—on its face would, for this dissertation’s purposes, require that participants responding to it infer that the issues discussed are being done *strictly in terms of whether or not the government should be involved*. To maximize utility, in this dissertation’s analyses of public opinion and other survey data, only issues and ideas that fit cleanly into the libertarian-authoritarian lens—which includes several items within the updated Wilson and Patterson (1968) Inventory; although, even though it is not a cleanly either/or government-intervention item, I will include the item of “Small government” because of its general applicability, and also as a tribute to Wilson and Patterson—will be included. Items in the inventory that would qualify must be, at the very least, closely related to whether the government is intervening. An out-of-date item (thus, ultimately excluded) like “Women judges” would qualify, since, if a person opposes having judges that are female, they would—whether or not they realize it—necessarily support government preventing females from becoming judges. “White superiority,” on the other hand, would not qualify, because it does not *necessarily* relate to government intervention.

This specific lens makes this dissertation somewhat unique with regard to the study of political attitudes. Typically, scholars—primarily those who tread the line between social psychology and political science (e.g., Jost, 2006; 2009)—utilize the aforementioned left-right, liberal-conservative dimension or dimensions in exploring

political attitudes and attitude structures. The conceptualization of attitudes as figuratively *structural*, as opposed to *isolated* elements, is used nearly universally in scholarship today, with Converse's (1964) conceptualization of "belief systems" being the common ancestor of most of that scholarship.

To illustrate, thanks to Converse (1964) and *his* forebears (e.g., Abelson & Rosenberg, 1958; Campbell et al., 1960), it nearly goes without saying at this point—although, of course, in a true review of academic literature, it never really goes without saying (see section 1.3.1)—that attitudes are structured similarly within similarly-minded groups of people. If someone, to use a still-applicable example from Converse (1964), opposes expanding Social Security, they also *probably* oppose expanding progressive taxation (p. 207). Those two stances, as well as a swath of other conservative stances, usually "go together" because of a series of factors that bind, or "constrain" them together. For his part, Converse (1964) asserted, quite correctly (see section 2.1.1), that, generally speaking, logic (Converse, 1964, p. 209), social identity (p. 211), and psychological dynamics (p. 210) were those factors.

In the case of my libertarianism-authoritarianism lens, I expect to find that a majority of people who oppose government regulation of the financial sector and oppose affirmative action programs will also support government involvement in the military and government regulation and prevention of immigration. Those four attitudes exist in an abstract structure, and conceptualizing this structure as a one-dimensional, for-or-against-government continuum allows for the understanding of the underlying factors driving support or opposition to government involvement. Finding those specific factors that drive that specific attitude structure and other attitude structures is the point of this

dissertation. A structure may be logical to the person who wields those attitudes, but by situating structures within a lens of consistent logical coherence, this dissertation is taking a consistent, logical, and coherent approach.

Other work has, indeed, done this, albeit more indirectly than I intend to do. Several have explored the potential mechanisms that drive attitude structures (Judd & Downing, 1990; Lavine, Thomsen, & Gonzales, 1997). These scholars, however, primarily focus on the relationship between attitudes as being based on *ideology*—not a fully objective operationalization of attitudes—and the subsequent logical, social, and psychological pressures of wielding an ideology. As explained above, there are important empirical disadvantages to operationalizing attitudes and the structures thereof based on where they fit in political ideologies. This is acknowledged readily by those scholars, who point out that almost all people’s cognitive systems structure and organize attitudes on the basis of “relatively idiosyncratic factors” instead of objective, measureable traits (Lavine et al., 1997, p. 736). Thus, the importance of maintaining an objective lens of attitudes is not lost on other researchers.

1.2.2. Operationalizing Political Ideologies

Of course, I will not be *ignoring* political ideologies. A person’s political ideology is important not just in terms of the potential social identity impact of belonging to an ideology and the relationship that identity has with wielding specific political attitudes—ideological identifiers will be more likely to support a policy if they think or are told that other members of their ideology do as well, without necessarily regarding the substance of the policy (Cohen, 2003; Hartman & Weber, 2009; Malka & Lelkes, 2010; Poteat &

Mereish, 2012; Smith, Ratliff, & Nosek, 2012)—but also because it relates to my central questions. By most definitions of the respective ideologies, conservatives’ attitudes will conflict with each other in different ways than liberals’ (Cricher, Huber, Ho, & Koleva, 2009). Libertarians and populists, meanwhile, are, by the definitions of *those* descriptors, minimally conflicted. But, what are those definitions? How are conservatives, liberals, libertarians, and populists defined?

It must be made clear, again, that in attempting to define those ideologies, and eventually classifying people as members of or adherents to those ideologies, there exist margins of error. The definitions are not always clear, with non-negligible variance in terms of what constitutes, for example, a conservative, for which definitions range from someone who supports existing institutions, as opposed to a reactionary (Muller, 2001, p. 2625); to someone who simply wants less government (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003, p. 377); to someone whose attitudes are all driven by a fear or dislike of uncertainty, and, consequently, driven by the subfactors thereof (Wilson, 1973).

Because my intentions are to eventually explore the differential attitudinal incongruities *by* ideology, it is necessary that I at least offer a few methods of classifying people *into* ideologies. I will use three primary methods, each of which were referenced in the previous section, and each of which offers different potential results.

First, participants can be classified as a member of a specific ideology by their own identification—they can *self-identify* as, specifically, a general conservative, liberal, libertarian, populist, moderate, or an economic conservative, economic liberal, and so forth. This method is common in political science and political psychology, and it is, in many ways, an effective method, as “symbolic ideology” is an important aspect of

political orientations (Ellis & Stimson, 2009; Jacoby, 1991; Jost, 2006; 2009; Malka & Lelkes, 2010). It also gets at the heart of what it means on a deeper level to identify with a group, a mechanism that research shows has an additional effect beyond simple political orientations (Federico, Hunt, & Ergun, 2009); that is, an *affective* effect which, at times, is even more pronounced than that of the logical implications on political attitudes of wielding an ideology (Cohen, 2003; Poteat & Mereish, 2012). The method is not without its flaws, however—after all, the substantive “operational” ideology is often quite different from the “symbolic” ideology that people *think* they have (Conover & Feldman, 1981; Ellis, 2012; Luttbeg & Gant, 1985; Treier & Hillygus, 2009), as evidenced by libertarians’ self-identification as “conservative” more than anything else (Holsti & Rosenau, 1996; Weber & Federico, 2013) and by over one-fifth of self-identified conservatives, according to an estimate by Stimson (2004), being operationally liberal (Federico et al., 2012, p. 383)—which necessitates the need for other metrics.

Second, participants can be ideologically typified based on their indicated political attitudes, with people who indicate a relatively large enough number of “conservative” issue attitudes being classified as conservative—for example, having a conservatism “score” in the top quartile or decile of respondents, calculated by adding together similarly-scaled responses on issues—and so on, leaving them with an operational, more substantive ideological classification (see Table 1.1). This eliminates any effect of *identifying* as a specific ideology and keeps the classification based on more measurable attributes, but it also depends entirely on what constitutes a “conservative” attitude, for example, and that is often dependent on contextual factors (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003)—especially if analyzing a cross-national sample, which exemplifies the

need to fully explore the potential descriptions of respective ideologies (Inbar, Pizarro, Iyer, & Haidt, 2012, p. 541)—and, subsequently, will result in differing results across studies.

Third and finally, similar to the classification typology above, participants can be typified based on their attitudes **in terms of ideology composite scores**, instead of categorization as one or another (Conover & Feldman, 1981; Kerlinger, 1984; Malka & Lelkes, 2010). Attitudes can be categorized as any number of composite types, and participants can subsequently have any number of ideological composite scores. This method serves as somewhat of an extension of the libertarian-authoritarian scale introduced in the previous section, but also as a set of individual difference variables—people can have a conservatism score, a liberalism score, a social welfare score, and so on; although, again, what constitutes a “conservative” position, for example, is not set in academic stone. Meanwhile, although there would be a risk in having a score on a conservatism variable simply be the opposite of a liberalism score—since liberalism is not simply the opposite of conservatism, as they are essentially orthogonal (Kerlinger, 1984)—scholars have long been able to avoid this conundrum by incorporating different issue attitudes into different scales (Conover & Feldman, 1981; Kerlinger, 1984). However, in operationalizing attitudinal incongruence, the metrics most often utilized (see section 1.3.2) use the same issue attitudes in determining an incongruence score, meaning that there will be significant overlap between the items used in ideological variable scores and the items used in incongruence scores. Therefore, this technique will be unable to be employed in every analysis, in spite of its utility.

So, how will I define conservatives, liberals, libertarians, and populists, aside from self-identification? In other words, when not having someone identify as a member of a specific ideological group, how will someone be classified and categorized as a member of an ideological group?

The series of issue-attitudes-by-ideology of the Pew Research Center's (2011) nationally representative survey results mentioned at the beginning of this chapter serves as a guideline for classifying people as one ideology or another. Pew's designations fall short, however, in that the range of political attitudes gathered is not comprehensive or all-encompassing. Necessarily, other methodologies will need to be used to best categorize individuals—for example, using the results of latent class analyses that demonstrate additional issue attitudes' respective ideological classifications (Johnston, 2011).

At any rate, certain sets of attitudes and stances will only be held by conservatives, other sets will only be held by liberals, and so on. To illustrate, taking a person's total number of conservative stances, then, will yield a conservatism *score*, and if that score is high enough—that is, as noted above, if it passes a numerical threshold determined in each respective analysis, since it depends on the range of potential answers—they can be classified as a conservative.

Obviously, the classification paradigms will be dictated by the available data, but generally, the process will largely accord with the procedure described as follows (see Figure 1.3), with common issue attitudes noted where applicable (see also Table 1.1).

American conservatives tend to have a desire for a relatively uninvolved, mostly libertarian and laissez-faire economic government and an activist-authoritarian social and

military/security government: They want as little government intervention in the economy as possible, while still wanting a great deal of intervention on cultural and security-related issues (Pew Research Center, 2011). For conservatives, people are naturally unequal, and success is up to an individual's initiative to thrive (Kerlinger, 1984, pp. 15-16; cited by Knight, 1999, p. 69)—philosophical attributes that are especially crystallized in the modern Tea Party movement (Arceneaux & Nicholson, 2012). In essence, “conservative” attitudes are consistent with a resistance to social change and a resistance to new ideas—especially the latter when it comes to economics (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a; Luttbeg & Gant, 1985). Substantive conservatives constitute around 20% of the American public (Pew Research Center, 2011), even though self-identified conservatives constitute around 30% (Public Religion Research Institute, 2013).

Liberals inversely reflect conservatives in that liberals desire egalitarian economic regulation and a social government that only involves itself to ensure social equality and civil rights (Kerlinger, 1984; Knight, 1999; Pew Research Center, 2011)—an active government in treating “social deficiencies” and improving the welfare of humanity (Kerlinger, 1984, p. 15)—because of liberalism's inherent philosophical penchant for “constructive social progress and change” (Kerlinger, 1984, p. 15). For the most part, liberals' attitudes—specifically their support for government spending and social welfare (Luttbeg & Gant, 1985)—follow logically from their general acceptance of new ideas (Choma, 2008). They also vacillate between supporting military actions and security programs, mostly depending, it seems, on who is in charge—a notion evidenced by liberals' *initial* majority **support** for the National Security Agency's phone-tracking

programs under President Obama but majority **opposition** under President Bush (Pew Research Center, 2013b). Substantive liberals constitute around 25% of the American public (Pew Research Center, 2011), although self-identified liberals only constitute around 20% (Public Religion Research Institute, 2013).


Libertarians—also confusingly known philosophically as “classical liberals,” and often referred to as “liberals” in *international* political science research (De Lange, 2007)—are easy to define in that they are, by definition, opposed to all but minimal government intervention (Jones et al., 2013; Pew Research Center, 2011). They want a small and heavily restricted federal government, with as much social and economic freedom as possible, including the legalization of recreational drug use and prostitution (Jones et al., 2013; Pew Research Center, 2011; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000). As a simple rule, if there is a question about whether the government should be involved in something, libertarians’ default response is a fast *no*. People who are consistently, substantively libertarian comprise between 7% (Jones et al., 2013, p. 8) and 10% (Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 1) of the American electorate, although self-identified libertarians constitute 13% (Jones et al., 2013, p. 8; Public Religion Research Institute, 2013).

Populists present the biggest research problem, and not just because there is no universally-accepted definition or even *term* for them—they are also occasionally referred to as “communitarians” (Carmines et al., 2012; Janoff-Bulman, 2009) or “communalists” (Jones et al., 2013)—and not just because they are typically only studied in contexts outside of the United States, often in countries with parties that, conveniently, have “populist” right in their name. Most importantly, populists are difficult to study

because, in research exploring ideological differences, they are, or can be often equated with conservatives *and* liberals, depending on the situation: economically liberal and socially liberal to some (e.g., Pew Research Center, 2011), economically conservative and socially conservative to others (e.g., Johnston, 2011; Zaller, 1992). So, while there is definitional agreement that populists are, overall, supportive of government intervention in economic and military matters, it is over the *type* of intervention—prohibition versus promotion—in social and cultural issues that there is disagreement. Populists can be considered to be socially conservative if they are more concerned with social traditionalism than economic regulation, or considered to be socially liberal if they are more concerned with social equality—and thus, another form of government activism, in that the government is intervening to ensure social equality—so prohibition of social activity and promotion of social equality respectively.

These differential effects would be easier to discern and more pronounced if other research were to utilize my libertarian-authoritarian lens, since populists would simply constitute liberals who go several steps farther. This makes sense in light of liberals' general support of instead of opposition to government intervention that has been increasing in the last several decades (Holsti & Rosenau, 1996), likely due to cue-taking (Zaller, 1992) from increasingly polarized political parties in America (McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 2006). But, as mentioned above, today's liberals do vacillate between supporting government intervention in some areas, and opposing in others. Therefore, the few areas in which liberals regularly *oppose* government intervention and favor libertarianism—for example, obscenity, first trimester abortions, and, in some respects, civil rights, since most liberals do not want the local, state, or federal government

involved in preventing, for example, gay couples from adopting children (Pew Research Center, 2011)—should be the primary markers for defining populism and distinguishing it from liberalism in general and social conservatism more specifically (Johnston, 2011). This obviously limits the qualitative distinction and, eventually, the quantitative differentiation between populists and liberals, and thus, may present a problem for this dissertation. During analyses, the distinction will be made clear, and steps will be taken to ensure adequate separation.



It should be noted that other groups certainly exist, namely moderates and apathetics (see Hibbing, 2013, p. 483), which, in terms of substantive issue stances, may constitute a plurality of the American public (Jones et al., 2013, p. 8). Both groups, however, are far too heterogeneous and varied to make any real conclusions about them. Since this dissertation is mostly exploring different ideological groups in terms of post-hoc calculations, and subjects' scores on ideological variable scales, when moderates and

apathetics are included in analyses, they will be defined in terms of the frequency of “no opinion” responses for apathetics, or in terms of their scores on those ideological variable scales for moderates. In other words, apathetics will be defined by indifference to political issues, and moderates will be defined by their degree of measurable centrism with regard to the aforementioned ideological classifications.

Table 1.1: Issue Attitudes, Government Involvement, and Typical Ideological Stances					
Updated WPAI Item	Gov't	Conservatives	Liberals	Libertarians	Populists
Organized school prayer	Yes	Agree	Disagree	Disagree	Agree
Bans on obscene material	Yes	Agree	Disagree	Disagree	Agree
Border wall	Yes	Agree	Disagree	Disagree	Agree
Government-guaranteed women's equality	Yes	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree
Federal death penalty	Yes	Agree	Disagree	Disagree	Agree
Federal surveillance program	Yes	Agree	Agree	Disagree	Agree
Ban sodomy	Yes	Agree	Disagree	Disagree	Agree
Ban gay marriage	Yes	Agree	Disagree	Disagree	Agree
Right to an abortion	No	Disagree	Agree	Agree	Disagree
Drone strikes	Yes	Agree	Agree	Disagree	Agree
Require creationism alongside evolution	Yes	Agree	Disagree	Disagree	Agree
2003 Invasion of Iraq	Yes	Agree	Disagree	Disagree	Agree
Increase federal welfare spending	Yes	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree
Tax cuts	No	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
Gun control	Yes	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree
Increase federal military spending	Yes	Agree	Disagree	Disagree	Agree
Torture terror suspects	Yes	Agree	Disagree	Disagree	Agree
Pollution control	Yes	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree
Small government	No	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
Foreign aid	Yes	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree
Free trade	No	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree

It may be alarming to note that, in discussing substantive ideologues, the discussion may actually be about barely half of the American public, leaving the other half under-analyzed. However, even if comparing the attitudinal content of the four primary ideological groups is a matter of comparing small percentages—as noted earlier, anywhere from 7% to 25% per group, and, in sum, somewhere around 50%—of the

American population (Jones et al., 2013; Pew Research Center, 2011; Public Religion Research Institute, 2013), the comparison is still between groups of, even in the smallest group, at least twenty-two million Americans.⁴ Therefore, even though the relative percentages may be small, the groups are still quite large, with ostensible membership in the tens of millions.

Upon settling on series of definitions of attitudes and ideologies, it is possible, then, to move toward potential methodologies for explaining ideological differences in attitudinal congruence and incongruence.

1.3.1. Defining Congruence & Incongruence

At this point, it is necessary to set the scene in terms of definitions, and to situate this work within existing literature. In terms of vocabulary, previous work in this topic has no vocabulary upon which every scholar has agreed. The terms congruent, congruous, consistent, and constrained, as well as their respective antonyms, have essentially been used as synonyms (Luskin, 1987, pp. 860-861; Petersen, Slothuus, & Togeby, 2010, p. 532), while other work has used the terms “logical interrelationship” and “coherence” to describe the same topic (Gerring, 1997, p. 974).

I will primarily use the first two terms, however; “congruent” and the respective *state* of “congruence” when discussing more quantitative and geometric elements, and “congruous” and “congruity” for qualitative. The English language has no formal rule for these Latin-rooted terms, meaning that English’s application of Latin in this instance is very incongruous.

⁴ If substantive libertarians—the smallest group—constitute 7% of the United States population of 316,000,000, 7% of 316,000,000 yields 22,120,000.

“Constraint,” meanwhile, has primarily been utilized in scholarly responses to Converse (1964), who uses the term to refer to both temporal and logical consistency in political attitudes and belief systems. In terms of attitudinal constraint—that is, congruence—for Converse, sets of attitudes may trickle down *vertically* from a larger value or ideology (p. 212), or they may be logically constrained around *each other* and, essentially, trickle across *horizontally*.

This dissertation’s focus will be on *horizontal* constraint—as opposed to *vertical* constraint or a *combination* of the two types—for two reasons, both of which are similar to the reasons justifying my attitudinal modeling.

First, horizontal constraint is a more efficient lens through which incongruence can be analyzed. With vertical constraint, attitude items may technically be consistent with each other through a number of ways. To illustrate, a person may hold the value of individual freedom in the highest regard and only want the government to act if someone’s individual freedom is in question. This person may be *horizontally* incongruent with regard to Social Security and Medicare—supporting the privatization of Social Security on the grounds of an individual’s right to make decisions about their retirement for themselves, but supporting the government’s insurance system so that they may have their health looked after in their retirement—but they would be *vertically* congruent with individual freedom being their guiding value. Additionally, someone else could use that same value to justify opposition to both Social Security and Medicare, with Medicare being a social program that interferes with their freedom by taking their tax dollars to pay for it.

Second, with the same value being able to drive differing attitudes for different people, most likely depending on their differing understandings of the value itself, the importance of sticking with a simple and objective measurement is clear. By only focusing on attitudes with regard to government activity, the metric remains sound and objective.

I will be using the phrases “attitudinal congruence” and “attitudinal incongruence” in place of “horizontal constraint” and a lack thereof, respectively, in order to help situate this dissertation in a new research paradigm—one that is different from the paradigm previously occupied primarily by Converse-related political science scholarship, and, instead, includes more explicitly *psychological* research and empirical work. Moreover, as previously mentioned, constraint literature focuses not just on the logical and rational constraints of wielding specific attitudes, but also on temporal shifts and changes in mass-level and individual-level attitudes, or “attitude stability” (e.g., Federico & Schneider, 2007)—that is, the way a person’s or groups of people’s attitudes and belief systems may morph and change over time. I want to be clear: **This dissertation is not concerned with temporal constraint or attitude stability**, as my central questions relate to what drives people to support or oppose government intervention in some areas and not others—not how that support or opposition may change from one time period to the next.⁵

⁵ An alternative to the phrase “attitudinal congruence” would be to modify “inter-attitudinal consistency” to refer specifically to logical—that is, non-temporal—consistency between attitude structures. Since the bizarre rules of English would seem to dictate that this would then become “inter-attitudinostructural consistency” or “inter-attitudinal-structural consistency,” and that this would *still* not be specifically referring to non-temporal consistency, the best way to refer to this idea would be to specify its figurative geometry with “congruence” and “congruity”—hence, the ultimate choice of “attitudinal congruence and incongruence.”

Therefore, the best overall systemic lens for this dissertation and the best way of answering my central questions—both for reviewing and dissecting existing literature and conducting new experiments and analyzing the results thereof—is by answering the more specific questions of what factors affect why and how people wield essentially contradictory attitudes about any government intervention. In other words, I am answering this dissertation’s titular question of what drives attitudinal incongruence, and the secondary question of what, if anything, happens when people are forced to confront the fact that their political attitudes contradict each other.

1.3.2. Operationalizing Attitudinal Congruence & Incongruence

Subsequently, it is necessary to quantitatively operationalize an individual’s attitudinal congruence and incongruence. Recalling that attitudinal incongruence specifically serves as a more paradigmatically appropriate—for the purposes of this dissertation—term for, essentially, horizontal non-constraint, utilizing previous research’s operationalizations of horizontal constraint should serve, at the very least, as a useful starting point.

Converse (1964) used simple correlation coefficients to measure the degree to which different groups—for example, Congressional candidates and the general public—agreed on different types of issues. Obviously, this means that Converse was not measuring individual-level congruence, but rather, group-level agreement *around* single issue items. While it could be possible to measure the degree to which a person’s attitudes correlated together in a single direction, this would over-complicate the value—both figurative value and literal, quantitative value—of what I am attempting to find: the

degree to which attitudes are congruent with *each other*; or, inversely, the *dispersion* of attitudes. So, while a correlation coefficient could potentially yield a single correlation value for each person, doing so adds an unneeded arithmetic dimension (Balch, 1979; Wyckoff, 1980), and its use has been criticized in studies that have *attempted* to use it (Herzon, 1980).

Barton and Parsons (1977) were among the first to attempt to quantify individual-level incongruence in a simple arithmetic manner. Their approach, which has subsequently been used by a great deal of scholars (e.g., Arceneaux, Johnson, & Maes, 2012; Federico et al., 2012; Federico & Hunt, 2013; Griffin, 2013; Hagner & Pierce, 1983; Hamill, Lodge, & Blake, 1985; Jelen, 1990; Jennings, 1992; Kiecolt & Nelsen, 1988; Kim, Wyatt, & Katz, 1999; Lavine et al., 1997; Luskin, 1987; Miller, Hesli, & Reisinger, 1995; Norrandar, 1989; Wyckoff, 1980; 1987a; 1987b), quantifies the level of an individual's attitudes' consistency—since, according to the authors, it is a “standard” in psychology to determine the “beliefs which ‘go together’ as consistent” (Barton & Parsons, 1977, p. 164)—by calculating the *standard deviation* of a participant's mean score on a series of political attitudes that have been standardized to all go in the same direction (see Equation 1 below). Therefore, the higher the standard deviation is, the lower the degree of congruence, and the higher the degree of incongruence.

The Barton and Parsons (1977) method, however, is slightly problematic due to the fact that it does not take into account subjects who either do not answer questions or answer indifferently—a “major flaw” as described by Wyckoff (1980, p. 127). Hagner and Pierce (1983) work around this flaw in their alternative equation by arithmetically weighting “the individual's number of missing values in each set of potential responses”

(p. 318), and, in doing so, refrain from arbitrarily designating a division between issue “directions” (p. 343)—or, in my operationalization, the level of overall *support for*, rather than *opposition to* government intervention. Their method, in addition to excluding subjects with missing data, weights the standard deviation by the ratio of the number of *potential* item pairs to the number of *complete*, non-missing item-pairs (see Kiecolt & Nelsen, 1988, p. 55). However, my analyses will utilize *only* the Barton and Parsons (1977) equation and *not* the Hagner and Pierce (1983) equation.

Equation 1: Incongruence between different political attitudes (see Barton & Parsons, 1977)

$$Incongruence = \sqrt{\frac{1}{n-1} \sum (x - \bar{x})^2}$$

n = number of issues included the scale

x = value (typically 1 to 5) of response to a specific issue

\bar{x} = mean value (typically between 1 and 5) of responses, scaled in the same direction with regard to support for government intervention

The Barton and Parsons (1977) equation demonstrates a simple aspect of congruence. While the Hagner and Pierce (1983) equation is a more arithmetically complete and complex picture of the same idea, it should be noted that, according to Wyckoff (1987a; 1987b), the Hagner and Pierce (1983) equation is better suited to measuring political sophistication than what equates to attitudinal congruence. Their method takes the individual’s *range* of attitudes—that is, how much they know—into account, but rarely adds anything to the greater analytical picture (Wyckoff, 1987b, p. 150-151).

To illustrate Equation 1, I offer two people—a conservative and a liberal—and five of their attitudes on the same respective political issues, operationalized with regard

to the lens I described in section 1.2.1. For each of their stances, a value of 1 to 5 can be assigned, with a *higher* value corresponding to *strong* support for government intervention.

The conservative strongly favors the government prohibiting all abortions (5), strongly opposes the individual mandate for health insurance (1), strongly opposes any government action about climate change (1), strongly favors expanding aid to Israel (5), and strongly supports building a border fence (5). The liberal opposes government involvement in abortion for the first two trimesters (2), strongly favors the individual mandate for health insurance (5), strongly favors government action on climate change (5), strongly opposes government aid to Israel (1), and strongly opposes a border fence (1).

Using Equation 1, the conservative's incongruence score is 2.191, while the liberal's is 2.049. Obviously, no real conclusion can be made with a total sample size of 2. I provide this example, again, as a mere illustration of the mechanism, and without subjective judgment about whether the scores themselves and the differences therein *mean anything* for society. Chapter 4 provides more statistically viable elucidations and executions of the equation, since it includes much larger sample sizes, and the ability to compare average incongruence scores by ideology and the potential dispositional covariates (see section 2.1.1) therein.

1.3.3. Previous Work on Congruence & Incongruence

The existence of this oft-cited approach to horizontal constraint is evidence that attitudinal congruence and incongruence is not a new topic altogether. However, much of

the work that uses the Barton and Parsons (1977) metric only does so to show a positive correlation between congruence, education, and political sophistication (e.g., Federico & Hunt, 2013; Griffin, 2013; Hagner & Pierce, 1983; Jennings, 1992; Miller et al., 1995)—the congruence metric itself was, at one point, thought to be a direct measure of sophistication (Luskin, 1987), an idea that was quickly dismantled (Wyckoff, 1987a)—if it even goes *that* far (Wyckoff, 1987a; 1987b). Consistent with Converse’s (1964) conclusions, generally, political elites tend to be more attitudinally congruent, with people who are not politically knowledgeable instead concerning themselves with specific issues one at a time, rather than ideological principles (Knight, 1985). Although, it is worth noting that other scholars have also used the Barton and Parsons method to compare attitudinal congruence across religious groups (Jelen, 1990; Kiecolt & Nelsen, 1988) and primary vs. general election voters (Norrander, 1989), as well as the competing role of genetics in attitudinal congruence (Arceneaux et al., 2012) and the impact of media use on attitudinal congruence (Kim et al., 1999).

More specific to the ends of this dissertation, however, in an unpublished manuscript, Kesebir, Phillips, Anson, Pyszczynski, and Motyl (2013) demonstrate that, contrary to their—and a sample of the general public’s—expectations, self-identified Democrats, liberals, Obama voters in 2008, and moderates were, in each of five studies, more congruent (with respect to congruence with the ideologies, *not logical* congruence with respect to government involvement) than Republicans, conservatives, and McCain voters in their political attitudes. Although, after being primed with reminders of their own mortality (see “Mortality Salience” in section 2.1.1), conservatives became slightly more congruent and liberals became slightly less congruent. It is also worth noting that

some studies have found no main-effect of ideology on attitudinal congruence (e.g., Arceneaux et al., 2012), although Kesebir et al.'s (2013) main-effect results have otherwise been replicated as well (see Federico et al., 2012).

Outside of the use of the Barton and Parsons (1977) metric, however, only a few others have explored the specific idea of attitudinal incongruence, or even partially related concepts (e.g., Hoffman, 1971). In particular, Critcher et al. (2009) study the way that conservatives and liberals *reconcile* differential support for abortion rights and the death penalty—that is, incongruence with regard to those issues inasmuch as the “value of life” is concerned; so, the same political attitudes but with a different empirical lens, oriented toward “values” and not the government-action operationalization of this dissertation. The authors find that, in each of three studies, conservatives tend to see their simultaneous *support* for the death penalty and *opposition* to abortion rights as consistent, and reject the notion that they are not consistent. Meanwhile, liberals tend to see *their* simultaneous support for abortion rights and opposition to the death penalty as essentially inconsistent, but not particularly bothersome.

These results are interesting for a number of reasons. First, for conservatives to simply *reject* the notion that their attitudes may contradict one another with respect to values means that the conservatives in the sample are objectively incorrect, in both a logical understanding of those attitudes (see section 3.1.4 for why this is not necessarily a bad thing) and in terms of my libertarian-authoritarian lens. They may be correct in *their understanding* of the “value of life,” or they may have simply not *thought through* the larger implications of wielding those two attitudes. Either way, the conservatives are exhibiting psychological denial (see Reicherter, Aylward, Student, & Koopman, 2010).

Second, liberals' basic acknowledgement of when they are incongruent may demonstrate what equates to—but certainly does not verify—a deeper understanding of the intricacies of political ideologies. In cases when liberals are more congruent, this logically follows from researchers finding a positive relationship between political sophistication and attitudinal congruence (Federico & Hunt, 2013; Federico & Schneider, 2007; Griffin, 2013; Hagner & Pierce, 1983; Jennings, 1992; Miller et al., 1995; Wyckoff, 1980; cf. Wyckoff, 1987a; 1987b).

But, it must be noted that Critcher et al.'s (2009) results are severely limited. They have no ability to generalize beyond their small, heavily-liberal, and mostly-undergraduate participant samples. Moreover, their focus on abortion and the death penalty limits extrapolation of their findings to other issue domains, in addition to the fact that abortion and the death penalty are two of the most seriously contentious and deeply personal political issues—quite possibly more heavily impacted by religion, personal morality, and personal experience than any other issues (Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012; Wiecko & Gau, 2008).

Still, other scholars have also investigated the anti-abortion/pro-death-penalty bloc and found interesting results: Namely, that a deep-seated propensity for punishment—that is, *punitiveness*—is likely the strongest driver of *that* specific attitudinal incongruence (Cook, 1998; Wiecko & Gau, 2008). Basic demographics, traditionalism, Biblical literalism, and a preference for “simple, low-cognition tasks over complex and cognitively demanding activities” also play a role (Wiecko & Gau, 2008, p. 557).

Meanwhile, for scholars exploring attitude structure, contradictory attitudes present a curious point of study. When politically sophisticated people—but *not* political novices—are either repeatedly *reminded* of the logical implications of specific attitudes (Judd & Downing, 1990), or simply asked to think about pairs of attitudes (Lavine et al., 1997; Millar & Tesser, 1986), attitudinal congruence *increases*. The *importance* of a specific issue to a specific person will also inform whether that person’s other attitudes can be congruent with the important ones (Judd & Krosnick, 1989).

Nonetheless, Critcher et al. (2009) and Kesebir et al. (2013) stand as among the most important pieces for this dissertation due to their scholarly proximity to the topic of attitudinal incongruence. Moreover, both pieces readily point to the factors that lie outside of the realm of conscious control that drive the attitudes in their samples’ participants—an area of research that requires some background.

The following chapter will provide that background, and use it to present the central theoretical framework of this dissertation.

CHAPTER 2
 PSYCHOLOGICAL DISPOSITIONS, POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS,
 AND A THEORY OF IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES
 IN ATTITUDINAL INCONGRUENCE

If I weren't a Catholic conservative, I'd be a libertarian nihilist.

—Anonymous conservative acquaintance, 2013

2.1.1. The Psychological Drivers of Political Attitudes

To paint the best picture of the ultimate forces—that is, systemic and dispositional—behind attitudinal congruence and incongruence, it is fundamentally necessary to explore the psychological drivers of and, potentially, origins of political attitudes and ideologies, which undoubtedly serve to inform a large extent, if not *a majority* of personal politics (see Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). In order to do that, this chapter will approach the topics of attitudes and ideologies at a deep and foundational level—social and environmental factors that inform attitudes and ideologies notwithstanding, although they will be noted—and use the fundamentals of research in social, cognitive, and political psychology to build a scholarly scaffolding upon which the central model and theory of this dissertation will ultimately be explicated.

Political psychology is, as an academic field, wide and deep, and current research in the psychological underpinnings of political attitudes is built upon and around several areas of research, all of which implicitly follow the words of Wilson (1973), who noted that it was clear that attitudes were *not* simply the product of “rational processes” (p.

265). It is these areas of research—specifically, research into the psychological and cognitive traits that have been repeatedly shown to drive political attitudes and ideologies—that must be well-elucidated before a central theoretical framework of attitudinal congruence and incongruence can be formulated.

The foundational meta-analytic work of Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway (2003a) serves as a cornerstone of research on the psychological factors that tend to drive general political conservatism and, in some ways—but not all (Choma, Hafer, Dywan, Segalowitz, & Busseri, 2012; Conover & Feldman, 1981)—inversely, liberalism (Jost et al., 2009). Jost et al. (2003a) define political conservatism as an ideology organized around a deep resistance-to-change (that is, as previously discussed, support-for-*tradition*) and an underlying acceptance of social and economic inequality—as opposed to general political liberalism’s *advocacy* of change and *rejection* of inequality—which echoes other scholars’ conceptualization of political orientations being based around the two perhaps orthogonal dimensional axes of openness-conformity and equality-inequality (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt, 2001; Feldman, 2003).

The list of psychological factors driving conservatism—and, again, in *some* inverse cases, liberalism—that the authors demonstrate *most strongly* and *robustly* with their 88-study meta-analysis consists of the following variables:

Dogmatism: It refers to a fairly closed-off “cognitive organization” of beliefs related to the world that are situated around a more central belief system about “absolute authority” that, “in turn, provides a framework for patterns of intolerance” toward other people (Rokeach, 1954, p. 195). Others, meanwhile, hash it out to relate to an essential *cognitive style* informed by the degree to which a person’s belief system is “open or

closed” (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994, p. 1054). High Dogmatism tends to lead a person to a higher likelihood of rejecting the idea that there are facts that contradict their worldview (Rokeach, 1954, p. 197). Overall, Dogmatism and conservatism are typically correlated (Choma et al., 2012; Jost et al., 2003a, p. 353), as are Dogmatism and Christian fundamentalism and conservatism and Christian fundamentalism (Altemeyer, 2002). The trait is often measured with the 40-item Dogmatism Scale “Form E,” which was developed by Rokeach (1960). The scale consists of items related to “double-think” beliefs—that is, a type of compartmentalization that refers to the degree to which people indicate beliefs that **logically contradicted each other** (Rokeach, 1960, p. 36), for unclear reasons (Rokeach, 1963)—coupled with a common denial of that double-think (Rokeach, 1960, p. 37), as well as items measuring general orientation toward threat and authority (see Eckhardt, 1991, p. 114). Some have criticized the scale for being subject to political biases of subjects (Parrott & Brown, 1972), although subsequent analyses have supported the scale’s objectivity (Hanson, 1989). A 20-item version has been shown to be a fairly reliable analogue for the full scale (Troidahl & Powell, 1965).

Fear and Prevention of Loss: Often measured alongside Fear of Death, it is obviously a measurement of how sensitive a person is to the threat or possibility that they could lose someone or something close to them (see Altemeyer, 1998). Jost et al. (2003a) describe conservatism’s relationship with the construct by elucidating the idea that conservatives are extremely sensitive to the potentialities of loss, which is “one reason they wish to preserve the status quo” (p. 364). It is conceptualized using a variety of different constructs, most of which correspond to Mortality Salience—a closely-related psychological factor outlined more fully below. But, unique to Fear of Loss is the

inclusion within the respective studies of statements related to a “belief in a dangerous world” (Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt, 2001), which ties it conceptually to Social Dominance Orientation (outlined below). It is typically measured with small numbers of items that ask respondents whether they feel “life is changing for the worse” (see Jost et al., 2003a, p. 364).

Intolerance of Ambiguity: Originally an off-shoot from Freudian psychoanalysis research (see Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949), and often abbreviated as IA, it measures how a person “perceives and processes information” related to stimuli that are ambiguous in nature when the person is confronted with clues that are unfamiliar, *incongruous*, or too complicated to readily grasp (Furnham & Ribchester, 1995, p. 179). High IA individuals tend to interpret ambiguous events as threatening or discomfoting (Budner, 1962), and respond to them by increasing their at-that-moment worldview to be more absolutist, black-and-white, and, in many cases, religious (Sagioglou & Forstmann, 2013). It is ostensibly a personality variable that manifests itself in behaviors such as the following:

resistance to reversal of apparent fluctuating stimuli, the early selection and maintenance of one solution in a perceptually ambiguous situation, inability to allow for the possibility of good and bad traits in the same person, acceptance of attitude statements representing a rigid, black-white view of life, seeking for certainty, a rigid dichotomizing into fixed categories, premature closure, and remaining closed to familiar characteristics of stimuli. (Furnham & Ribchester, 1995, p. 180; see also Jost et al., 2003a, p. 346)

Scholars posit that IA is manifested in three *reaction* types: (1) Cognitive, in which people interpret an ambiguous situation as an absolutist, black-or-white scenario; (2) emotional, in which people exhibit negative emotions such as unease, anger, and anxiety; and (3) behavioral, in which people reject or avoid a situation with ambiguity (Grenier, Barrette, & Ladouceur, 2005, p. 594). It is often measured using Budner’s (1962)

Intolerance of Ambiguity scale or the Rydell-Rosen Ambiguity Tolerance Scale (MacDonald, 1970; Rydell & Rosen, 1966). Both have been found to have operational use (Kirton, 1981); although, according to a Google Scholar search, Budner's (1962) 16-item scale has been used—or at least referred to—at least three times as often. Kirton (1981) shortened and combined the two scales to create an effective 18-item composite (Furnham, 1994).

Mortality Salience: Centrally derived from Terror Management Theory—the notion that thoughts and reminders of death lead one to desire and seek out greater security, meaning, and self-esteem (Greenberg et al., 1990)—this construct relates to the impact of death-related thinking and a general fear of death on a person's behavior and attitudes (Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Chatel, 1992), and can be, and *has been* conceptually combined with the Fear and Prevention of Loss, and Fear of Death, with its roots firmly situated in evolutionary and biological mechanisms (Tritt, Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 2012). Conservatives have been shown to become more conservative in their beliefs when reminded of human mortality—specifically, their *own* mortality (Greenberg et al., 1990; Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989)—while, depending on the experimental context (Nail, McGregor, Drinkwater, Steele, & Thompson, 2009, p. 902), liberals seem to become more liberal (Greenberg et al., 1992). MS is usually measured with the 15-item Death Anxiety Scale (Templer, 1970), and/or *induced* with a number of different manipulations—for example, having participants write open-ended essays responding to prompts regarding the emotions that are aroused by “the thought of your own death,” or what they believe will happen physically *upon* dying, and *after* dying (Kesebir et al., 2013, p. 26)—all of the

above seek to explicitly remind subjects of death (Burke, Kosloff, & Landau, 2013; Kesebir et al., 2013).

Need for Cognitive Closure: Also referred to somewhat interchangeably as simply “Need for Closure” (NFCC; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994, p. 1049), it denotes a person’s level of preference for an immediate *answer* as opposed to confusion or ambiguity (Kruglanski, 1989). In other words, it is a quickly-developing drive to wield a firm—as opposed to uncertain or unclear—belief (Jost et al., 2003a, p. 348). Oftentimes, personal preferences for order and structure are included within explorations of NFCC, as the concepts are basically analogous and refer to the same underlying construct (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994, p. 1050). Moreover, a basic preference for the status quo—a la resistance to change (Jost et al., 2003a)—is also a common correlate (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003b, p. 384). People with high NFCC will “seize and freeze” on newly encountered information in that they will cling to information that allows or fosters an answer and stick with that information (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Conservatives tend to be higher in NFCC than other ideological groups (Chirumbolo, 2002; Chirumbolo & Leone, 2008), and conservative attitudes on cultural issues are driven quite strongly by NFCC (Golec de Zavala & Van Bergh, 2007), especially with regard to Biblical literalism (Brandt & Reyna, 2010). Although, liberal attitudes can be driven by NFCC as well (p. 601); in fact, liberal identifiers *with high NFCC* have been shown to be, on average, **more attitudinally incongruent** than conservatives with high NFCC (Federico et al., 2012). NFCC is generally measured with the Need for Closure Scale (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993), a 42-item scale that measures preference for order, preference for predictability, decisiveness, ambiguity discomfort, and closed-

mindedness (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Shorter versions exist, however: a 15-item scale has also been shown to be effective when practical considerations prohibit the use of the full 42-item scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011), although the 15-item version lacks the full dimensionality of the 42-item version, so it should not be seen as a replacement to it (p. 93). The same effective-but-not-ideal notion is true for a 14-item scale as well (Pierro & Kruglanski, 2006; 2008), while a 5-item version was, as would be expected with such a short scale, psychometrically invalid (Federico, Jost, Pierro, & Kruglanski, 2007).

Need for Structure: Also referred to as “personal need for structure”—in this dissertation, however, “NFS” will be used to emphasize the “need” aspect upfront—this factor denotes the degree to which a person desires a homogeneous, simple structure in thought and cognition (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). People with high NFS are relatively more likely to feel uncomfortable in response to uncertainty and ambiguity (Barrett, Patock-Peckham, Hutchinson, & Nagoshi, 2005) and develop stereotypes based around misconceptions, an effect that is partially mediated by other psychological factors (Schaller, Boyd, Yohannes, & O’Brien, 1995). NFS has a lot in common with NFCC, rendering the NFCC Scale partially redundant (Neuberg, Judice, & West, 1997), but not enough to mean that NFS and NFCC are not measuring unique constructs. NFS is measured with the 12-item Need for Structure Scale (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993).

Openness to Experience: One of the Big Five personality traits, and often abbreviated to simply “Openness,” it measures “intellectual curiosity, aesthetic sensitivity, liberal values, and emotional differentiation,” and is marked by creativity, originality, imagination, and non-conformity (McCrae, 1987, p. 1259). Openness generally has a positive correlation with liberalism and negative correlation with

conservatism (Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008; Mehrabian, 1996); these correlations are strengthened significantly with regard to liberal and conservative attitudes on immigration respectively (Dinesen, Klemmensen, & Nørgaard, 2014). Openness is conceptualized as consisting of six traits: fantasy and imagination; appreciation for art; receptivity to and importance of emotions; readiness to try new activities; intellectual curiosity; and willingness to be skeptical toward one's values (Onraet, Van Hiel, Roets, & Cornelis, 2011, p. 184). It should be noted that recent analyses have demonstrated that personality appears to be simply correlated—not necessarily *causally* linked—with ideology, with both being driven ostensibly to the same degree by common genetic traits (Verhulst, Eaves, & Hatemi, 2012), meaning that measuring Openness is essentially indirectly measuring ideology. Although, Openness still represents an elemental and logical abstraction away from ideology, so to speak, which means it still plays a somewhat unique role in attitude formation, ideology, and the understanding thereof (see Perry & Sibley, 2013). Therefore, it is still worth exploring. At any rate, it seems that, most commonly, Openness is measured with ten items from the full Big Five battery used in the 44-item set developed by John, Donahue, and Kentle (1991).

Uncertainty Avoidance: Empirically and substantively similar to Intolerance of Ambiguity (Grenier et al., 2005)—to a point of, understandably, being used interchangeably in some studies (p. 594)—but instead of measuring a “here and now” response to an ambiguous situation, uncertainty avoidance (identified in most other research as Intolerance of Uncertainty, or IU, see Grenier et al., 2005) refers to the *future* (p. 596). In other words, in looking toward the future, people high in IU will tend to

become uncomfortable, and focus more than other people on *negative* potential events, regardless of their likelihood (Dugas, Gosselin, & Ladouceur, 2001). Early scholars of conservatism have gone as far as to say that the singular foundational factor of the conservative ideology is how likely it is that someone will be threatened or anxious when confronting uncertainty (Wilson, 1973, p. 259). IU is typically measured by the 27-item Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994).

There are four additional dispositional factors similar to those above, but which are not included in Jost et al.'s (2003a) model that are worth mentioning. First is another “cognitive style” variable known as the Need to Evaluate (NE; Jarvis & Petty, 1996), which is a measurement of the degree to which a person impulsively evaluates a stimulus of any type as either positive or negative (Bizer et al., 2004; Federico, 2004; Jarvis & Petty, 1996). People who are high in NE are less likely to respond “no opinion” on surveys, and tend to form strong opinions on ideas and concepts quickly (Jarvis & Petty, 1996) in binary, good-or-bad terms (Federico, 2007, p. 538), and have “extreme likes and dislikes” with a lot of attention paid to the good and bad of everything, even when they are not personally involved in a given conceptual target (Higgins, Kruglanski, & Pierro, 2003, p. 316). People who are *low* in NE, meanwhile, structure their opinions with more effort, and with a greater consideration of existing beliefs (Federico & Schneider, 2007, p. 226). NE went unmentioned by Jost et al. (2003a), but, since then, has gained moderate traction as a relevant covariate of other psychological drivers of conservatism (Bizer et al., 2004; Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2006), if not itself a driver of conservatism (Crowson,

Thoma, & Hestevold, 2005). It is normally measured with the 16-item Need to Evaluate Scale (NES; Jarvis & Petty, 1996).

Second is the additional Big Five personality trait of Conscientiousness, which describes a person's propensity for competence, order, duty, striving for achievement, self-discipline, and deliberation (see Mondak, 2010, p. 53). Conscientiousness's relationship with conservatism, and especially with more authoritarian components of conservatism, is observed regularly (Dallago & Roccato, 2010; Dirilen-Gümü , Cross, & Dönmez, 2012; Perry & Sibley, 2012; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008; Van Hiel, Mervielde, & De Fruyt, 2004), but most often to a smaller relative degree than Openness (Carney et al., 2008; Cohrs, Kämpfe-Hargrave, & Riemann, 2012; Mondak, 2010; Stenner, 2005; Van Hiel, Mervielde, & De Fruyt, 2004). Like Openness, Conscientiousness is measured with a section of the Big Five battery developed by John et al. (1991).

Third is the Need for Cognition, or NFC, which is not to be confused with NFCC, although they are similar in some respects, and correlate to a moderate degree (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011), and, confusingly, both are referred to as NFC in different contexts. Developed by Cacioppo and Petty (1982) off of earlier work in the acquisition of knowledge (e.g., Cohen, Stotland, & Wolf, 1955), the factor refers to a person's propensity to, essentially, think effortfully, and enjoy doing so. This does not mean that people low in NFC avoid thinking about the world around them, but they usually require outside motivation to do so, and, subsequently, to process and comprehend message arguments (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). When it is possible, people low in NFC typically depend on judgmental strategies that require the least effort—like heuristics, or cognitive shortcuts—leading to them being described as “chronic cognitive

misers,” as opposed to “chronic cognizers,” or those who are high in NFC (Cacioppo et al., 1996, p. 197), who demonstrate a higher relative degree of rational beliefs (Mahoney & Kaufman, 1997). Jost et al. (2003a) mention NFC as a motivational factor, but do not incorporate it into their analysis due to the fact that it is “non-directional,” and does not *satisfy needs* in the same way that factors like NFCC and Dogmatism do (pp. 340-341), but I mention it now due to its essentially negative relationship—either indirect or direct—with conservatism (Crowson, 2009a). NFC is measured with the Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984), an 18-item statement battery shown to be *negatively* related to conservatism (Crowson, 2009; Hennes, Nam, Stern, & Jost, 2012), support for punishment (Sargent, 2004; Tam, Au, & Leung, 2008), prejudice (Waller, 1993), and group-based dominance (Kugler, Cooper, & Nosek, 2010), but not significantly related to strictly *economic* conservatism (Crowson, 2009a).

Fourth is the construct of Preference for Consistency (PFC; Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995), which is a measure of a person’s propensity for congruence in their own thoughts and behaviors, desire for others to be congruent, and desire to be seen by others as congruent (p. 319). Formulated out of cognitive dissonance research (see Chapter 5), PFC is positively related to NFS and Conscientiousness, and negatively related to Openness (Cialdini et al., 1995, p. 320). Some outside of cognitive dissonance research have conceptualized PFC as a way to tap into aversions to general inconsistency, unpredictability, and diversion from the status quo (Nail et al., 2009, p. 903), going as far as to discuss how PFC fits squarely with Jost et al.’s (2003a) assertions, and finding it to correlate with a “need to belong” (Nichols & Webster, 2013)—which is defined as a deep drive to establish and preserve “enduring interpersonal relationships” (Baumeister &

Leary, 1995, p. 522). PFC also partially moderates the relationship of religious fundamentalism with prejudice (Hill, Cohen, Terrell, & Nagoshi, 2010). People high in PFC are more likely to attempt to distract themselves from incongruent thoughts, and will experience negative affect when their incongruence is made clear to them (Newby-Clark, McGregor, & Zanna, 2002), while people low in PFC will not necessarily have the opposite effect of those high in PFC, but may actually have an actual aversion to consistency in general (Bator & Cialdini, 2006, p. 229). Some scholars have decried a need for the relatively young metric to be standardized in terms of in what academic contexts it is employed and how low and high scores vary based on academic contexts (Guadagno & Cialdini, 2010, p. 161). At any rate, PFC is measured with the Preference for Consistency Scale (Cialdini et al., 1995), an 18-item battery, although some have successfully used a 9-item scale with 9-point responses (e.g., Newby-Clark et al., 2002).

Other scholarship has put a more primary focus on the impact of the more broadly ideology-oriented measures of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) on conservatism and ideology in general. RWA was first conceptualized and operationalized by Altemeyer (1981), based off of the foundational work of Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) on general personality authoritarianism—which Adorno et al. believed to be rooted heavily in a person’s early childhood and relationship with their parents. RWA serves as a composite measure of three core factors: *authoritarian aggression*, or supporting punishment for wrongdoers; *authoritarian submission*, or obeying authorities; and *conventionalism*, or upholding moral absolutes and requiring others to follow those moral absolutes (Adorno et al.,

1950; Altemeyer, 1998; Christie, 1954; Peterson, Doty, & Winter, 1993; Sanford, 1973). It may be because of their general deferral to and reception toward their preferred authorities in forming their political attitudes that people high in RWA often “harbor many double standards and hypocrisies” (Altemeyer, 1998, p. 48), since their preferred authorities—for example, political elites (Zaller, 1992)—like the preferred authorities of liberals as well, often express incongruent attitudes without explicitly *or* implicitly noting the problematic logic inherent in doing so (see Chapter 3).

RWA is often empirically *equated* with a resistance to change (Mavor, Louis, & Sibley, 2010), which makes sense in light of its oft-observed positive relationship with conservatism and negative relationship with liberalism (Altemeyer, 1998; Crowson et al., 2005; Jost et al., 2003a). People who have high RWA scores tend to view the world as dangerous and constantly veering toward destruction—for example, they will perceive threat much more readily than other groups (Feldman & Stenner, 1997)—and they imagine themselves to be very high in morality and honor. As Altemeyer (1998) puts it, they are “scared” and they are “self-righteous” (p. 52).

RWA’s long-observed relationship with political conservatism has drawn the understandable ire of conservatives who reject the notion that they believe in an authoritarian, controlling society, as well as some scholars who either explicitly reject Jost et al.’s (2003a) somewhat blanket view of conservatism (e.g., Greenberg & Jonas, 2003), or probably would reject it, if they not written prior to 2003 (e.g., Ray, 1985). They counter—as demonstrated in a large amount of literature and history (see Greenberg & Jonas, 2003, p. 377)—that it is *left*-wingers that are authoritarian, evidenced, for example, by the vast array of dictatorial socialist regimes of the Twentieth Century

(Greenberg & Jonas, 2003). In a response to those critics, Jost et al. (2003b) acknowledge the existence of left-wing authoritarianism, but make it clear that the empirical evidence points to a much larger relative degree of right-wing authoritarianism in the world—which echoes other scholars' sentiments (Stone, 1980), in addition to the notion that authoritarianism is both a means and an end in politics and not always an ideology in itself (Lakoff, 2008, p. 73).

At any rate, RWA is typically measured with the RWA Scale, originally developed by Altemeyer (1981) and since updated by Altemeyer (1998), that consists of 30 statements, each of which relates to one of the three authoritarianism dimensions. Shortened versions of the scale have also been constructed that have high degrees of reliability (Manganelli Rattazzi, Bobbio, & Canova, 2007; Zakrisson, 2005).

SDO, meanwhile, emerged from social dominance theory—a framework based around the postulation that civilizations work to reduce intergroup conflict by fostering widespread belief systems of one group dominating over others (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994)—as a variable for measuring a person's degree of desiring to have *their* in-group dominate and “be superior to out-groups” (p. 742). In social and political psychology, SDO is said to have become “one of the most versatile and useful constructs for understanding sociopolitical ideologies, the psychology of prejudice, and intergroup behavior” (Ho et al., 2012, p. 584).

High SDO indicates greater opposition to egalitarianism and a greater belief in a dog-eat-dog, “competitive jungle” world, while low SDO corresponds to greater general support for equality (Duckitt, 2001; Federico et al., 2009). Conservatives tend to have high SDO scores, while liberals tend to have low SDO scores (Altemeyer, 1998);

although, it is important to note that recent research suggests that “extreme” liberalism *requires* low SDO while conservatism does *not* necessarily (Wilson & Sibley, 2013, p. 283).

Issue domains are relevant as well, with SDO shown to have a relatively higher impact on issues related to economics and societal hierarchy, as opposed to issues related to culture (Altemeyer, 1998; Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002). SDO will drive a person to believe in human *dominance* over the environment to a degree that they reject the importance or even existence of climate change, for example (Milfont, Richter, Sibley, Wilson, & Fischer, 2013). Although, it should be noted that SDO still plays at least a covariant and indirect role in most issue areas (Altemeyer, 1998), with an especially high impact on some prejudicial attitudes (p. 54). Positive inter-ethnic contact, for example, may reduce SDO and prejudicial attitudes over time (Dhont, Van Hiel, & Hewstone, 2014). Still, its impact on prejudicial attitudes is likely different from RWA’s, since high RWAs are usually very religious, and use religious reasons to justify prejudice, while high religiosity is not a necessary trait of high SDOs (Altemeyer, 1988, p. 61).

SDO is measured using the SDO Scale, a 16-statement battery developed by Pratto et al. (1994). Other scholars have used factor analysis to determine that the scale is best viewed as having two somewhat overlapping, but still separate components—group dominance orientation and egalitarian orientation (Ho et al., 2012; Jost & Thompson, 2000).

In what has become known as the Dual Process Model (DPM), scholars have basically combined RWA and SDO into a two-pronged approach to the study of general ideology and attitudes (Duckitt, 2001; 2006; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum,

2002), corresponding RWA and SDO to the Jost et al. (2003a) model of ideology as, respectively, opposition-to-change and acceptance-of-inequality (Federico, Weber, Ergun, & Hunt, 2013; Wilson & Sibley, 2013). According to some scholars, this makes DPM essentially analogous to a measure of social and economic ideology, with RWA representing social ideology and SDO representing economic ideology (Duckitt, 2001; Federico et al., 2013; Heaven & Connors, 2001). In essence, then, DPM functions as a conglomeration of RWA and SDO into a more widespread set of psychological factors that describe ideology—not overall predisposition factors in themselves (Van Hiel, Pandelaere, & Duriez, 2004)—and it has become an “increasingly popular framework” as a result (Sidanius et al., 2013, p. 314).

Meanwhile, researchers exploring the psychological underpinnings of morality have posited the existence of five “Moral Foundations” derived from psychological intuitions that drive values and attitudes (Haidt & Graham, 2007), and function differentially by political orientation (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Graham et al., 2011). The five foundations—which serve as answers to the question of to what extent a consideration is relevant to one’s thinking when deciding whether something is right or wrong—are built upon five respective axis constructs, and are listed as follows, with the corresponding answer to the question posed above in parentheses: Harm/care (whether someone was harmed), fairness/reciprocity (whether someone acted unfairly), ingroup/loyalty (whether someone betrayed their group), authority/respect (whether the people involved were of the same authoritative and worthy-of-respect-and-obedience

rank in a society),⁶ and purity/sanctity (whether someone did something disgusting). Liberals tend to utilize the first two foundations—harm/care and fairness/reciprocity, known together as the “individualizing foundations” —while conservatives utilize *all five* in informing their politics, with the final three foundations known as the “binding foundations” (Graham et al., 2009; Graham et al., 2011).

Currently, subjects’ Moral Foundations scores are measured through the use of the Moral Foundations metric—the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ), which is either a 30-item questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011) or a 32-item questionnaire (Haidt, 2012a), both of which are divided into two sections denoting, respectively, whether a subject believes a certain value is relevant in their moral decision-making, and whether an action is moral or immoral.

Absent from most of the analyses above, however, are populists and libertarians. Direct research on populists’ psychological motivations is nearly non-existent. Research explicitly on people who qualify as populists—economically liberal social conservatives, by one definition (Johnston, 2011)—has found that they are somewhat similar to conservatives in their responses to uncertainty (p. 89), but the dearth of literature, and lack of agreement on definitions means that dispositional traits of populists remain very much unexplored.

Meanwhile, scholars exploring libertarians tend to conclude that they constitute a functionally different group from conservatives and liberals based on all of the above factors. When separated into cultural and economic conservatism, Crowson (2009a) finds

⁶ It is worth noting that the modern trend in the Moral Foundations scholarship is to conceptualize this dimension as *authority/subversion* instead (Graham et al., 2013, p. 60).

that several of the motivations above—specifically Dogmatism, NFCC, NFC, NE, fear of death, and RWA—only have an impact on cultural conservatism, and not economic conservatism, the latter of which is essentially one of the two sides of libertarianism (Lester, 1994).

The idea that libertarians would have relatively low—especially when compared to conservatives—existential motivation is not a new idea (Tetlock et al., 2000), but the degree to which libertarians are actually a motivationally and psychologically unique group is a fairly new area of research, albeit one grounded in the well-discussed philosophical idea of libertarians having a penchant for neoliberal economics coupled with the Old Enlightenment idea of conscious rationality above all else, including emotion and empathy (Lakoff, 2008, p. 51).

Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, and Haidt (2012) were likely the first to define libertarians from the quasi-motivational perspective akin to that of Jost et al. (2003a). The authors eventually come to paint libertarians as rationalist individualists at their core. Libertarians tend to have the lowest—relative to conservatives and liberals—average totals for the five Moral Foundations, leading them to formulate two additional quasi-Foundations: Economic liberty and Lifestyle liberty; libertarians had the highest relative scores on both of these dimensions (Iyer et al., 2012). This leads Haidt (2012b) and Graham et al. (2013) to formulate the *actual* sixth Moral Foundation: Liberty/Oppression. Although other scholars have found libertarians to value the individualizing foundations more than conservatives (Weber & Federico, 2013), the general result of the Moral Foundations analyses—libertarians' *lower general scores* on Moral Foundations questionnaires—still remains.

Additionally, when compared to conservatives and liberals, libertarians were shown to have high NFC scores, and—as also demonstrated, albeit indirectly, by Crowson (2009a) and Tetlock et al. (2000)—low psychological reactance and, again, existential motivation. They also exhibit more utilitarian, less emotional responses to moral dilemmas (Iyer et al., 2012). Along those rationalist lines, libertarians also have a less emotional, more reason-based cognitive style in general, with high scores in systematizing, low scores in empathy (Baron-Cohen, 2009; Baron-Cohen, Richler, Bisarya, Gurunathan, & Wheelwright, 2003), and general rejection of the use of emotion in political decision-making (Lakoff, 2008, p. 88). Recent studies have taken this research to heart and actually excluded people who self-identify as libertarians from their analyses of conservatives (Okdie, Rempala, & Garvey, 2013).

In spite of the fact that my lens of political attitudes would suggest that populists are simple the opposite of libertarians, the complexities of ideologies confound such a suggestion. Like conservatives and liberals (Conover & Feldman, 1981), libertarians and populists are not clean inverses. Some hypotheses can be made, however, if populists are assumed to be socially conservative, as some have done (Johnston, 2011). But, government intervention in social affairs is not limited to social conservatism, as others may support government *funding* of, for example, abortion, instead of a total lack of government involvement. Again, populists are a tricky lot.

At any rate, all of the above factors lie largely outside of the realm of conscious control. While, of course, subjects can simply lie on the prompts designed to gauge their levels of the respective psychological factors, this is not much of a worry, as, for the most

part, the metrics for the factors above come across as abstract enough to avoid those potential issues, especially given the fact that they all tend to use batteries and respective post-hoc score calculations.

2.1.2. The Cognitive Drivers of Political Attitudes

An additional set of factors, meanwhile, has resulted from work in cognitive psychology, with specific foci on the dynamics of cognitive complexity, cognitive functions, cognitive rigidity, and cognitive ability. The greater relative objectivity of the tools used to measure these dynamics—which, in the cases of those factors, consist of *behavioral tasks* in which participants *do something* instead of simply indicating what they *believe* to be their opinions, attitudes, or responses to prompts—sets them apart from the psychological factors of the previous section, which, again, are typically measured by simple questionnaires, and potentially subject to conscious and non-conscious biases.

Cognitive Complexity: Although treated as a simple psychological factor in Jost et al.'s (2003a) meta-analysis, cognitive complexity—also called “integrative complexity”—as defined herein is different from the psychological factors listed in the previous section by its more direct involvement in non-conscious factors and, subsequently, by virtue of the methods by which it is measured. Instead of being a simple psychological factor, it is a matter of the degree of complexity and, essentially, *sophistication* of thoughts and cognitions, and thus, it is often measured with tasks in which participants to complete certain tasks that require complexity of thought—such as tasks that require a person to avoid static problem-solving patterns in order to answer a multi-step math equation (Rokeach, 1948) or word problems (Crano & Schroder,

1967)—or with content analyses of, for example, speeches and interviews (Conway et al., 2012; Fiske, Kinder, & Larter, 1983; Fiske, Lau, & Smith, 1990; Gruenfeld, 1995; Tetlock, 1983; 1984; Tetlock, Bernzweig, & Gallant, 1985).

The concept of cognitive complexity itself can be divided into two variables: *Differentiation*, or the variety of “characteristics or dimensions” of problems over which people cogitate when confronting an issue (Van Hiel, Onraet, & De Pauw, 2010, p. 1770), with low degrees of differentiation elemental to good-bad, black-white thinking, and high degrees of differentiation elemental to considering issues from multiple perspectives (p. 1771); and *integration*, or the degree to which someone identifies the characteristics of an issue that have been differentiated as either independent and simple or synergistic and multifaceted, low and high integration respectively (p. 1771). In other words, a person with a high degree of differentiation and integration is first able to acknowledge the many different, “often contradictory” aspects of political attitudes, and the magnitude to which those aspects may be connected (Tetlock, 1986, p. 819).

Typically, general political conservatism has been shown to have a negative correlation with cognitive complexity in a variety of contexts (Hinze, Doster, & Joe, 1997; Jost et al., 2003a), while liberalism’s relationship with greater ease in deviating from habitual cognitive responses often leads scholars to conclude that liberals are more cognitively complex, or at least better-suited to deal with complex information and stimuli (Amodio, Jost, Master, & Yee, 2007; Jost, Krochik, Gaucher, & Hennes, 2009). However, scholars have also demonstrated that economic conservatism—that is, economic libertarianism—correlates *positively* with the same cognitive sophistication measurements (Crowson, 2009a). Still, in all of the above cases, political sophistication

plays a role, and politically sophisticated people tend to have higher cognitive complexity (Fiske et al., 1983; Fiske et al., 1990), as do, on occasion, political extremists (Sidanius, 1984; 1988; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2003). So, the degree to which cognitive complexity is truly related to ideology is, at the very least, impacted in part by political sophistication.

Cognitive Functions: As defined here, I am referring to the application of specific types and direct outputs of cognition, and, in this case, primarily include research related to attention in cognition. Research that uses “gaze-cuing” experiments to influence the direction in which participants will point their eyes generally find that liberals are more easily influenced by experimental gaze cues than conservatives, who were essentially unaffected by the cues (Dodd, Hibbing, & Smith, 2011). This makes sense in light of conservatives’ regular espousal of the values of personal autonomy and individualism (p. 27), but it should be noted that other work has shown conservatives can, indeed, be affected by gaze cues, albeit only when the cue comes from other conservatives (Liuzza et al., 2011).

Other research that focuses on visual attention has found additional differences between conservatives and liberals. In another experiment in which eye movement is tracked—in this case, while participants view collages of positive/appetitive and negative/aversive images—it was demonstrated that, while every participant tended to focus more on aversive images than appetitive images, conservatives spent *more* time than liberals dwelling on those aversive images (Dodd et al., 2012). Negative and generally threatening stimuli are regularly shown to have a greater set of attentional effects on conservatives than liberals (Carraro, Castelli, & Macchiella, 2011; Joel,

Burton, & Plaks, 2014; Jost et al., 2007; Shook & Clay, 2011; Shook & Fazio, 2009), especially when factoring in authoritarianism (Lavine, Lodge, Polichak, & Taber, 2002).

Cognitive Rigidity: Also treated as a psychological variable and “widely” measured with survey instruments (Schultz & Searleman, 2002, p. 171), I am referring here to its strictly objectively-measured definition. Treating it like a psychological survey-measured factor renders it vulnerable to the problems with self-reported responses, and measuring it with surveys is a fairly indirect metric, essentially measuring a sibling of IA, NFCC, and openness to experience (p. 172). At any rate, strictly *cognitive* cognitive rigidity relates to the degree to which a person’s mental and behavioral patterns and expectations persevere (p. 170). For Ionescu (2012), it is executive functioning and other factors of cognition that interact with context, sensorimotor mechanisms, and general cognition in a person’s development that drive and shape cognitive rigidity (p. 195).

Developed from the aforementioned work of Adorno et al. (1950) is the “rigidity of the right” hypothesis (see Tetlock, 1984), which postulates that conservatives interpret the world around them rigidly, dichotomously, and laden with simplicity and, consequently, simple values in order to provide for a sense of order in an ambiguous, chaotic, or threatening world (Gruenfeld, 1995, p. 6; Tetlock, 1984, p. 365). This is due to the very nature of conservatism and the non-conscious factors that drive it (Chirumbolo & Leone, 2008, p. 1286). For those high in cognitive rigidity, the world is dichotomous—good or evil; black or white—which fits with the academically-emerging typification of conservatives and liberals into “absolutists” and “contextualists” respectively (Alford, Funk, & Hibbing, 2005), in which absolutists see the world as a

world of good-versus-evil and moral absolutes and contextualists see the world as with a postmodern sensibility, dependent on an array of contexts (Napier & Jost, 2008).

Generally, objective cognitive rigidity tasks reveal that conservatives tend to be more cognitively rigid than liberals and moderates, while liberals tend to be more cognitively flexible than conservatives (Amodio et al., 2007). This logically follows from the finding that the ethnocentric and prejudicial attitudes that often constitute politically conservative attitudes are strongly related to cognitive rigidity (Rokeach, 1948; Johnson et al., 2011; Sidanius, 1985). Still, the findings are not universal, as it is possible to experimentally induce rigidity for liberals as well (Crawford, 2012).

Cognitive Ability: This research serves to demonstrate individual and group differences in larger *abilities* within people's intellectual systems and behaviors, with an obvious connection between cognitive ability research and cognitive complexity research—that is, cognitive ability and cognitive complexity are generally positively correlated (Heaven, Ciarrochi, & Leeson, 2011). A connection between cognitive ability and intelligence can and has been made as well, and research has demonstrated links between political attitudes, sophistication, intelligence, and cognitive ability (Luskin, 1990; Stankov, 2009).

Among the first researchers to point toward cognitive ability as a possible driver of general political orientations—in this case, authoritarianism—were Wilson and Patterson (1968), who contended that the evidence available at the time suggested that the current understanding of general authoritarianism was a product of “ignorance and confusion” (p. 264)—that is, decreased cognitive ability. Since then, others have demonstrated similar findings, with general conservatism and composite sets of

conservative attitudes correlating negatively with cognitive ability (Hodson & Busseri, 2012; McCourt, Bouchard, Lykken, Tellegen, & Keyes, 1999; Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson, & Chamberlin, 2002; Stankov, 2009; Van Hiel et al., 2010), effort-of-thought (Eidelman, Crandall, Goodman, & Blanchar, 2012), and intelligence (Heaven et al., 2011; Lapsley & Enright, 1979; McCourt et al., 1999).

It is very important to note that these findings do *not* indicate conservative inferiority—intellectually or evolutionarily. Aside from the fact that cognitive ability research typically operationalizes cognitive ability with regard to various educational outputs and the possible liberal, anti-conservative indoctrination therein (Heaven et al., 2011; Van Hiel et al., 2010, p. 1772; Woodley, 2011)—meaning that these ability studies are *possibly* biased against those without a liberal, culturally-sophisticated education—heightened cognitive ability is not necessarily a good thing. High cognitive ability does *not* lead to a more accomplished, effective, fulfilling, or meaningful life, and, according to some scholars, often does the opposite (Kanazawa, 2012). As one example, the novelty-seeking behavior that corresponds to higher supposed “intelligence” leads them to use drugs relatively more often than others, and, subsequently, be harmed by those drugs (Kanazawa, 2012). As another example, the highest scorers on intelligence tests in men who try out for the National Football League may actually be *less* likely to be successful than average-scorers due to high-scorers’ higher likelihood to read *too much* into the opposing side’s play schemes and react discordantly with the *actual* scheme (Lyons, Hoffman, & Michel, 2009).

I will not be using measures of supposed cognitive ability and/or intelligence as individual difference variables in this dissertation. I bring up the topic of cognitive

abilities as a way of illustrating a debate in the literature—meaning that this topic is not settled—and as a way of staying objective and presenting the most complete picture possible. While *thinking through* certain ideas *may* lead some people toward increased attitudinal congruence—but only under certain conditions, for certain people, for certain attitude structures (Judd & Downing, 1990)—and while it is certainly *possible* that heightened intellect leads to heightened likelihood to “think something through,” that has not been shown to be the case in the scholarship. Dedicating the time and cognitive energy to think about the large, big-picture ideas and logic behind different policy positions will not necessarily drive attitudinal congruence for everyone (Lavine, 1994). In other words, attitudinal congruence is not a product of any conceptualization of larger cognitive ability and/or intelligence.

Still, the fact that the construct of “intelligence,” as many academics define it, is not indicative of any kind of real superiority is in spite of the very ironic fact that many conservatives and libertarians—for example, David Brooks (2012), David Weigel (2010), Charles Koch (see Moore, 2006), Ralph Reed (see Donovan, 2013), and the Heritage Foundation (see Drezner, 2013)—are quick to use the assertions of some writers (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994) who claim that there are what equate to interracial genetic differences in intelligence, measured primarily with IQ tests. These writers go on to recommend that policies should be implemented that are in accordance with this notion and that subsequently directly and indirectly favor the more supposedly “intelligent” races and do *not* provide for the “unintelligent” races (see Murray, 1984)—recommendations that were thought to be taken to heart by the Reagan administration in their cuts to federal social welfare programs (“Losing more ground,” 1985). Claims of

legitimate intelligence differences between races are false (see Dahl, 1976; Eisenberg & Richmond, 1997; Weinstein, 1997), let alone the fact that IQ tests are not legitimate measures of intelligence, however intelligence may be defined (Hampshire, Highfield, Parkin, & Owen, 2012). On top of that, the notion that intelligence of any scholarly definition is a product of genes alone—or even a product of genes to any meaningful degree—without regard for environmental and educational context is categorically false on innumerable orders of magnitude (Chabris et al., 2012).

So, irony aside, and fortunately for those conservatives in the previous paragraph, even though some conservatives may, *perhaps*, be likely to have lower relative cognitive abilities than liberals, this should not itself lead to differences in congruence between the two, since, in indirect studies of ability and congruence (Judd & Downing, 1990; Lavine, 1994), the impact of cognitive ability on attitudinal congruence has been shown to be marginal at best. Moreover, cognitive ability and intelligence have not been shown to be indirectly reflective of an increased ability or increased drive to be congruent or understand congruence. Therefore, the observation that conservatives reject the notion that they are inconsistent in their values and that liberals accept it (Critcher et al., 2009) is not indicative of differences in cognitive ability or intelligence.

2.1.3. Synthesis of These Political Attitude Drivers

In some ways, this dissertation and many other dissertations are exercises in cognitive complexity and the practice of analyzing research and synthesizing and integrating those analyses together to form a larger, interconnected picture. Accordingly,

it is necessary and important that the interrelationships of the variety of factors listed in the previous two sections be more fully elucidated.

A series of conceptual overlaps should be immediately apparent in reading about the factors above, an idea that has not been lost on scholars: for example, Eckhardt (1991) asserted that conservatism, authoritarianism, and Dogmatism are quite similar—definitionally congruent, if you will—in that they represent similar constructs across different contexts, like affect, behavior, cognition, and ideology (pp. 98-99).

One method of organizing the psychological factors is by categorizing them based on whether they relate to *epistemic* or *existential* factors, as done by recent scholarship (Jost et al., 2003a; Jost, Ledgerwood, & Hardin, 2008; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; 2013), with epistemic factors primarily relating to the *certainty* of different types and aspects of knowledge, and existential factors primarily relating to fear, threat, and survival. In other words, epistemic factors drive people's motivation to seek certainty and avoid uncertainty in a threatening and ambiguous world, while existential factors drive the general behavior that leads to survival therein (Jost et al., 2003a, p. 351).


Alternatively, it is possible to organize the factors as they relate to *motivation* in terms of knowledge, consistency, self-worth, and social approval (Briñol & Petty, 2005). Although, such a designation does require that some factors fit into more than one motivational lens—for example, NFCC is driven by a motivation for knowledge *and* a motivation for consistency (p. 577). So, the most effective arrangement of these factors may be with the epistemic/existential lens while also factoring the motivational components therein.

Of the dispositional factors listed above, epistemic psychological factors, then, include Dogmatism, IA, NFCC, NFS, NFC, PFC, IU, and NE; existential factors include fear of loss and mortality salience. For Jost et al. (2003a) and similar research, it is the higher-than-average need for both epistemic and existential factors that drive conservatism. Note again the two components of conservatism and how they are relevant in these considerations: the connection of epistemic needs to change-resistance, the connection of existential needs to inequality-acceptance, and the overlaps and interrelationships of all of the above together and with cognitive rigidity as well, is clear.

More than anything, due to the factors that drive it, conservatism is about uncertainty, fear, and the interaction of the two (Jost et al., 2007). Accordingly, then, some people may *identify* as liberals when they have high NFCC, meaning that they may actually *be* conservative—and, consequently, more attitudinally incongruent, if conservative attitudes are, by definition, more incongruent—because of epistemic motivations outweighing their symbolic identity (Federico et al., 2012).

In any case, there are several important overlaps between the epistemic factors that are worth noting (see Figure 2.1): NFC and Dogmatism are negatively correlated (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982); NFCC is positively correlated with Dogmatism and IA (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994); IA and IU are strongly correlated (Grenier et al., 2005); NE and NFC have a moderate positive correlation (Tormala & Petty, 2001); NFS is strongly positively correlated with NFCC and IA (Leone, Wallace, & Modglin, 1999; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994); NFS is positively correlated with Dogmatism (Leone et al., 1999; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994); IA and Dogmatism are strongly correlated (Feather, 1969); Dogmatism and NFCC are both associated with

Christian fundamentalism (Altemeyer, 2002; Brandt & Reyna, 2010); and, finally, Dogmatism and PFC are likely to be correlated, since the Dogmatism metric's focus on double-think suggests that Dogmatism and PFC are measuring different parts of the same construct—in fact, Feather (1969) seemed to postulate the existence of a PFC-like construct in noting Dogmatism's sibling-like role in the manifestation of the construct (p. 245).



Moreover, although they are measured with simple and not-fully-objective surveys and questionnaires, the aforementioned factors of NFC and NFCC fit into a more cognitive lens of attitude-drivers in a few key ways. For example, with liberals' greater relative levels of NFC, the more detailed and complex manner in which many liberals process information helps to elucidate their decision-making patterns—especially with regard to the finding that liberals will avoid stereotypes and, instead, form more effortful opinions, most notably on social and cultural issues like gay rights (Stone, West, Jost, &

Rule, 2013). To that end, libertarians' high NFC scores (Crowson, 2009a) may explain their socially liberal attitudes, like their general support of gay rights (Iyer et al., 2012).

In terms of existential factors, general fear is enough of a driver of conservatism that simply using an experiment to, essentially, threaten liberals drives them to be more conservative (Nail et al., 2009). An analogous effect is observed when instilling threat-of-disease in an experiment, as it drives people to be more conformist (Murray & Schaller, 2012)—a common trait of those high in RWA (Altemeyer, 1998).

Along those lines, the role of the DPM and its sub-factors of RWA and SDO in those epistemic and existential factors is less clear, however, which led Jost et al. (2003a) to include RWA and SDO in a different category of motivations—that of *ideological* motivations. However, as noted above, RWA's relationship with change-resistance and SDO's relationship with inequality-acceptance provide roots for the DPM in epistemic and existential factors—in addition to RWA's moderator role in NFCC's relationship with ideology (Chirumbolo, 2002)—again, an idea not lost on recent research (Feldman & Johnston, 2014). So, ideological motivations overlap with epistemic and existential factors—as evidenced by the fact that Dogmatism is occasionally treated as an ideological variable itself, because of its large overlap with RWA and items almost explicitly related to ideology (Crowson, 2009b; Van Hiel et al., 2010)—just as epistemic and existential factors overlap to a degree themselves.

The attitudes of people high in RWA show some additional interesting interactive effects with other factors; for example, RWA mediates NFCC's effects on conservatism and prejudicial attitudes (Van Hiel, Pandelaere, & Duriez, 2004). Additionally, the fact that conservatives' greater relative levels of NFCC and NFS likely drive their rigid and

inflexible thinking (Barrett et al., 2005) makes sense especially in light of work showing the positive interrelatedness of RWA, Dogmatism, IA, NFCC, NFS, and cognitive rigidity (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993)—although, interestingly, RWA and NFS are only associated for men, not women (Kimmelmeier, 2010). Moreover, the negative relationship between a desire for punishing wrongdoers—punitiveness, which has at least some roots within RWA (see Tam, Leung, & Chiu, 2008, p. 79)—and Openness strengthens when factoring in RWA (Colémont, Van Hiel, & Cornelis, 2011).

Moral Foundations, meanwhile, seem to be manifested in people's attitudes through a structural relationship with DPM, with RWA's relationship with the *binding* foundations and SDO's relationship with the *individualizing* foundations being key drivers of attitudes (Federico et al., 2013). Subsequently, then, this figurative interactional spiderweb has a role to play in the formation and locomotion of attitudinal congruence and incongruence.

Incorporating cognitive factors into this larger synthesis, then—aside from the aforementioned connections between all four sets of cognitive factors—there exist several important associations.

Cognitive complexity and cognitive rigidity have an obvious connection to the factors that contribute to aspects of the absolutist, black-and-white worldview—for example, Dogmatism, IA, NFCC, NE, and IU—and this is especially important in discerning a larger picture of conservatives. Dogmatism's link to rigidity especially is a notion not lost on scholars (Rokeach, 1960, p. 67; cited by Jost et al., 2003a, p. 346). Additionally, the IA subscales of Need for Certainty and Uniformity are positively

correlated with several measures of cognitive rigidity (Sidanius, 1985). At any rate, conceiving of conservatives and liberals as absolutists and contextualists respectively is a helpful lens in exploring their epistemic-related cognitive and psychological roots.

It may be that those cognitive differences between conservatives and liberals drive their differential absolutist or contextualist worldviews respectively (see Hibbing, Smith, & Alford, 2013). Absolutist tendencies could ostensibly blind conservatives to the notion of shades of gray, while contextualist tendencies may blind liberals to outliers, extremes, and legitimate evils in the world that do, in fact, pose a danger to others (see Zimbardo, 2007). Although one study demonstrated that absolutist thinking is not a reflection of even negligible degrees of RWA subscales, still within the realm of conservative thought was the study's finding that social-Darwinist economic conservatism—especially SDO—and support for aggressive foreign policy and torture were related to the absolutist worldview of “pure evil” existing in the world (Webster & Saucier, 2013).

Meanwhile, in terms of existential factors, the fact that *threat* is associated with reduced cognitive resources and, subsequently, reduced cognitive abilities (Mogg, Mathews, Bird, & MacGregor-Morris, 1990; Preston, Buchanan, Stansfield, & Bechara, 2007), may partially explain conservatives' lower relative scores on cognitive ability tasks (Thórisdóttir & Jost, 2011). Coupled with that notion, because of their high NFCC, NFS, and cognitive rigidity, conservatives' tendency to “seize and freeze” on information may leave them seizing on *incorrect* information at a higher rate than other groups (Peterson, Duncan, & Pang, 2002; Schaller et al., 1997), leaving their scores on cognitive ability tasks—which, again, may just be testing a combination of knowledge and cultural

sophistication and not actual ability (Heaven et al., 2011; Woodley, 2011)—lower as a result.

In line with this, Thórisdóttir and Jost (2011) point to conservatives' greater relative need to reduce uncertainty and semi-subsequently higher closed-mindedness as being a factor that drives—or is possibly driven *by*—the cognitive differences between conservatives and other groups. Still, the degree to which threat affects attitudes, as well as the cognitive mechanisms through which it does so, depends on the *type* of threat—that is, whether the threat originates in the private life of a person or in the external world—and the level of RWA and SDO within the person (Cohrs & Ibler, 2009; Onraet, Van Hiel, Dhont, & Pattyn, 2013). Conservatives with high RWA, then—so, *most* political conservatives in America (Altemeyer, 1981; 1998)—may be *better suited* than others to handle internal stress, as RWA could serve as an emotional buffer against distress (Van Hiel & De Clercq, 2009). Although, meta-analyses reveal that a right-wing orientation itself is *not* enough to, simply, drive a positive well-being (Onraet, Van Hiel, & Dhont, 2013).

Nevertheless, this all sharpens the picture somewhat to distinguish conservatives from liberals—both in terms of (1) epistemic motivations, in line with the absolutist-contextualist dimensionality; and in terms of (2) existential motivations, in line with threat and fear's dimensional effects on attitude formation in non-conscious systems. It is not a coincidence that this picture has two dimensions—they correspond quite well to the modular viewpoint of Jost et al. (2003a) that was foreshadowed in Chapter 1 (see Figure 1.3). It cannot be overstated, then, that the simplest, most parsimonious method of exploring the underlying roots of differences between different ideologies is Jost et al.'s

(2003a) two-pronged approach. Conservatives' orientation toward societal stability and social hierarchy "reflects and reinforces" their motivation toward structure, obedience, and duty in the world around them; while liberals' orientation toward equality and social change "reflects and reinforces" their motivation toward curiosity, openness, novelty, and defiance (Carney et al., 2008, p. 817).

This conceptualization of the ideologies' underpinnings is exemplified in research on the differences in *tastes* and *preferences* of conservatives and liberals (e.g., Carney et al., 2008; Gillies & Campbell, 1985; Glasgow, Cartier, & Wilson; 1985; Ruch & Hehl, 1986; Wilson, 1990; Wilson, Ausman, & Mathews, 1973), most studies of which generally find that conservatives are oriented toward structure, familiarity, and certainty, while liberals are relatively more accepting of and even preferential toward ambiguity, new sensations, and a lack of structure. Nowhere is this relationship clearer than in analyses demonstrating, respectively, conservatives' high preference and liberals' low preference for the following elements: representational, as opposed to abstract, paintings (Wilson et al., 1973); poetry that rhymes, as opposed to non-rhyming free-verse (Gillies & Campbell, 1985); and humor in which "incongruous" elements of a joke are resolved, as opposed to absurdism and non-sequiturs (Ruch & Hehl, 1986; Wilson, 1990).

Anecdotally, but as a more specific illustration, I have noticed that my conservative friends tend to abhor the endings of recent films of the Coen brothers—such as 2007's *No Country for Old Men* (Coen, Coen, & Rudin, 2007), and 2009's *A Serious Man* (Coen & Coen, 2009)—in which there is no character resolution, and in which the story ends essentially mid-sentence; my liberal friends, meanwhile, are much more tolerant of and, in some cases, somewhat confusingly *satisfied* with a purposefully *unsatisfying* ending.

This general effect is robust enough to suggest that, in some experimental or analytical contexts, those characteristics can serve as decent stand-ins for those underpinnings and deeper traits—especially if analyzing data that do not include batteries.

Nonetheless, even though conservatives seem to reject the idea of potential quality in humor in which incongruence *remains*—meaning that they seek and prefer jokes in which incongruence is alleviated, instead of jokes that stay ambiguous and up in the air—they, like liberals, *remain incongruent in their attitudes*. They prefer congruence and structure in how they are entertained, in how they have their time occupied, and, more generally, in the world around them, but this preference does not seem to extend to their personal politics, which are rife with incongruities. Why this is the case is a product of the dispositional traits that are associated with a person being politically conservative, and likely *drive* a person to be conservative. This notion edges closer to understanding why people have incongruent attitudes in the first place.

These orientation motivations are much less clear for libertarians and populists, although recent research has produced a few results of note. Iyer et al. (2012) found that libertarians, especially when compared to conservatives, have the highest overall scores on the Cognitive Reflection Task—a task that essentially requires higher-order thinking, or at least the rejection of initial, incorrect thinking, to solve questions (Frederick, 2005). Populists, meanwhile, seem to be among the least politically sophisticated, and the most epistemically motivated (Johnston, 2011)—although, again, the literature on populists is

quite sparse. Drawing synthetic conclusions about these groups, then, is an impossible task, given the relative lack of empirical work.

Still, all of the above psychological and cognitive factors are listed because it is important to provide as full of a picture as possible of what we know about what drives our politics—although, a large number of more strictly biological factors also play a large role, but they will be fully explored in Chapter 6.

At any rate, this summary of many of the non-conscious factors behind attitudes and ideology serves as groundwork for the central framework of this dissertation, described in the following section.

2.2.1. The Internal-External Model of Attitudinal Congruence & Incongruence

The fact that a number of psychological and cognitive factors have been shown to drive political attitudes directly and indirectly obviously suggests that those underlying factors will also drive attitudinal congruence and incongruence and the recognition, or lack of recognition thereof. On top of that, the fact that conservatism and conservative attitudes seem to be more directly linked to epistemic and existential factors than liberalism and liberal attitudes are serves to inform the rest of this dissertation's vision.

But, political attitudes are not the product of these factors alone; they are still subject to variety of *relatively* more conscious and controllable traits as well, such as symbolic ideology, party identification, elite cues, education, and historico-political context (Campbell et al., 1960; Cohen, 2003; Kinder & Sears, 1985; Sniderman & Citrin, 1971; Zaller, 1992)—each of which has been studied for upwards of a century in the

discipline (Sniderman & Citrin, 1971, p. 402), and each of which is still largely non-conscious, or at least *affected* to a large degree by non-conscious effects.

In a now-classic flyover investigation of the vast literature on the origins of political attitudes, Kinder and Sears (1985) note that political attitudes “are, in the first place, badges of social membership,” entailing personal allegiances, but are reflective of additional characteristics of individuals’ social lives, including one’s ethnicity, religiosity, gender, and occupation (p. 682).


Then again, scholars have long known that the ultimate “roots” of most Americans’ attitudes and ideologies are far from the product of logical deduction alone, or even a moderate amount of the time (Kinder & Sears, 1985, p. 671), thereby lending support to the non-logical, non-conscious psychological and cognitive forces of attitude formation. As the authors famously noted in a clause that inspired the title of this dissertation, “Americans are not creatures of coherent, wide-ranging ideologies” (p. 682); rather, six large conceptual actuators with varying degrees of respective influence from conscious and non-conscious forces provide for perhaps the best understanding of from where attitude structures originate (p. 671): (1) self-interest, (2) group identification, (3) leadership of elites, (4) personal values, (5) personality, and (6) historical context and inferences. Although, it must be noted that even those more environmentally- and societally-based—as opposed to psychologically- or cognition-based—sources, **are also subject to non-conscious effects**: the degree to which a person may be affected by cues and leadership from political elites will depend on their feelings toward those elites and the elites of the other “side,” their ability to absorb and process those cues, and their internal sense of logic and political knowledge that constrains everything else, and *vice*

versa (see Jost et al., 2009, p. 316). As explained by Jost et al. (2009), there are bottom-up processes that are often the focus of psychologists and top-down processes that are often the focus of political scientists (p. 314), and these processes overlap and interact (see Jost, 2009). This echoes the transposed theses of Sniderman and Citrin (1971), who noted that political attitudes were reflective of “personal motives and inner needs” and express “economic self-interest or reference group identifications” (p. 402).

In other words, there are more *internally-rooted*, non-conscious factors that quite nearly always come from within an individual, and more *externally-rooted*, *still mostly non-conscious* but, at the very least, relatively *more controllable* factors that either *can* come from outside of an individual or do come from outside of an individual and may *interact with* factors that come from within. Internal and external factors drive attitude structures—and, subsequently, attitudinal incongruence—independently *and* in tandem with one another. Therefore, to best answer my central questions of what drives attitudinal incongruence, and, eventually, how and why it is generally *and* specifically manifested in different ideologies—questions also asked by Jost et al. (2009) when they wrote of a need for future work to explain why specific “constellations” of attitudes come together into congruent and incongruent packages (p. 328)—it is necessary to put forth a framework that incorporates this internal-external divide.

Therefore, I offer a simplified model that categorizes the drivers of political attitudes as either **internal** or **external**. I entitle this framework the **Internal-External Model of Attitudinal Congruence and Incongruence** (IEM) (see Figure 2.2). **Internal** factors include epistemic, existential, and cognitive—and biological (see Chapter 6)—variables; **external** factors include social, environmental, logical, and *some* relational

variables, *including* ideological identification but *not including* RWA or SDO, which I deem to be internal due to (1) their abstract and post-hoc nature, and (2) the fact that they are *almost strictly* non-conscious measurements (Altemeyer, 1981; 1998; Duckitt, 2001; Jost & Banaji, 1994; see Zschau, 2010, pp. 170-171). Identification—in spite of the fact that it *is* heavily non-conscious (Jost et al., 2009, p. 323)—is not *always* a direct and pure psychological motivation, and *can be* and often *is* affected by outside cues (Cohen, 2003). Identifying as one ideology or another is closer to non-consciousness on an axis of non-consciousness-to-consciousness (see Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2013, p. 241), but it is on an axis nonetheless, and it is a matter of interpersonal interaction (pp. 240-242), unlike the factors I have operationalized as internal.



Most simply put, the IEM is a framework through which the potential origins of attitudes can be viewed and analyzed in terms of the extents to which attitudes originate in, and/or are driven by *internal* factors or *external* factors. The IEM is able to take individual factors and sets of factors and utilize them to explore the direct or indirect role

they have in driving incongruent attitudes. It serves as an essential analogue of Jost et al.'s (2009) top-down/bottom-up model, the aforementioned up-and-coming model of attitude formation (see Verhulst, Hatemi, & Eaves, 2012), but with both a greater focus on congruence of attitudes and an extension of what, exactly, is entailed in both ostensible “sides” of the model.

In other words, the full model of Jost et al. (2009) is extendable. Although briefly mentioned in their 2009 piece, in 2013, they more fully elucidated their model as potentially three-tiered, consisting of the aforementioned epistemic and existential motivations in addition to a third set of motivations known as “relational motivations” (pp. 240-242)—that is, the motivations that lead one to belong to a group and follow what that group does (see Cohen, 2003; Zaller, 1992), or the aforementioned “badge of social membership” described by Kinder and Sears (1985, p. 685)—that drive a socially constructed “discursive superstructure” and a psychologically-based “motivational substructure” (p. 233). While including social pressures and social identity in a separate category of motivations makes a great deal of sense—as they are, indeed, subject to non-conscious effects to essentially the same degree as internal factors (Malka & Lelkes, 2010)—as noted above, in the IEM I include some of those relational motivations within a category along with environmental (that is, *more conscious*) variables for the following reasons: (1) parsimony, and the subsequent ease of the scientific desideratum of falsifiability therein (Popper, 1959, p. 142); (2) a greater ease of analysis of attitudinal incongruence; and (3) the fact that the factors considered internal are almost entirely non-conscious, especially when comparing them to the factors that are *more* relational and *more* subject to conscious control.

But still, classifying factors as internal or external is, admittedly, a glaring and confusing misnomer, and not just because of the dichotomy's either/or format that oversimplifies the nature of the human psyche and subsequent human behavior (see Zschau, 2010, p. 143; p. 290). On top of that, as mentioned, the external factors included in the model consist of factors that are, to a large extent, also non-conscious and uncontrolled; and by the nature of research involving survey responses—that is, research *not* involving cognitive tasks and tests—the internal factors that survey research attempts to measure are, by *their* nature, subject to *some* degree of consciousness and conscious output (see Smith, Oxley, et al., 2011, p. 382).

What, then, sets the factors apart? What makes the internal-external descriptors worth using in spite of the flaws?


The clues to the distinction's utility lie in this chapter's synthesis of the psychological factors underlying ideologies and attitudes and the research described therein. The primary assumption is that the factors (e.g., epistemic and existential factors) I am operationalizing as ***internal are almost entirely non-conscious and non-controlled***. While the exact percentage of non-consciousness versus consciousness is currently unknown, what *is* known is that internal factors are very deeply-rooted and **directly** reflective, predictive, and impactful of underlying personality and—at this point in empirical history—irreducible psychological traits and orientations at an individual level (see Jost et al., 2013, p. 235). Moreover, they are remarkably stable over time (Ludeke & Krueger, 2013).

The factors I operationalize as *external*, on the other hand, vary between being deeply rooted (e.g., ideological identification, see Alford et al., 2005) and being fairly

controllable (e.g., economic self-interest, see Kinder & Sears, 1985). But, they share the fact that they are, at most, *indirectly* reflective of, predictive of, and impactful on underlying traits and orientations. To illustrate, even though identifying with an ideology is heavily automatic in origin, it is still not *as* innate and unchanging as the personality and psychological traits that a person holds through much of their life (see Mondak, 2010; Verhulst et al., 2012). On top of that, ideological identity changes over time at a higher (albeit still fairly low) rate than psychological factors (Jennings, 1992), along with the (albeit indirectly) subsequent attitudes that are informed by the identity.

Therefore, the division between internal and external factors is predicated on the *degree* to which the factors are or are not *directly* reflective of processes and motivations that are deep-seated and automatic: the most directly reflective factors are internal, the most indirectly reflective are external. The division is admittedly imperfect, yes, as some external factors, for example, are more automatic than others. But, the intention of the division itself is not as a true dichotomy with mutually exclusive sides, but rather as the model and framework that can best elucidate attitudinal incongruence because of attitudes'—and the subsequent incongruities therefrom—origins in processes that are bottom-up and top-down in nature. Figure 2.3 better illustrates the overarching and somewhat confusing distinction paradigm: the near-solely internal factors of epistemic and existential motivations, along with the factors in the DPM (RWA and SDO), are included *only within the person*; and relational motivations and social identity effects—even though they are within a figurative area of higher levels of non-consciousness (the green circle)—lie outside of the *head* of the person.

Moreover, the model avoids an assumption of human free will, a subject of ongoing and prickly debate in cognitive and social psychology (Baumeister & Monroe, 2014). I make *no* assumptions regarding whether or not an individual makes logical deductions regarding, for example, their rationalistic individual desires. Awareness and consciousness are not upon what the model's division is founded—although the ways in which awareness and consciousness *interact* with the model and its assumptions is a mechanism that is necessary to explore in order to better explain the central ideas of this dissertation, and *will*, therefore, be explored in a cognitive dissonance experiment in Chapter 5.



Nevertheless, I am not the first to propose an overall model of the origins of political attitudes. Over time, the focus has gone from attitudes formulating as a result of rational, logical deduction (Downs, 1957; Key, 1966), to socialization (Campbell et al., 1960), to the aforementioned psychological factors (Jost et al., 2003a), to genetics (Alford et al., 2005; Hatemi et al., 2011). None before me, however, have attempted to model attitude origins in such a way that also permitted and fostered the analysis of attitudinal congruence.

The “dual-processing model” of Lodge and Taber (2013) *seems* to be related to the IEM. Not to be confused with the dual-process RWA-SDO-conglomeration model discussed earlier (see section 2.1.1), their model—also referred to as the “John Q. Public” model—incorporates notions of different types of cognition, both conscious and non-conscious, and how they affect the way a person will evaluate different targets and, subsequently, rationalize those evaluations. However, the model’s general inability to describe differential potential *drivers* of attitudes means that it is unsuitable as a way of elucidating attitudinal congruence and incongruence.

Additionally, the “Cognitive-Social Theory” of Lavine and Latané (1996) also appears to be a counterpart to the IEM, as it is a model for predicting or theorizing human behavior based on different sets of factors. The authors formulated their theory to elucidate the interrelationship between cognitive and social processes and, accordingly, describe how individuals will “bundle” sets of issues—potentially contradictory issues, for example—together because of public opinion, which is itself informed by individuals’ bundling. Cognitive and social processes, according to the theory, reinforce each other mutually (Popham, 2008, p. 39), and will likely lead to an increase in attitudinal congruence by virtue of people *wanting* to be congruent (Lavine & Latané, 1996, p. 55).

At first glance, this framework seems to be almost analogous to the IEM. But, the congruence to which it alludes is not automatically based on *objective* congruence; rather, it is a product of what public opinion suggests and what individuals believe, neither of which are not necessarily rooted in objectivity or logic (Converse, 1964). Moreover, while the Cognitive-Social Theory is worthwhile in explaining the *interaction* between widespread social identity and individual social identity, especially with regard to public

opinion on abortion and the death penalty (Popham, 2008), and the way this interaction happens over time—as explained by Jost et al. (2003b), incongruities in attitudes inevitably accumulate over time, after all (p. 387)—it does not have the potential to explain attitude origins, much less how those origins will drive attitudinal congruence or incongruence. The IEM, meanwhile, has the potential to do so, without operating under an assumption that people will not only figure out when they *are* incongruent, but that they will *want* to be congruent.

Accordingly, Converse (1964) asserted that people have incongruent and contradictory attitudes because a healthy majority of people simply do not have *meaningful* attitudes or beliefs (p. 245). However, I believe this paints an incomplete picture. Aside from the fact that this contention does not address *why* the percentage of people with meaningful attitudes was so low—and in addition to the fact that subsequent research and polling has obviously demonstrated that people *have* attitudes nonetheless (Conover & Feldman, 1981; Feldman, 2003; Kerlinger, 1984; Knight, 1985; 1999)—scholarly work has shown that most people’s attitudes may not be stable or loyal, but they *are* “meaningful and interpretable” (Jost, 2006, p. 656). Converse’s (1964) argument, then, does not lend itself as a functional model of attitudes. Therefore, the IEM operates under the assumption that people’s political attitudes are, at the very least, meaningful.

One way to conceptualize the characteristics of the IEM is by thinking of it as an analogue to Smith, Oxley, et al.’s (2011) elegant conceptualization of the connection between genetic factors and political attitudes (see p. 372). The authors envision a one-directional step-by-step flowing chain of stages that ultimately go on to inform political attitudes. The stages are listed as follows in chronological order, relatively speaking: (1)

genetics, (2) biological systems, (3) cognition, (4) personality and values, (5) ideology, and (6) issue attitudes; steps (2) through (6) are impacted by the environment around a person. Certainly, (1) through (4) are undoubtedly internal factors by my definitions, and the overarching effect of the environment—on (2) through (6)—constitutes an external factor. What, then, of (5), which Smith, Oxley, et al. go on to define (p. 373) as consisting of a series of preferences (e.g., for religion, occupation, social organization, etc.)? It is at this stage, due to the “preferences” classification and inclusion of factors I have demonstrated to be significantly more indirectly reflective of underlying processes than earlier stages that I would consider the items in stage 5 to be external factors. On top of that, the fact that the preferences in this stage also entail some relational motivations (e.g., preferences for bedrock issues of social organization), the category which Jost et al. (2013) consider to be more in the realm of top-down processes (p. 241), is further reinforcement for considering these stage 5 factors to be external—although **I do acknowledge the messiness of the idea**, and will note as much throughout this dissertation’s analytical and experimental operationalizations of the IEM.

2.2.2. Asymmetric Application of the Internal-External Model by Ideology

How the IEM drives attitudinal congruence differentially and asymmetrically by ideology due to the very nature of the primary American ideologies informs the central theory and overarching subsequent hypotheses of this dissertation. Because conservatism, liberalism—and, for that matter, libertarianism and populism—are themselves driven by a wide variety of differing factors in differing degrees from both the internal and external

sides of the IEM (see section 2.1.3), it should be apparent that the IEM will *push* each ideology's attitudes—and thus, each ideology's attitudinal incongruities—differently.

My central theory, then, is that *internal* factors will drive *conservatism's* incongruities to a greater degree than *liberalism's* incongruities.⁷ Libertarianism and populism, meanwhile, by their very definitions, lack any meaningful degree of incongruence—however, the negligible quantities of incongruities within libertarianism and populism will vary in their origins based on the specific type of incongruence; that is, incongruities in socially conservative and economically liberal directions will be associated with internal factors, while socially liberal and economically conservative incongruences will be associated with external factors. Therefore, the ideologies in order of descending influence of internal factors on incongruence are conservatism, liberalism, and then tied together, libertarianism and populism.


Put *more* simply, I theorize that the effect *tends toward* the following:

conservatives are incongruent because of **internalities** and **liberals** are incongruent because of **externalities** (see Figure 2.3). The effect is, as pictured, non-absolute—I do not expect conservatives' attitudes to be *completely* driven by internal factors, nor do I expect liberals' attitudes to be *completely* driven by external factors. I refer here to likelihoods; not pure determinations, and certainly not universals—really, the only universal in social science, let alone political psychology, is that there are no universals.

The derivation of this theoretical framework is relatively straightforward. The social authoritarianism and system justification that are so strongly intertwined with

⁷ The terminology I will be using to refer to these ideas is that of my “central theory” as a result of the strong theoretical backbone, off-shooting hypotheses, and ability to be falsified. I do not mean to use the term to compare it to more legitimately empirical theories (e.g., gravity, natural selection, relativity), but, instead, as a descriptor that is interchangeable with “theoretical framework.”

modern conservatism are the product of internal, purely non-conscious factors likely more than anything else (Hennes et al., 2012)—primarily those factors included in the aforementioned epistemic and existential motivations. Research has continuously demonstrated a stronger relative effect of *these* internal, non-conscious factors on conservatism when compared to liberalism, with conservatism being driven more strongly than liberalism by epistemic and existential factors like NFCC, MS, and IA (Jost et al., 2003a). Moreover, conservatives' general attentional biases toward negative stimuli (see Hibbing, Smith, & Alford, 2014) *remain* even when controlling for other factors—for example, NFCC—that may otherwise orient attention (Carraro et al., 2011), which suggests a greater impact of internal forces: there is something deeper, even biological within a conservative political orientation and mindset, farther outside of consciousness, that drives a bias toward, among other things, negative stimuli and, subsequently, conservative attitudes (see Dodd et al., 2011; 2012).



Therefore, the internal dispositional factors that drive conservatism and conservative attitudes will *also* drive attitudinal incongruities by the very nature of conservatism, its non-conscious drivers, and its more *internally-driven* general nature (see Abramowitz, 1973; Gootnick, 1974; Gurin, Gurin, & Morrison, 1978; Sweetser, 2014). Conservatives' higher relative amount of, to use one example, IA, coupled with their lower relative degree of cognitive complexity, should—and, according to my theory, *does*—lead them to (1) possess a simpler, black-and-white view of the world; (2) possess simpler, black-and-white attitudes about how the world should be; and (3) simply avoid thinking about how their attitudes may be incongruent. Importantly, this mechanism happens *in spite of the fact* that conservatives *desire* congruence in their world.

The inverse effect is expected for liberals. Even though *low* scores on the dispositional trait batteries that predict conservatism often predict liberalism, it is not necessarily a matter of liberalism being negatively driven by, to use the above example, IA—although that *is* the case when comparing liberals' reactions to ambiguous or conflicting information to conservatives' (Amodio et al., 2007), and, hence, why I do not hypothesize this effect to be uniform. Rather, I expect that, especially when compared to conservatives, liberals' attitudinal incongruities are *more readily* informed by external factors than they are by internal factors, which is consistent with the notion that liberalism is not a strict inverse of conservatism, but rather a negligibly-overlapping factor not mechanistically unlike conservatism (Choma et al., 2012; Conover & Feldman, 1981).

Put more simply, I expect that predicting attitudinal incongruence with psychological and other internal traits will be more powerful for conservatives than

liberals, while predicting incongruence with societal and other more external traits will be more powerful for liberals than conservatives.

Moreover, I expect that these external factors inform attitudes through mostly non-conscious mechanisms, but I choose to remain agnostic on the exact differential magnitudes of consciousness involved in internal versus external factors, outside of contending that, again, *external factors are less non-conscious than internal factors*. At this point in research history, and with the tools I have available to me, consciousness is too difficult of a construct to explore adequately (see Gawronski, Hofmann, & Wilbur, 2006). It may suffice to note that some previous work has *instilled* conscious awareness of political attitudes in subjects, finding that when moderately politically sophisticated subjects are asked to simply take a moment to **think about** different *pairs*—albeit, not larger structural “constellations” (Jost et al., 2009, p. 328)—of specific political attitudes, and *then* indicate their attitudes, the congruence of those two attitudes is higher than it would be when compared to people who do not ruminate (Judd & Downing, 1990; Lavine et al., 1997). Although, again, it must be noted that no significant rumination effect was observed for people who were not politically sophisticated.

Nevertheless, I will refrain from making broad claims of consciousness with regard to ideologically asymmetrical rates of attitudinal congruence, and the potential origins thereof, outside of noting, again, that the many *internal* factors are always and strictly non-conscious, while the many *external* factors are subject to non-conscious effects and, *potentially*, conscious thought as well.

Soaring over and impacting all of the above is the direction of research exploring the relationship between political orientations and the driving forces within a person’s

life—defined as the *locus of control* (see Abramowitz, 1973; Gootnick, 1974; Rotter, 1966; Sweetser, 2014). This research has found that liberals tend to view their lives and the rest of the world as more externally-driven; that is, subject to forces beyond their own actions—for example, fate, chance, and society (Rotter, 1966, p. 11). Conservatives, on the other hand, tend to view their lives and the rest of the world as more internally-driven; that is, subject to their direct actions more than anything else—for example, effort, initiative, and drive, as opposed to laziness and ignorance (p. 12).

I hypothesize that the viewpoints held by these ideological adherents are accurate, but only with regard to their own actions and attitudes. The hypothesized accuracy is in spite of the generally poor job that people do in directly indicating objective traits about themselves (Kruger & Dunning, 1999; 2002), as opposed to the decent job that people do responding to psychological survey batteries, which are thought to be measuring an abstract trait and doing so accurately in spite of survey research’s constraints (see Smith, Oxley, et al., 2011, p. 382). Rather, I believe the respondents in these cases are correct due to their underlying root traits, especially those obviously related to SDO—the belief in the degree to which the world is a “competitive jungle,” most notably (Altemeyer, 1998). Due to the fact that conservatives tend to have a belief in a dog-eat-dog world in which one must only work hard to get ahead, and that only those who do not work hard enough tend to be the ones who fall behind (Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002; Federico et al., 2009), conservatives’ point of view here of how they view their place in the world is reflective of what makes them who they are as people. In other words, according to their thinking, since conservatives’ success in life is dictated more than anything else—the key divider here, compared to liberals—by *their* individual initiative and *not* by societal

constraints or prejudices, this is one of many attributes that defines them at a deeper level, especially relative to liberals. That is one of the key aspects of my central theory, and why the IEM would necessitate the theoretical framework of ideological asymmetry with regard to internal and external factors' impacts on incongruence.

This chapter's epigraph quotes an anonymous acquaintance—which came about in a discussion of my research interests and him pointing to his own attitudinal incongruities—and it is anecdotally illustrative of this multifaceted process, and reflective of the hypothesized ideological differentiation I seek to demonstrate. This acquaintance, a strong conservative and dyed-in-the-wool Republican identifier, notes his evident awareness of his religious identification and religiosity affecting his lack of congruent attitudes. *In his estimation*, were he not raised as a strong *social*-traditionalist Catholic—albeit without regard to the Catholic Church's history of objectively populist economic teachings (see Ross, Lelkes, & Russell, 2012, p. 3621)—with all of the assumed attitudinal and behavioral attributes that come internally and externally with that upbringing (see Donahue, 1985), his moral philosophy would consist of nihilism that would, in turn, drive libertarian politics. Thus, in my hypothesized modeling of this mechanism, for him, internal drivers of attitudes and behaviors are stronger than whatever external drivers there may be; although he notes that it is his identity that shapes his philosophical outlooks, I hypothesize that it is the internal underpinnings of *that identity* playing the largest role. If he were a liberal, it would be identification as the stronger force driving his attitudinal incongruence.

The case could be made, of course, that his awareness of his incongruities contradicts my central hypothesis. However, I make no hypotheses about broad consciousness of incongruence *per se*, but rather the origins and drivers of incongruence itself. An implication of the IEM is, of course, that consciousness plays *less* of a role for conservatives than liberals; but, in my acquaintance's case, his awareness serves as somewhat of an exception that also supports my point: libertarianism *would be* his orientation if he did not have a system of strong internal drivers toward conservatism and its respective incongruities.

As a further illustration, in an interview with ReasonTV, conservative political commentator Tucker Carlson said, "I have libertarian instincts, but I also have all kinds of views that are in conflict with one another...there is a place where theory bumps up against reality. I'm not sure what that place is" (see Moynihan, 2010). The same mechanism as my conservative acquaintance is evident, with Carlson—a strongly religious Christian (see Olasky, 2013)—noting a theoretical *theory-versus-reality* conflict in his own rooted-in-"libertarian-instincts" views, out of which his religiosity emerges the figurative victor.

My central theory will be tested in this dissertation in two primary ways.

The first method is with analyses of survey data that not only contain issue attitudes—and, through the use of post-hoc calculations, incongruence scores—and ideological identification, but also, in several contexts, dispositional trait batteries. The degree to which certain psychological traits are, at the very least, associated with—if not directly having some type of effect on—incongruence scores can then be calculated. This

method will be used in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 in particular, but also indirectly in Chapter 5.

The second method uses a common cognitive dissonance research procedure to elucidate differential *reactions* to the attitudinal incongruence. With this design, participants will be forced to confront the idea that their attitudes are, essentially, hypocritical, and either accept or reject the idea. Chapter 5 uses this method, and also collects dispositional trait data to provide a more complete picture of the participants and, other than political orientation, what could be having an effect on their reaction to their own and others' incongruence.

The final chapter of this dissertation brings together all of the above. I conclude by pointing out that attitudinal incongruence can not only be an individually philosophical and normative *positive*—and, thus, not a good way of trying to undermine political opponents—but can actually be a good thing for American politics because it is (1) reflective of millennia-old mechanisms that are ***necessary for a civilization to thrive***; (2) a way for people to better understand how they, and others, feel about the larger idea of *government*; and (3) often necessary in making the most effective, pragmatic, and helpful political decisions in spite of the logical constraints of other attitudes. Although, of course, this is not a universal conclusion.

CHAPTER 3

GAY IS THE NEW BLACK (BUT BLACK IS STILL BLACK):

THE HISTORY OF AND CURRENT TRENDS IN ATTITUDINAL INCONGRUENCE

I wish most sincerely there was not a slave in the province. It always appeared a most iniquitous scheme to me—fight ourselves for what we are daily robbing and plundering from those who have as good a right freedom as we have.

—Abigail Adams, 1774 (Butterfield, 1963, pp. 161-162)

As a nation, we began by declaring that “*all men are created equal.*” We now practically read it “all men are created equal, *except negroes.*” When the Know-Nothings get control, it will read “all men are created equal, except negroes, and *foreigners, and Catholics.*” When it comes to this I should prefer immigrating to some country where they make no pretense of loving liberty—to Russia, for instance, where despotism can be taken pure, and without the base alloy of hypocrisy.

—Abraham Lincoln, 1855 (Basler, 1953, p. 323)

3.1.1. Introduction

There is no shortage of examples of attitudinal incongruence in American politics, and it may as well be a physical law of the American politics discipline—akin to the laws of thermodynamics in physics—that there never *will be* a shortage. In presenting a brief overview of attitudinal incongruence in the last several decades in America—already

nearly impossible to do, as evidenced by the amount of scholarship about short periods in American politics (e.g., White, 1965), let alone entire centuries (e.g., Kabaservice, 2012)—choosing a small number of examples is therefore a difficult task. I will focus primarily on three time periods for the ways in which they exemplify some of the central tenets of attitudinal incongruence: (1) the Sixties, (2) the Eighties, and, (3) as of this writing, the *current* era of the late-Twenty-Augths and early-Twenty-Tens.

I provide this anecdotal and illustrative overview of incongruence in different political periods because of the importance of grounding this topic in the comparatively “real” world outside of the world of strict academic and empirical research. Being able to tie the central theoretical constructs and hypotheses of this dissertation to applications within political and social landscapes reflects the strength of those constructs, lends support or opposition to those hypotheses, and serves to exemplify essentially abstract conceptualizations and frameworks in societal contexts. Moreover, in demonstrating how incongruence has, at least from this superficial and anecdotal standpoint, been reflected along the same societal dimensions, I am thereby demonstrating the pervasive, inescapable nature of wielding incongruent attitudes in American politics.

The following chapter will provide a quantitative attitudinal analysis of the electorate in different political eras, and explain the implications of the findings for the larger academic picture of attitudinal incongruence. Eventually, I make the case that the surviving-and-thriving of attitudinal incongruence is a temporal manifestation of what drives attitudes and constrains or does *not* constrain them.

Perhaps the best way to conceive of this chapter and the following one is with a metaphor: for ideologues—and everyone else really—attitudinal incongruence is the *oni*

of Japanese folklore: An unsettling ghost creature that indefatigably follows and often torments its victims (see Reider, 2003), but may ultimately prove to be benign, or may even provide positive salvation (e.g., Publick & Hammer, 2006). The role of the *oni* here, however, varies by year and by ideology.

3.1.2. Conservatism and Conservatives in the Early Sixties: Fission and *Fusion*

I begin with the Nineteen-Sixties because the decade represents, among many other ideas, a robust turning point in American political history. The half-century between then and the writing of this dissertation may, at first glance, appear to be arbitrary. But the Sixties era—in particular, the 1964 Presidential Election—serves as perhaps the most exemplary of any era of this common quirk of political ideology: that of attitudinal incongruence. And, the way in which the quirk is exemplified is largely manifested through issues related to race. It is race-related issues that I hope to demonstrate are keys to the ways in which attitudinal incongruence has reached the status it has today.

In the Presidential Election of 1964, the people who would likely call themselves “liberal” today (see Ellis & Stimson, 2009)—that is, the economic populists who, at the time (but not for long), tended to devote most of their attention to issues of economics—voted primarily for Democrats and the Democratic President Lyndon Johnson (Field & Anderson, 1969; White & Stuart, 1966). This was in spite of the fact that much of the electorate resisted the self-label of liberal, considered Johnson and the Democratic Party to *be* solidly liberal, and considered themselves to be conservatives instead (Field &

Anderson, 1969, p. 393).⁸ In post-mortem research of the election (viz., Converse, Clausen, & Miller, 1965; Field & Anderson, 1969), scholars make regular references to the ideological *wings* of the two major parties, especially in the Republican Party, in which the amount of in-fighting in the lead-up to the national convention between the hawkish conservative-libertarianism of U. S. Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona and the liberal moderation of Governor Nelson Rockefeller of New York was metaphorically visible from outer space (Donaldson, 2003, p. 62), and made a large contribution to Johnson's eventual electoral landslide (see Field & Anderson, 1969). This in-fighting serves to epitomize—albeit anecdotally—my central ideas and the IEM in this section.

Rockefeller preached anti-communism and supported the invasion of Vietnam (White & Stuart, 1966), but he was otherwise lacking in anything resembling a coherently conservative—by any historical or modern definition (see section 1.2.2)—belief system, at times even being indistinguishable from Democrats (Kabaservice, 2012, p. 84), leading upwards of 40% of his primary voters to vote for Johnson over Goldwater in the general election (Converse et al., 1965, p. 326). He was a Sixties Republican moderate, and in a number of ways, a strong social liberal (Donaldson, 2003, p. 63). He was attitudinally incongruent, however, in an oft-repeated way for conservatives since that era (see also section 3.2.1) in that, on the economic issues for which he did *not* have a liberal stance—so, aside from his support of federal welfare, education, and housing programs, and civil rights laws (Donaldson, 2003, p. 63)—he was a moderate economic

⁸ As a side note that foreshadows the current state of the primary ideologies in America today (see section 3.2.2), the dynamic ideological mix in those who ultimately voted for Johnson was undoubtedly *more* mixed than it is today for national elections (Ellis & Stimson, 2009, p. 397), because ideological heterogeneity of that magnitude was, even at that point, an exception to long-observed voting trends. The exception in that case was primarily a result of the poor campaigning and image management of Goldwater, his campaign, and the Republican Party that followed (see Field & Anderson, 1969, p. 393).

libertarian, a set of beliefs that historians have attributed to his personal wealth (Kabaservice, 2012, p. 84). It seems to be the case, then, that the—by my framework—external factors associated with his bank account drove his incongruence. Considering the fact that, today, the bulk of his policy platform would unquestionably align him with the Democratic Party and qualify him as a liberal (Donaldson, 2003, p. 63)—*not* coincidentally like his recent office-holding nephew, U. S. Senator Jay Rockefeller of West Virginia, a liberal Democrat (Bonica, 2013a)—his reliance on external factors for his attitudes lends at least anecdotal support to my central hypothesis that liberals will rely more heavily on external factors than internal factors in the formation of their attitudes.

Goldwater, while incongruent with respect to his domestic libertarianism and militaristic hawkishness, had his stark libertarianism and coldly rationalist states’ -rights congruence reflected in his opposition to federal civil rights laws (White, 1965; White & Stuart, 1966), even though he was personally opposed to segregation and racism in practice (Cohen, Goldwater, & Anderson, 2006). Nevertheless, upwards of a majority of Goldwater’s support came from people—exemplified by anti-Black, pro-segregation political leaders like Governor George Wallace of Alabama—who opposed civil rights laws because of personal prejudices and racism, perhaps illustrated most explicitly by their near-success at the Republican state convention in California in adding to the Party Platform a resolution to “send Negroes back to Africa” (Kabaservice, 2012, p. 118).

In other words, outside of the philosophical discrepancy between his domestic and foreign policy platforms, Goldwater and his supporters were congruent, but for different reasons. As postulated by my central theory, because what drove many, if not most

conservative supporters of Goldwater was likely deep-seated racism (Ansell, 1997, p. 10; Kabaservice, 2012, p. 118), their attitudes—and their subsequent inter-attitudinal *congruities*, in this case—were driven indirectly by internal processes that have an indirect result of being manifested in their political beliefs.

Again, recall that, in my model, the mechanism in which attitudes *do or do not* fit logically together is a by-product of the relationship between internal or external factors and attitude structures—conservatives are more internally-driven; liberals are more externally-driven. Conservatives' drive is generally epitomized by their inconsistent support for government involvement in that they tend to want a small economic government but large social and military government; some sort of dissonant cognition is taking place in which they do not recognize—consciously or not—the inconsistency in claiming the virtues of a small government while, at the same time, proclaiming the need for the government to prohibit an array of behaviors and spend somewhat exorbitantly on militarism.

For the many anti-Black, pro-segregation supporters of Goldwater, economic issues were not central to their cause, although they were still important. Their focus was, instead, laser-sighted on issues of race, leading large percentages of supporters of the segregationist and Democrat George Wallace—who attempted an insurgent campaign against Johnson—to become Goldwater supporters and, thus, Republican voters in 1964 (Rohler, 2004, p. 40).

Unbeknownst at the time, this change foreshadowed an upcoming movement in the South and, ultimately, the so-called “Southern Strategy” that capitalized on those sentiments (Carmines & Stimson, 1989, p. 54; Knuckey, 2005, p. 10)—although, this

association did not have sizably tangible traction until the following presidential election (see section 3.1.3).

While this movement simmered, conservative writers made it known that they were aware of the apparent conflict within their ideology, making the case that the traditionalist conservatism strand and libertarian conservatism strand should, at their cores, co-exist and thrive together—an idea known as “fusionism” (Edwards, 2007). Contrary to my lens of attitudinal congruence, the two strands, according to Frank Meyer and William Buckley (pp. 2-3)—the framers of modern American conservatism (Gross, Medvetz, & Russell, 2011, p. 331)—actually fit logically together as a result of those writers’ understanding of the conservative political philosophy: socially traditional institutions, they contended, must be preserved in order to maximize the virile potential of the free market (Edwards, 2007, p. 3). More cynically, but still accurately, fusionism was an electoral necessity: it served as an infrastructural unifier carefully organized and argued in order to appeal to nationalist and anti-communist sensibilities that were, at least at that time, present in both strands of conservatism within the electorate (Gross et al., 2011, p. 331; Kabaservice, 2012, p. 26).

Nevertheless, in a 2009 speech to the conservative Hudson Institute, Republican Representative Paul Ryan of Wisconsin explained it thusly,

A “libertarian” who wants limited government should embrace the means to his freedom: thriving mediating institutions that create the moral preconditions for economic markets and choice. A “social issues” conservative with a zeal for righteousness should insist on a free market economy to supply the material needs for families, schools, and churches that inspire moral and spiritual life. In a nutshell, the notion of separating the social from the economic issues is a false choice. They stem from the same root. (Ryan, 2009, para. 27)

Fusionism rests on the notion that the supreme value of the free market is hand-in-hand with the supreme value of conservative Christian morality. Although, it should be noted that some libertarians (e.g., Welch & Gillespie, 2012)—who, consequently, tend to be *non-nationalist*—explicitly reject this argument, asserting that the government must be consistent in how it practices the coercion central to most conceptualizations of ancient and modern political philosophy (see Williamson, 1970), *and* how it intervenes in markets; otherwise, to those libertarians, the free market is not, in fact, free.

But, regardless of its libertarian critics, the mere existence of the Fusionist school of thought is evidence of a long-running train of cognition within American politics. The topic of attitudinal incongruence is, thus, not a new idea, and serves to exemplify my central ideas remarkably well. For conservatives, it does so directly; for liberals, however, the exemplification is more indirect, and a matter of comparison.

3.1.3. Ideologies in the Late Sixties: *War has Caused Unrest*⁹

The liberals of the *early* Sixties utilized electoral strategy quite successfully on a national level. Later in the decade, two huge issues shaped essentially everything else (Converse, Miller, Rusk, & Wolfe, 1969, p. 1086): (1) the Vietnam War, the media coverage of which moved a portion of the window of public thought to the abject horrors of the war and a subsequently less militaristic and less hawkish mass foreign policy platform (p. 1085); and (2) race, which was primarily—though not completely—localized as the most important issue for individuals in the South (p. 1101).

With regard to the war, it was a mere *one* policy position—supporting or opposing a continued military presence in Vietnam—that characterized the first steep

⁹ For an insightful overview, see Whitfield and Strong (1970).

divide between Democratic Party factions. Lyndon Johnson, the man the public saw as instigating the war, (p. 1085), declined pursuing re-election in 1968, leaving Vice President Hubert Humphrey to haphazardly pick up the pieces of Johnson's campaign apparatus and, albeit reluctantly and somewhat ignorantly—having been kept out of the loop until the same time as the public (White, 1969, p. 7)—run, at least initially, on a steadfast-but-begrudging pro-military platform (Rivkin & Stuart, 1969).

Capitalizing on the public's growing anti-war sentiments—let alone the anti-war sentiments of the liberal *contingent* of the public, which, since then, has continued to be a fairly resolute policy position of liberals (Button, Grant, Hannah, & Ross, 1993, p. 232)—were U. S. Senator Robert Kennedy of New York and U. S. Senator Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota, until the June, 1968, assassination of Kennedy, at which point the sentiments were, figuratively and clinically,¹⁰ depressed (White, 1969, p. 233). When it was clear that Humphrey would be the nominee, the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago infamously became a site of anti-war protests and violence, and opposition to Humphrey—in spite of the fact that he came to endorse a withdrawal policy (Rivkin & Stuart, 1969), but only after a long period of public vacillation (Kinder & Sears, 1985, p. 663)—stayed firm, likely driving the election of Richard Nixon (see Converse et al., 1969).

The rifts in the Democratic Party following the 1968 election mirrored the rifts in the Republican Party in 1964 and thereafter; although, the Democrats' rifts were not the product of the singular policy of Vietnam as they had once been and, for the first time in its history, the Democratic Party was actually approaching a deeper ideology (White, 1969, p. 62). Rather, social issues—primarily those related to race—began to further the

¹⁰ The latter type of depression is vividly captured in real-time by Rivkin and Stuart (1969).

larger divide (Converse et al., 1969). This was especially apparent in anti-Black southerners, who occupied a fluid ground between the two major parties, and eventually grew to vote without much attention paid to the populist economic issues that actually sustained many of them—for example, agriculture subsidies and unionized labor (p. 1091)—thus, driving a plateful of incongruence. Instead, they largely voted for the big issue that caught their attention—race—and the candidate who most readily reflected their ideas about that issue—conservative Democrat George Wallace (p. 1087).

It is Wallace who perhaps best characterizes the theme of these years and the theme's applicability to this dissertation. As Governor of Alabama, Wallace exemplified some of what has come to be known as modern liberalism—at the *state* level—in his support for and implementation of “heavy appropriations” for schools, hospitals, infrastructure, and Social Security (White, 1969, p. 344), although Wallace argued against implementing those appropriations at the federal level (Carter, 2000, p. 352). Wallace was also a major-league, old-fashioned racist (Carter, 2000).

Hence, it is because of this *prejudiced state-level progressivism*—the state-level progressivism was irrelevant in the minds of most of his supporters because of the overarching importance of segregation to them (Carter, 2000, p. 370), so it was mostly just the “prejudiced” part—exhibited by Wallace that many have argued that, if Wallace did not “southernize” American politics *himself*, he at least anticipated the process, given the success of his campaign in gathering support (p. 466), chiefly by nurturing voters’ “deep discontents” of minorities (p. 370). His success was in spite of objectively poor campaign organization and infrastructure, which was astutely noted by Wallace himself, who stated that it was not until he stopped “talking about school and highways and prisons and

taxes,” and “began talking about [N-words]” that he was able to garner mass support (Carter, 2000, p. 109).

On top and because of the stark cultural shifts of the late Sixties (see White, 1969, pp. 54-55), the conservative ideology gained adherents and identifiers as a result of individuals’ anti-Black concerns outweighing most other concerns (Gross et al., 2011, pp. 336-338), particularly in the South. In fact, some scholars (e.g., Edsall, 1992) bluntly assert and empirically demonstrate that the observed growth of self-identified conservatives in the South was *almost entirely* because of racism (see Gross et al., 2011, p. 335). Wallace served as a catalyst. From his campaign, a new ideological strand materialized in the electorate that was predicated on prejudice. Thus, given their emphasis on *what they deemed to be* traditionalism and traditional morality, and their somewhat hazy support for a mixture of libertarian economic policies that would follow, most of the adherents to that strand qualified as what could be considered modern-day conservatives.

Therefore, the conservatism and liberalism that emerged from the late Sixties served as ostensible templates of conservatism and liberalism as they are known today. The percentage of centrist conservatives and Rockefeller Republicans in the electorate began to decrease as more trickled over to modern substantive liberalism as time went on (Pfeffer, 2012, p. 16), while the inverse effect was true for conservative and/or Southern Democrats (Gross et al., 2011, p. 334; Schiffer, 2000). As illustratively explained in a review by Kousser (2010), conservatives’ eventual successes were the result of “making segregated appeals—racist grits for the lower white orders and economic prime rib for their betters” (p. 371).

Likely as at least a partial result of these appeals, the growth in conservatism was faster and stronger than the growth in liberalism. Again, liberalism as a political belief system was not as limited to one party as it is today (Field & Anderson, 1969); as noted earlier, the platform of Republican Nelson Rockefeller would qualify as solidly liberal by modern definitions (Donaldson, 2003, p. 63). America's two major political parties have certainly changed dramatically since the late Sixties, but the respective *substances* of America's two major political *ideologies* have *not* changed to nearly the same degree (Ellis & Stimson, 2009). Conservatism has largely remained a steadfast mixture of the two major strands and their subsequent fusionist synthesis, and liberalism a solution of what is colloquially considered to be *progressivism*—expansive civil rights, norms of broad social equality, and Keynesian economic policies. In other words, according to one conservative elite, “the bitter fruit of liberalism” consists solely of societally “destructive” policies that are, at all levels, “anti-family, anti-religion, and devoid of respect for traditional values” (Weyrich, 1982, p. 52).

Two ideas characterize these notions. The first is the previously-noted division between Humphrey Democrats and Wallace Democrats, perhaps best characterized by White (1969) as

a symbiotic relationship between the Humphrey campaign and the Wallace campaign—for if Humphrey preached Trust, Wallace preached Distrust; when one gained, the other faltered....There were any number of ways to approach this strange relationship. The cruelest way was to strip the euphemisms and get down to the naked issue of race and hate (pp. 362-363).

In fact, the October prior to the election saw Humphrey telling a rally in Detroit, “Let's lay it on the line: George Wallace's pitch is racism” (White, 1969, p. 363). In other words, the divide in the Democratic Party and the creation of its ideological core—and

the incongruities that would follow—came because of a split over issues explicitly related to race, and the elites knew that this was the case.

The second illustrative idea, and more to the point, is that the shift in presidential nominees for the Democratic Party from 1968 to 1972 was quite evocative of the crystallization of liberalism (and its subsequent incongruities) that would follow in subsequent decades: 1968's cautious progressive Humphrey was supplanted in 1972 by objectively-unrealistic idealist populist-liberal U. S. Senator George McGovern of South Dakota, who somewhat incomprehensibly responded to charges that he was “too far left” with only the word “nuts” (“McGovern lashes out,” 1972; see Kabaservice, 2012, p. 332). Quite astutely, soon-to-be-reelected President Richard Nixon privately stated on Election Day in 1972 that what McGovern did to the Democratic Party was akin to what Goldwater did to the Republican Party (White, 1973), with the thrashing of Goldwater even among conservatives in the electorate immediately observed by scholars (Field & Anderson, 1969, p. 393). The supplantation of more liberals and liberalism in the Democratic Party would, nevertheless, take some time.

In any case, the heterogeneousness of America's ideologies that was apparent at the beginning of the Sixties entered the following decades more homogeneous than before—the separation between conservatives and liberals became clearer.

3.1.4. The Branching of Ideological Strands in the Eighties

In a 1975 interview with libertarian magazine *Reason*, Ronald Reagan was famously quoted as saying,

If you analyze it I believe the very heart and soul of conservatism is libertarianism. I think conservatism is really a misnomer just as liberalism is a

misnomer for the liberals—if we were back in the days of the Revolution, so-called conservatives today would be the Liberals and the liberals would be the Tories. The basis of conservatism is a desire for less government interference or less centralized authority or more individual freedom and this is a pretty general description also of what libertarianism is. (Klausner, 1975, para. 7)

That passage has been used a vast number of times by American conservatives in making their case for conservatism *actually being* libertarianism (e.g., Kibbe, 2014, pp. 217-218), even among conservatives for whom “libertarianism” is far from an apt substantive-ideological descriptor (see Gillespie, 2013). Even more problematically for the conservatives above, Reagan continues on to note that, although conservatism and libertarianism “are travelling the same path,” his belief system is a matter of “shades,” not a black-and-white, absolutist worldview, stating,

Now, I can't say that I will agree with all the things that the present group who call themselves Libertarians in the sense of a Party say, because I think that like in any political movement there are shades, and there are libertarians who are almost over at the point of wanting no government at all or anarchy. I believe there are legitimate government functions. There is a legitimate need in an orderly society for some government to maintain freedom or we will have tyranny by individuals. The strongest man on the block will run the neighborhood. We have government to insure that we don't each one of us have to carry a club to defend ourselves. (Klausner, 1975, para. 8)

All of this is exemplary of two central theoretical ideas in studies of American conservatism, and the central constructs of this dissertation.

First, many conservatives utilize only the first passage—as an example of a saint of modern American conservatism (see Pew Research Center, 2014a, p. 36) stating that other conservatives should believe that there is no need for government outside of an extremely limited one—and *ignore* the sentiment of the quote that literally *immediately* follows the first and quite vividly contextualizes and qualifies the absolutist language therein. This dichotomy is reflective of an oft-observed ignorance and confusion among

most people who are politically involved, but *especially* among conservatives. Research has demonstrated that, although liberals are guilty of it as well, conservatives appear to be *more likely* than liberals to resist new facts and new science when it does not comport with their pre-existing beliefs (Liu & Ditto, 2013; Mooney, 2012; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010); although, it should be made clear that this asymmetry is not a normatively negative notion—cognitively steadfastness has a meaningfully large magnitude of utility in human behavior (see Eidelman & Crandall, 2014, pp. 94-95; cf. Nam, Jost, & Van Bavel, 2013, p. 7).

Second, for Reagan himself *and* those who admire Reagan and use the first quote in explicating their political philosophy, the quotation demonstrates incongruence with Reagan's tenure as president, in spite of his regular *espousal* of limited government and economic conservatism (see Valentino & Sears, 2005, p. 673). During his presidency, especially his second term—to the chagrin of many libertarians (e.g., Samples, 2010)—he oversaw somewhat dramatic increases of the federal government's size and involvement in many areas (Huang & McDonnell, 1997; Shull & Shaw, 2004), most notably in areas related to national defense (see Eckhardt, 1991; Glad, 1983), and cultural issues like abortion rights (Green & Guth, 1989, p. 42). Both of these were key issue areas for Evangelical conservatives and close to their hearts—but, especially in the case of abortion rights, not at first.

Religious conservatives and Christian leaders were initially indifferent or even in favor of abortion rights following, and even in the years *leading up to* the 1973 *Roe v. Wade* decision (Balmer, 2007, pp. 12-14). It was only upon refining the message and realizing the *massive* get-out-the-vote power of the issue in 1980 and the few years

leading up to it that conservative elites took the issue on as a *centerpiece* to campaigns at nearly all levels (p. 10). It was this realization that gave rise to one of the key incongruities in today's American conservatism, and perhaps the most classically-used example of attitudinal incongruence that is exhibited by a vast majority of Republicans and conservatives, most of whom regularly ring the bell of small government.

Ironically, but still in accordance with work in epistemic motivations (see Chapter 2), research has demonstrated that people who are the most solidly anti-abortion—that is, opposed to abortion rights in all or most circumstances—have a more rigid, black-and-white, dogmatic, and “monolithic” style of cognition (Stets & Leik, 1993, p. 280). Abortion is among the most important political issues for them, and everything else falls by the wayside when voting and responding to surveys. The objectively high degree of attitudinal incongruence that they and other Evangelical *laissez-faire* conservatives have makes sense, then: they are politically motivated by abortion and other cultural issues, not by economic conservatism—demonstrated by the fact that they actually vary to a moderate, but comparatively large extent in their economic attitudes when asked about economic issues (Olson & Carroll, 1992). However, they still overwhelmingly vote for, qualify as, and identify as conservatives (Johnson & Tamney, 2001, p. 234)—in spite of the fact that, until the Eighties, most Evangelicals tended to vote for and qualify as liberals and Democrats (see Olson & Carroll, 1992, p. 779).

Therefore, assuming Balmer's (2007) contentions are correct, Eighties conservative elites—that is, Republican Party organizers and candidates, and Evangelical conservative leadership—made abortion into a keystone because it was electorally advantageous to do so; they would be able to mobilize the ten- to twenty-percent of

voters to whom abortion was the most important issue (see Pew Research Center, 2013a, p. 10). Elites drove the incongruence with messaging and campaigning, and voters responded dramatically. In the Eighties, in fact, religious traditionalism on a mass-scale shifted to a more *offensive* as opposed to *defensive* stance (Evans, 1988, p. 463). While these events may not be directly related, their intrinsic connection cannot be denied.

However, elite-driven incongruence is not directly limited to issues like abortion that are often defined with religion; although, the incongruence likely has the same set of root, driving mechanisms at work: that of deep-seated psychological traits—in particular, anti-Black prejudice—and the electoral exploitation thereof.

Lee Atwater, an at-the-time purposely-unidentified Reagan adviser, perfectly illustrated the broader picture of this process in a 1981 interview.

You start out in 1954 by saying, “[N-word], [n-word], [n-word].” By 1968 you can’t say “[n-word]”—that hurts you, it backfires. So you say stuff like forced busing, states’ rights, and all that stuff, and you’re getting so abstract. Now, you’re talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you’re talking about are totally economic things and the byproduct of them is blacks get hurt worse than whites. And, subconsciously, maybe that is part of it. I’m not saying that. But I’m saying that if it is getting that abstract and that coded then we’re doing away with the racial problem one way or the other, you follow me? “We want to cut this” is much more abstract than even the busing thing, uh, and a hell of a lot more abstract than “[n-word], [n-word].” (Lamis, 1999, p. 8)

It was this strategy of being “abstract” that Atwater, as campaign manager for the 1988 Presidential Campaign of George H. W. Bush, unofficially—and, according to those who knew Atwater, with “glee” (Jacobs & Tope, 2007, p. 1466)—employed in, among other campaign strategies, the infamous anti-Dukakis advertisements that linked Dukakis with convicted rapist and murderer Willie Horton, the latter of whom was, not coincidentally, a Black man (Jennings, 1992, p. 420).

Racism, at any number of levels and in any form, is well-known to be clear driver and associate of attitudes (see Knuckey, 2005; Sears, 1993). Beyond that, racism is, in huge part, itself a product of deeper, internal, non-conscious processes, many of which are shared with the drivers of religious traditionalism (Altemeyer, 1998; Ho et al., 2012; Hodson & Busseri, 2012; Sidanius, 1985). In accordance with the IEM, it is not a surprise, then, that these two sets of attitudes are linked to the degree that they are (Altemeyer, 1998), nor is it a surprise that they are both reflected in conservatism and conservative attitudes more than liberalism (Altemeyer, 1998; Heaven & Furnham, 1987; Knuckey, 2005; McCann, 2010; Mendelberg, 2008).

Elites and other opinion-makers may as well operate outside of the IEM themselves, but they, at the very least, understand the important role played by internal processes in driving attitudes. My expectations of ideological asymmetry of the IEM is a product of the broad success of, as one example, code-words (see Hurwitz & Peffley, 2005) in eliciting—in this, and many other cases—anti-Black affect and attitudes that are “chilling” in how starkly racist and strong they can be (p. 109).

A strong demonstration of this would be to administer issue-stance survey items asking conservative respondents’ attitudes on gun rights *in general*—a longtime massively important issue for American conservatives (see Pew Research Center, 2014a, p. 60)—and gun rights *specifically for Blacks*. For example, asking about ensuring gun rights for “people in urban areas,” or “people in the inner-city,” or “people on welfare” would tie the construct to code-words (see Hurwitz & Peffley, 2005), and quite exquisitely test the extent to which conservatives’ opposition to gun control and support

for gun rights was affected by any latent prejudice, implicit or explicit. (Future research would be well-served to take up this experiment.)

Perhaps most directly reflective of this notion altogether is a more contextualist (no pun intended) history of American Evangelical conservatism. Echoing the central construct of a typical American conservative's belief system, in an obituary for Paul Weyrich—the “ultra-conservative” Evangelical elite (Weber, 2008, para. 4), who among other achievements, co-founded the Heritage Foundation (para. 2), coined the phrase “moral majority” (para. 3), and was, perhaps more than anyone, an “architect” of late-20th century conservatism (para. 11)—friends of Weyrich explicitly noted the fact that Weyrich “prized free-market economics” *and* “old-fashioned, traditional values” (para. 21). Although, interestingly, his *economic* libertarianism came with an unequivocal exception—that is, incongruity—for the government-subsidized Amtrak train service, which corresponded to his “lifelong” enthusiasm for trains (para. 8).¹¹ Nevertheless, Weyrich himself wrote of the existence of a “necessary, unbreakable, and causal relationship between traditional Western, Judeo-Christian values, definitions of right and wrong, ways of thinking and ways of living—the parameters of Western culture—and the secular success of Western societies” (para. 10).

In noting the words of a 1990 speech by Weyrich coupled with a fact-based perspective, Balmer (2014) adds to and supports his earlier argument by making a more fully-encompassing case for the tripartite prejudice-conservatism-incongruence linkage: abortion did not become *the* mobilizing issue for Evangelicals until **after** (1) according to Weyrich, ultimately failing in attempts to use, alternatively, pornography, school prayer,

¹¹ I invite those in the Adorno et al. (1950) school of ideological formation to pontificate on what exactly could be going on here.

the Equal Rights Amendment, and even abortion as *the* mobilizing issue (para. 15); (2) the organizational infrastructure was in place, which is why abortion failed to be a mobilizer the first time (para. 13); and (3) *the* primary mobilizers until that point—what equated to **support for school segregation and racial discrimination** (para. 16-17) that were, until then, justified in the public on the grounds of religious freedom (para. 18)—became increasingly challenging to defend (para. 23). All of this echoes the conclusions of Carter (2000), who, again, contends that the widespread support of George Wallace served to catalyze *this understanding of* traditionalism as a belief system: namely, conservative cultural attitudes, especially with regard to race, mixed with libertarian economics (p. 12). Evangelical conservative leader Ralph Reed made this case as well in a 2012 speech, asserting that Evangelicals turned away from Democratic President (and Evangelical) Jimmy Carter only after 1978 when Carter’s IRS issued regulations pressuring religious schools to explicitly desegregate or lose tax exemption, which prompted Evangelicals to protest the regulations on the grounds of their religious liberties being infringed (Carter, 2012).

Therefore, for conservatives, when explicit *de jure* racism became publicly unpalatable, abortion became the mobilizer. As mentioned earlier, this gave rise to, for many conservatives, the key mobilizer, and, for my purposes, a key attitudinal incongruity. Logical congruence of attitudes was not the concern; rather, it was about finding a way to get a sizeable voting bloc to the polls. For Balmer (2007; 2014), it was doing so without marked racism. For Atwater, it was doing so with *implicit* racism.

Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo (1996) empirically demonstrate this tripartite linkage in their critique and ultimate takedown of the “principled conservatism” perspective—

that is, the notion that conservative attitudes on race-related issues (for example, opposition to civil rights and affirmative action legislation) are rooted in individualist values, *not* prejudice. Sidanius et al.'s results—as well as subsequent replications (Federico & Sidanius, 2002) and refinements (Burdein, 2007)—reject that perspective. Instead, empirical results demonstrate that those racial attitudes are best understood with a group-dominance, SDO-related view (see section 2.1.1), in which conservatism's positive relationship with racism and opposition to affirmative action *strengthened* as subjects' political knowledge and sophistication increased. In other words, conservative attitudes are related to prejudice not just because of support for individualism, but also because of legitimate prejudicial attitudes held more often by those with conservative attitudes and exploited by campaigns using “subtler and more complex” expressions of anti-out-group—in this case, anti-Black—attitudes (see Federico & Sidanius, 2002, p. 490). For many conservatives, deeper, implicit dispositions about racial out-groups are dictating their attitudes and attitude structures more strongly than anything else (see Valentino & Sears, 2005), in spite of their regular claims of indifference to issues of race, and colorblindness (Burdein, 2007). Overall, the tripartite linkage has, at the very least, maintained its strength as an effect (Sears & Henry, 2005).

But what of liberals? Although empirical demonstrations are limited, many scholars have explored the role liberals played, and their explorations echo what was noted in this and previous sections. If my modeling of the Sixties–Eighties era is correct, what is likely the case is that the liberals and liberal-identifiers who most readily absorbed the anti-Black and/or prejudicial cultural messages became conservatives and conservative-identifiers. With Democratic Party in disarray at the end of the Sixties and

into the Seventies, utilizing the deep-seated anti-Black affect (mostly in southern Democrats), the Republican Party and the conservative ideology reaped the benefits and added to their respective memberships (see Pfeffer, 2012, p. 254). In the early Eighties, with Democrats in disarray once again, the end result—in particular, an increase in mass conservative identification—was replicated *especially* with Evangelicals, primarily utilizing abortion as the motivating issue (Balmer, 2007).

Extrapolating this, then, ostensibly left remaining after the departure of so many Southerners and Evangelicals was a Democratic Party that consisted heavily of those who were, essentially, more purely liberal, with more open-mindedness as a result of not being persuaded by prejudiced and anti-Black messaging (see Sibley & Duckitt, 2008), more complex and heterogeneous attitude structures as a result of not being persuaded by the anti-abortion messaging and organization (Stets & Leik, 1993), and less authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1998).

Therefore, logically, rates of incongruence overall were likely higher for liberals at this point. For conservatives, many of whom who were motivated to *be* conservatives in large part because of (1) anti-Black prejudices, (2) religious traditionalism, or (3) a combination of the two, *overall average* incongruence rates may have been just as high as liberals' because of the mixture of those groups within the ideology and Republican Party, but broken down into those three groups, the story was, perhaps, a little different, but still descriptive of the larger themes of this topic.

It is in the modern era that these themes are readily exemplified to clear and vivid magnitudes.

3.2.1. Modern Trends: Conservatism and Civil Rights

As noted above, it would be an impossible task to provide every example of attitudinal incongruence in today's American politics. I will therefore limit my overview of the modern era to three exemplary and illustrative reflections—conservatives and civil rights (section 3.2.1), liberals and privacy (section 3.2.2), and libertarianism, corporate interests, and how the relationship is reflective of the current state of ideology in America (section 3.2.3)—of the central topic of this dissertation, potential confounds therein, and what all of that means for the current state of politics in the United States.

At the 2010 Values Voters Summit—an annual conference of conservatives, sponsored primarily by the conservative Family Research Council (Wilson & Burack, 2012, p. 174)—then-U. S. Senator Jim DeMint of South Carolina, a Republican, stated that conservatives have wanted a “small government for years,” but also that the government should not ignore religious values (C-SPAN, 2010). DeMint went on to note that those who are truly fiscal conservatives must necessarily want religious values to be instilled by a government because doing so will lead to lower rates of pregnancies out of wedlock, sexually-transmitted diseases, and gambling—each of which cost “trillions of dollars” of federal money to address.

In other words, according to DeMint—who, quite appropriately when considering Paul Weyrich's foundational role in the organization, later became the president of the Heritage Foundation—it is a *moral* matter, and a *practical* and *pragmatic* matter to want a government to be instilled with cultural conservatism.

DeMint made no attempt to cite any sources for any of his factual claims, and was likely being hyperbolic for the sake of rhetorical effectiveness. Perhaps not coincidentally, there is no research backing his claim of the powers of a Christianity-oriented government system, and the “trillions of dollars” remark is also false unless approaching its substance by the broadest possible definition and the broadest possible time parameters, at which points virtually everything else also amounts to costing trillions of dollars.

At any rate, DeMint also noted upfront that his sentiments were intended to appeal to people who were members of, or sympathetic to the Tea Party: the movement of pure, crystallized American conservatism—given the fact that, across polls, Tea Party identifiers were symbolically and substantively politically conservative in the American sense (Jones & Cox, 2010)—that formed after the 2008 elections (see Arceneaux & Nicholson, 2012, p. 700), constituting between 25% (Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 1) and 29% (Arceneaux & Nicholson, 2012, p. 702) of the American electorate, and who report voting for Republicans between 80% and 90% of the time (Jones & Cox, 2010, p. 28). Really, then, Tea Party identifiers and sympathizers—though a plurality (48%) identify as Republicans, and a huge majority (71%) identify as conservative (p. 28)—are almost entirely Republicans in terms of substantive ideology.

However, considering those who *identify* as political conservatives to be *substantive* political conservatives is **worth avoiding** for the descriptive overview purposes of this section for reasons explained earlier (see section 1.2.2). Primarily, though, this is due to the overarching issue of symbolic ideology, on top of the fact that one-in-five of those who self-identify as conservatives could be substantively liberal

(Federico et al., 2012, p. 383). Since this discussion is already dealing with a non-majority sample of the electorate, breaking that sample down further will necessarily lead to a breakdown in explanatory power; thus, it is important to crystallize the discussion here to revolve around the crystallized conservatives that are manifested most apparently in the Tea Party and its identifiers.

Beyond that, however, to many scholars, the stated belief systems of the Tea Party have been described as “a confusing array” of positions (see Fishman, 2012, p. 40), given the economic libertarianism they wield alongside their social and militaristic authoritarianism (Arceneaux & Nicholson, 2012; Jones & Cox, 2010). To illustrate, an analysis of polling data on Tea Party identifiers (Jones & Cox, 2010) demonstrates that nearly two-thirds view immigrants as a “burden” (p. 30), think abortion should be illegal in all or most cases (p. 28), while over four-fifths attribute government growth to the downfall of individual effort (p. 31).

In fact, and to tie these findings to the previous section of this chapter, the authors of the study note “no significant differences” between Tea Party identifiers and Christian conservative identifiers (p. 5). Thus, it is safe to make the following conclusion:

identifying with the Tea Party actually constitutes the vast majority of the current

incarnation of the substantively conservative belief system in America and that

system’s subsequent attitudinal incongruities. Although there are certainly exceptions to this conceptualization, it serves as the most appropriate method of dividing the electorate into ideological groups and the illustrating thereof.

For modern conservatives—so, by my conceptualization, Tea Party identifiers, who are one and the same with the strongly conservative, especially on social issues

(Beasley, 2012, p. 123)—attitudinal incongruence is *still* best epitomized by the logically inconsistent wielding of economic libertarianism coupled with cultural and military authoritarianism, although the latter appears to be decreasing; so, the following attitudes, each of which is supported by *at least* 57% of the contingent:

- opposition to increasing the minimum wage (Jones et al., 2013, p. 21),
- opposition to environmental protection laws (p. 21),
- opposition to marriage rights for gays and lesbians (p. 22),
- opposition to marijuana legalization (p. 23),
- opposition to cutting defense spending (Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 109),
- support for “making it more difficult” for abortions to be obtained (Jones et al., 2013, p. 35),
- support for hindering pornography access (p. 35), and
- support for making the budget deficit the top priority for Congress and the president (Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 109).

As noted, however, broad military authoritarianism **no longer has solid majority support** for this contingent of conservatives, in spite of the strong (65%) opposition to cutting defense spending (p. 109) and strong (72%) support for “overwhelming force” as the “best way to defeat terrorism” (2014b, p. 64)—a slight majority agrees with the notion of the United States focusing “more on domestic problems” as opposed to being “active in world affairs” (2011, p. 110), while a plurality deviates between considering the interests of international allies and the interests of the United States in foreign policy (p. 110). Although, it should be mentioned that more in-depth analyses—that is, not strictly survey research results—of Tea Party members **do** demonstrate broad support of surveillance programs, racial profiling, and the detaining of those deemed to be “suspicious” (Barreto, Cooper, Gonzalez, Parker, & Towler, 2011).

Nevertheless, the aforementioned convictions of DeMint have been *regularly* echoed by other conservative elites, including perhaps most appropriately, the previously-mentioned Ralph Reed, a contemporary and protégé of Lee Atwater, and—like Paul

Weyrich—a “pioneer” of Evangelical mobilization (Goodstein, 2012). For Reed, the conservative belief system is best represented by support for free-market economics combined with social conservatism and, specifically, “policies that strengthen the family” which, according to Reed, decrease the likelihood of poverty (Donvan, 2013).

The picture of modern American conservatives is still clear, nonetheless, and the sentiments of DeMint and Reed serve as vivid illustrations of the current state of the conservative species. Where the belief system *used to be* characterized by explicitly and/or implicitly anti-Black issue stances (Ansell, 1997; Burdein, 2007; Knuckey, 2005), it is now marked by at least a clear set of explicitly anti-gay issue stances (Jones et al., 2013; Pew Research Center, 2011; 2014a; 2014b), most readily demonstrated by the fact that somewhere between 73% (Jones et al., 2013, p. 22) and 85% (Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 78) of conservatives indicate opposition to basic marriage rights for gays and lesbians, and the fact that 71% indicate feeling that gays and lesbians raising children is a “bad thing for American society” (pp. 79-80).

For today’s conservatives, gay is the new Black.

3.2.2. Modern Liberals and Privacy

Modern American liberals, though, are much more difficult to illustrate. In typifying the contemporary ideological groups in 2011, Pew Research Center separated the leftist contingents of the electorate into across-the-board *Solid Liberals* (16% of the electorate), the more socially moderate and religious *New Coalition* and *Hard-Pressed Democrats* (9% and 15% of the electorate respectively), and the more economically moderate *Post-Moderns* (14% of the electorate). In 2014, this was observed again

(2014b), with the respectively analogous groups being *Solid Liberals*, *Faith and Family Left*, *Hard-Pressed Skeptics*, and *Next Generation Left* (17%, 16%, 13%, and 13% of the electorate respectively). These classifications are in stark contrast to Pew's *two* conservative groups in 2011 (*Staunch Conservatives* and *Main Street Republicans*, 11% and 14% of the electorate respectively) and 2014 (*Steadfast Conservatives* and *Business Conservatives*, 15% and 12% of the electorate respectively, 2014b)—who have statistically identical responses to every one of major issues asked, except for Main Street and Business Conservatives both demonstrating relative centrism on a few economic issues when compared to their more extreme counterparts (2011, p. 71; 2014b, p. 6).

In fact, in looking at the current state of American liberals, similar to the way it has been in previous decades (Ellis & Stimson, 2009), being willing to identify as “liberal” is a much more effective indicator of a *substantively* liberal ideology (see section 1.2.2) than identifying as “conservative” is for substantive conservative ideology. Whereas more than half of substantive libertarians will *also* identify as “conservative” (Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 106)—rendering that label useless as a separator for the ideologies because it includes far too many non-conservatives—three of Pew's (2011) leftist groups vary distinctly: 60% of Solid Liberals identify as liberal, compared to 24% of New Coalition Democrats and 21% of Post-Moderns. Interestingly, 9%, 32%, and 19% of the groups, respectively, identify as *conservative*, which again reinforces the substantive uselessness of the conservative label for my purposes. The problems for symbolic ideology here are inverses: compared to people's substantive, *actual* ideologies and belief systems, too many identify as conservative and too few identify as liberal (see Ellis & Stimson, 2009). In exploring today's liberals, then, focusing on Pew's (2011)

Solid Liberals as well as other surveys' respondents who are willing to identify as liberal is probably the best course of action.

Unlike conservatives, choosing current political figures who exemplify today's liberalism, let alone singular speeches, is comparatively difficult. Looking at current polling data of a nationally representative sample of Americans, those who identify as "very liberal" or "somewhat liberal" indicate favorability—that is, among those who have an opinion, *over 60%* indicate a favorable opinion—of Vice President Joe Biden (Public Policy Polling, 2014, p. 7), former U. S. Senator of New York and U. S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (p. 8), and U. S. Senator Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts (p. 8). Like the three Pew (2011) groups, the three figures are ideologically similar, but still distinct. However, one of the three most readily meets the requirements to be certified as one of Pew's solid liberals: Warren.

Warren is among the most *quantifiably* liberal members of Congress today (Bonica, 2013a)—according to "ideological cartography" scholars (see Bonica, 2013b)—identified as a "liberal champion" by political writers (Tumulty, 2012), and representative of the populist sect of Democratic Party by journalists (Balz & Rucker, 2014). Thus, to anecdotally illustrate present-day American liberalism's most robust incongruities, Warren—like DeMint and Reed for conservatism—serves as, at the very least, an instructive figure.

In a 2013 speech to the AFL-CIO, Warren celebrated "federal laws on wages and hours," the right to organize, and Social Security (Warren, 2013, para. 11). Warren's populism is known far and wide in American politics; unlike most conservative political figures and citizens—again, at least with regard to economic issues—Warren regularly

praises government's ability to function properly (Jones, 2013). Yet, Warren is also on the record as *not* believing in a government's ability to manage legalized marijuana (Goodnough, 2011), and, more to the point, not believing in a government's ability to respect citizens' privacy rights (Sullivan, 2014).

U. S. Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont—the rarely-asked-about-in-national-polls liberal, *self*-described “democratic socialist” (Bierman, 2014, para. 3), close ally and longtime friend of Warren (Eidelson, 2013; see also Sanders & Warren, 2013), and probably the country's other top figure of progressivism (Bierman, 2014, para. 23)—regularly makes the same economic-populist arguments as Warren, sometimes as a co-author (see Sanders & Warren, 2013). But, Sanders too has exhibited and expressed civil libertarianism, especially with regard to government surveillance—in particular, the 2001 USA PATRIOT ACT and its subsequent revisions (Sanders, 2013).

Current polling demonstrates this belief system in the national population as well. Even though liberals were initially hesitant to oppose their supposed ideological leadership—in this case, the Obama administration—on the 2013 disclosure of the National Security Agency's domestic spying apparatus (Pew Research Center, 2013b), they have since shifted to civil libertarianism, with over two-thirds opposing the NSA's surveillance program and, instead, supporting privacy rights (Cass, 2014; Pew Research Center, 2014b, p. 65). Although, this is likely the biggest differentiation between today's liberals and a populist orientation—without it, liberalism *appears* to see the potential for government action in most sectors of individual life.

For today's liberals, government is a positive and effective tool in most arenas, but, for some reason, not when it interferes with individuals' privacy—*unless* that

privacy is related to the personal economic information of the wealthy, in which case it is fair game (Sanders, 2014).

3.2.3. Libertarians and the Rest of the Modern Landscape

Unlike previous eras and their respective sections in this chapter, the **present** time period is an interesting one for libertarians, and not just because there *appear* to be more libertarians today than in previous eras (Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 20), but also because of the difference between substantive and symbolic ideologies of many libertarians (see Holsti & Rosenau, 1996; Weber & Federico, 2013). 77% identify as Republican or Republican-leaning (Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 12), 63% state that they voted for a Republican in their 2010 Congressional vote (p. 12), and 53% identify as conservatives (p. 106). This is all in spite of multitudinal differences between modern libertarians and conservatives. Between 7% (Jones et al., 2013, p. 8) to 10% (Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 1) of the American electorate qualifies as substantive libertarians, while 13% *identifies* as libertarians when given the option to do so (Jones et al., 2013, p. 8).

Still, the large percentage of libertarians who identify as conservatives flies in the face of the many issues they do not share with conservatives today. This is perhaps best exemplified by attitudes toward LGBT rights: 71% of libertarians assert the importance of societal acceptance of homosexuality, which contrasts hugely with conservatives, 68% of whom assert the importance of societal *discouragement* of homosexuality (Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 32). Yet, in what should cause joy on the part of conservative elites, libertarians nevertheless still tend to support and vote for Republican candidates

(Jones et al., 2013), in spite of the fact that almost all of the Republican candidates for office categorically reject the libertarian mindset on a huge number of issues (Beasley, 2012).

The Ayn Randian self-interested viewpoint—that is, distrust of most things *government*-related in favor of private industry and profit motive—of today’s libertarians seems to explain their *comparative*, but somewhat contradictory trust in large for-profit private corporations. For libertarians today, the pursuit of profit is the end-all moral motivation (Tetlock et al., 2000), and a not-for-profit government is, by its very definition, inferior in most, if not all, respects.

Another perspective on their motivations is worth noting, however. Journalist Mark Ames contends that the libertarian ideology, as it is today, serves as little more than the current state of what objectively began as “a project of the corporate lobby world” in the mid-1940s (2013, para. 10), designed to serve as pseudo-academic support for the dissolving of federal labor laws and regulations that would, upon dissolving, make wealthy elites exponentially wealthier (para. 11). Whether or not those are the true motivations, the result of libertarian economics quite often *is* the wealthy becoming wealthier (see para. 16), noted even by those who espouse this Randian libertarianism (paras. 19-21).

The fusion of libertarianism and traditionalism for conservatism could, as it was before (see section 3.1.2), be a way to exploit the traditionalist sympathies of most within, in this case, the Tea Party and the remainder of the conservative electorate for a combination of increased electoral power and, on top of that, increased wealth for the libertarian elites. According to Ames (2013), then, libertarians’ stark congruence is

irrelevant for the electorate—what matters is the electoral utilization of the other attitudes that are commonly linked to economic libertarianism in the conservative polity.

Even without giving Ames (2013) the benefit of the doubt, the current state of libertarianism—if it is *actually* increasing in the proportion of Americans who adhere to it—does not mean that conservatives will naturally grow in their libertarianism. The ideological debate to which Thomas Jefferson alluded in an 1813 letter to John Adams as existing “through all time” (Randolph, 1830, p. 202)—exemplified at the time in the distinction between the Whigs and Tories¹²—will not by nature come down to all-or-nothing perspectives on the role of government in line with my lens. Given the fairly similar trends of the previous eras, the only futurist conclusion that can be drawn with certainty is that the current debate between conservatism and liberalism—in spite of the ideologies’ respective incongruities and in spite of what many psychology scholars assert in terms of humans’ natural inclination to work to reduce personal inconsistencies (see Chapter 5)—**will continue in its current form for some time**. Libertarianism, in spite of its logic with regard to government action, is not the end-state for conservatism, because *today’s* form of conservatism has been present for decades and, if anything, is *itself* growing in strength in no small part because of the notion that moderate conservatives in and outside of leadership are a dying breed (Kabaservice, 2012; Pew Research Center, 2014a).

The trend of the debate between the ideologies—and the existence of attitudinal incongruence *in* both ideologies—is especially static when taking into account the fact that American society has ostensibly *replaced* one out-group for another over time. Jews,

¹² Jefferson famously noted that “the terms of whig and tory belong to natural, as well as to civil history. They denote the temper and constitution of mind of different individuals” (Randolph, 1830, p. 202).

Catholics, Hispanics, Native Americans, and *especially* Blacks have all served as the *primary* out-group, so to speak, and many people still treat each of those groups as such today. The arguments used to deprive each group of civil rights have incidentally corresponded with each other to astonishingly high degrees; scholars typically find the ultimate roots for those anti-out-group attitudes in religious traditionalism, receptiveness to implicitly and explicitly negative messaging, and the psychological underpinnings of all of the above (Altemeyer, 1998; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008).

This effect, then, and the overall trend of incongruence is most readily *seen with* and *reflected in* the notion of LGBT people serving as the explicit out-group today for many, if not *most* conservatives, and inversely for liberals and libertarians. As previously stated, LGBT people serve as the “new” out-group not just for conservatives, but also for liberals and libertarians, just in the opposite direction.

Thus, for adherents to *each* ideology, gay is the new Black, **but Black is still Black**. Blacks still face considerable discrimination and prejudice in both explicit and implicit ways. As of this writing, state- and federal-level attempts to restrict voting rights by requiring people to provide photo identification prior to voting—which disproportionately affects Blacks’ voting rights (Bentele & O’Brien, 2013) and appears to be rooted in anti-Black prejudices (Mendez & Grose, 2014)—serve as clear examples of this discrimination. Moreover, nearly 20% of conservatives state *explicitly* that they believe that interracial marriage is “a bad thing” for America (Pew Research Center, 2011, p. 80), compared to a marginal percentage of liberals (pp. 80-81). So, while LGBT people are the current explicit focus, Blacks are still an implicit target.

3.3.1. Conclusion

According to *House of Cards*'s Frank Underwood, "The road to power is paved with hypocrisy" (Willimon & Foster, 2014). In other words, the incongruities—that is, hypocrisies—that accumulate among elites are the result of gaining power. Underwood's contention is correct, but the individuals who *follow* and *take cues from* those elites are not pursuing those same interests. At the micro-, layperson-level, it is *not* about power; rather, *their* attitudinal incongruities are the result of and subject to the forces explicated within the IEM.

Thus, the IEM serves as an individual-level model of attitudes, not a model of macro-level attitudes. Conservative elites are likely fully aware of social traditionalism and anti-Black affect serving as extremely effective mobilizing tools and use them as such, regardless of whether conservative leaders are social traditionalists or affectively anti-Black themselves; perhaps because the economic libertarianism that, for whatever reason—increasing personal wealth, gaining political power, etc.—is so salient to conservative leaders is supported regardless of the cultural orientation of the candidates (see Ames, 2013). At least until the current time, a reliable bloc of social conservatives will most assuredly turn out to vote for candidates with that orientation. Because this above-all-else-traditionalism has been such an electorally advantageous platform, it is because of, in my terminology, **external** forces (e.g., elite leadership) at a macro-level that **internal** forces (e.g., anti-gay affect) are exploited at a micro-level.

It is this micro-level that will be statistically analyzed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 4

EXPLORATORY SURGERY ON THE AMERICAN BODY POLITIC: ANALYZING ATTITUDINAL INCONGRUENCE IN THE ELECTORATE

The abortionists have got to bear some burden for this [the September 11 attacks] because God will not be mocked. And when we destroy forty million little innocent babies, we make God mad. I really believe that the pagans, and the abortionists, and the feminists, and the gays and the lesbians who are actively trying to make that an alternative lifestyle—the ACLU, People for the American Way—all of them have tried to secularize America. I point the finger in their face and say, “You helped this happen.”

—Jerry Falwell, September 13, 2001 (“Falwell,” 2001)

4.1.1. Introduction

This chapter uses survey data from American National Election Study (ANES) studies, as well as less generalizable but more specific data from a 2010 questionnaire given to subjects who were in a study of biology and politics (see Chapter 6), and a sample of undergraduates from 2013 who were in a cognitive dissonance experiment (see Chapter 5)—respectively identified below as Study 4.1, Study 4.2, and Study 4.3. The data will be described and then analyzed to explore attitudinal congruence and incongruence in America across political eras—both generally and by-ideology—as well as the potential psychological factors underlying the differential rates of incongruence. All in all, the results suggest the importance of historical-political context and ideological

identification on the external side, and the importance of Moral Foundations, Openness to Experience, and the Need to Evaluate on the internal side.

4.1.2. Study 4.1: Methods & Hypotheses

Study 4.1 utilizes the cumulative dataset of the ANES, which includes responses to biennial national surveys of the American populace from 1948–2008—excluding 2006, a year for which there was no ANES conducted. The ANES is a tried-and-true nationally representative dataset, employed in a vast amount of research (e.g., Arceneaux et al., 2012; Federico et al., 2012; Federico & Hunt, 2013). Only 1980–2008 studies will be analyzed, however, as the 1948–1978 studies did not include specific ideological identification items, or enough attitude items.

A drawback of the ANES is that its iterations rarely contain even a medium-sized battery of political attitude items—namely, where the respondent stands on abortion, the estate tax, etc.—and usually only includes a few specific attitude-stance items and an assortment of related items, including most regularly the degree to which the respondent supports increasing-versus-decreasing federal spending in certain areas. In addition to analyzing the rarely available issue-stance items, I will also be including the federal-spending items as admittedly imperfect analogues for attitude items. While they are certainly not direct measures of where a respondent stands on an issue, they do measure an aspect of government involvement on specific issues. However, I expect that more conservatism-oriented respondents will be more likely to indicate across-the-board resistance to supporting increases in spending as a result of the combination and interaction of (1) the effect of identifying as an ideology (see Cohen, 2003), and (2) the

conformity-priming effects well-observed in survey research (Tourangeau, Rasinsky, & D'Andrade, 1991).

Ideally, only items that were included with identical wording in every year would be included, and only items that fit within my lens of government involvement, but this is not possible with the available data. Nevertheless, the purpose of Study 4.1 is to demonstrate trends in incongruence over time, and how incongruence over time has been tied or not tied to ideological identification; just looking at the trends over time in broad strokes may not be fully scientifically valid, but it is necessary here.

Items to be included in incongruence calculation were chosen if they were included in more than four iterations of the ANES and whether they involved issue attitudes or federal spending. No items that fit both of those two criteria were excluded.


The items included in the calculation are shown in Table 4.1. The total numbers of participants who are able to be analyzed—that is, they responded to at least one of the items used in the incongruence calculations—compared to how many participants there were by year are shown in Table 4.2. Additionally, the yearly percentages of subjects that placed themselves along at a given seven-point ideological score are shown in Table 4.3, and illustrated in Figure 4.1.

Table 4.1: Items Included in ANES Analyses and Years Included

Variable No.	Variable Label	1980	1982	1984	1986	1988	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2008
VCF0809	Stance on Guaranteed Income	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
VCF0830	Stance on Aid to Minorities	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
VCF0838	Stance on Abortion being Allowed	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
VCF0839	Stance on Government Services	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
VCF0843	Fed. Spending on Defense	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1
VCF0886	Fed. Spending on Poor/Poor People	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1
VCF0887	Fed. Spending on Child Care	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1
VCF0888	Fed. Spending on Dealing with Crime	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1
VCF0889	Fed. Spending on AIDS Research	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0
VCF0890	Fed. Spending on Public Schools	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1
VCF0891	Fed. Spending on Fin. Aid for Higher Ed.	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
VCF0892	Fed. Spending on Foreign Aid	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1
VCF0893	Fed. Spending on The Homeless	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
VCF0894	Fed. Spending on Welfare Programs	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1
VCF9046	Fed. Spending on Food Stamps	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0
VCF9047	Fed. Spending on Protecting Env.	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1
VCF9048	Fed. Spending on Space/Science/Tech.	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
VCF9049	Fed. Spending on Social Security	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1
VCF9050	Fed. Spending on Assistance to Blacks	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1

Year	Total n	n of Incongruence Calculations	% of Total n
1980	1614	1516	93.928
1982	1418	1342	94.640
1984	2257	2220	98.361
1986	2176	2165	99.494
1988	2040	2028	99.412
1990	1980	1967	99.343
1992	2485	2477	99.678
1994	1795	1780	99.164
1996	1714	1714	100.000
1998	1281	1253	97.814
2000	1807	1806	99.945
2002	1511	1346	89.080
2004	1212	1210	99.835
2008	2322	2320	99.914
Total	49760	31505	63.314

	Extremely liberal	Liberal	Slightly liberal	Moderate, middle of the road	Slightly conservative	Conservative	Extremely conservative
1980	2.444	9.267	13.646	30.448	20.978	19.959	3.259
1982	2.128	9.071	11.758	34.826	19.933	18.813	3.471
1984	2.318	10.367	12.943	33.419	20.155	18.480	2.318
1986	1.470	7.961	14.207	36.926	20.147	17.269	2.021
1988	2.458	7.795	13.062	31.320	21.699	19.522	4.143
1990	2.050	10.782	12.073	36.522	20.805	14.655	3.113
1992	2.743	11.519	13.385	31.377	20.296	17.170	3.511
1994	1.786	8.214	10.000	34.143	18.714	23.143	4.000
1996	1.806	9.782	13.995	30.248	19.940	20.918	3.311
1998	2.976	8.929	12.500	36.409	19.940	16.071	3.175
2000	2.526	11.441	12.630	31.947	16.790	20.802	3.863
2002	1.791	14.145	10.922	26.589	14.861	26.231	5.461
2004	2.941	12.200	11.111	32.244	15.795	21.786	3.922
2008	4.310	14.163	11.576	31.589	14.594	19.150	4.618
Total	2.366	10.579	12.581	33.433	19.099	18.609	3.334



Variables included in the incongruence score were identically scaled so that each had the same potential range of values—for coding simplicity, each was re-scaled to be a 21-point scale, as items had either three or seven potential responses—at which point they were coded to run from no-government at the low end to full-government at the other, and the standard deviation was calculated. It is worth noting that, because some years did not have items from other years, the variance of incongruence—quite confusingly, then, the *deviation of the standard deviation*—will itself change from year to year. However, each of the tests that will be conducted—primarily ANOVA F-tests and linear regressions, which both utilize standard error metrics in their calculations—ultimately take the number of items used to compute the incongruence scores into account, by the nature of being standardized statistical metrics themselves, and by the utilization of power analyses when appropriate.

My hypotheses for Study 4.1 are as follows:

- Hypothesis 1: Overall mean incongruence scores will vary significantly from year to year, even when taking into account the varying items included in the scores by year. Additionally, when comparing mean incongruence scores across years by ideological identification, the effect will be stronger than the main effect.

This is simply a logical conclusion. I expect significant main effect differences across years simply because the variety of the items asked. However, I expect the effect to be strengthened when taking ideology into account because attitudes should be more strongly associated with ideological identification than the year in which the items are asked of respondents. Even as a stand-in for the comparatively stronger idea of substantive ideology, ideological identification's effects should be more powerful than the year the survey was administered, given identification's very strong effects on responses to issue attitude items in surveys (Cohen, 2003; Malka & Lelkes, 2010). In other words, while I expect the survey year to play a significant role in incongruence scores, I expect that ideological identification will have a *stronger* role.

- Hypothesis 2: Overall *and* by-year, self-identified conservatives will have higher mean incongruence scores than self-identified liberals and moderates.

In accordance with the findings of Kesebir et al. (2013) and Federico et al. (2012), I expect both an overall effect of ideology—that is, across *all* years' respondents—and a by-year effect of ideology. However, I do also expect that the random by-year variation discussed in H1 may also lead to significant changes that add some caveats to the results and qualify the by-year expectations; none of those caveats, however, should suggest that ideological identity is ever a weaker predictor of incongruence than year due, again, to identity's strong impact on attitudes and the subsequent incongruities thereof (Cohen, 2003; Malka & Lelkes, 2010).

4.1.3. Study 4.1: Results

The main effect mean incongruence scores by year are shown in Table 4.4, and pictured with standard error bars in Figure 4.2. It is quite apparent that the mean incongruence across all participants varies from year to year—an ANOVA F-test comparing the mean incongruence score between years shows this to be the case, $F(13,25143) = 126.240, p < .001, \text{effect size} = .248$. The first part of Hypothesis 1 is confirmed.

Mean incongruence scores by year across *seven*-point self-identified ideology, and collapsed *three*-point ideology—combining *Extremely liberal, Liberal, and Slightly liberal* and the analogous groups for conservatives—are pictured in Figure 4.3 and shown in Table 4.5. Contrary to my hypothesis, when using a linear regression in predicting incongruence using the study year and seven-point self-identified ideology as predictors (Adjusted R-Squared = .021), year of the study (Beta = -.138, $t = -18.573, p < .001$) is *stronger* than seven-point self-identified ideology (Beta = .041, $t = 5.451, p < .001$). The same is true when executing the same model using *three*-point self-identified ideology (Adjusted R-Squared = .020): year of the study (Beta = -.138, $t = -18.541, p < .001$) is stronger than three-point self-identified ideology (Beta = .034, $t = 4.627, p < .001$). Thus, the second part of Hypothesis 1 is rejected—study year is a stronger predictor of incongruence scores than self-identified ideology.

Table 4.4: Mean Incongruence by Year

Year	Mean	SE
1980	6.1521	.0715
1982	5.5757	.0637
1984	4.9708	.0319
1986	5.1826	.0278
1988	4.8643	.0248
1990	5.2515	.0241
1992	4.8105	.0221
1994	5.1531	.0272
1996	5.0971	.0243
1998	5.5508	.0751
2000	5.1248	.0289
2002	4.2934	.0366
2004	5.0500	.0348
2008	4.7112	.0281
Total	4.7003	.0122






Table 4.5: Mean Incongruence Scores by Year by Self-identified Ideology

Year	Extremely liberal		Liberal		Slightly liberal		Collapsed liberals		Moderate, middle of the road		Collapsed conservatives		Slightly conservative		Conservative		Extremely conservative	
	Mean	SE	Mean	SE	Mean	SE	Mean	SE	Mean	SE	Mean	SE	Mean	SE	Mean	SE	Mean	SE
1980	6.3292	.558	5.7799	.260	5.7580	.242	5.8211	.170	5.8892	.153	6.5495	.132	6.0518	.181	6.7823	.196	8.3272	.520
1982	6.5815	.393	6.0466	.178	5.6355	.188	5.8856	.126	5.1960	.130	5.5418	.107	5.4155	.155	5.5598	.161	6.1694	.386
1984	5.8954	.257	4.9110	.102	4.8970	.082	4.9930	.064	4.7782	.060	5.0210	.057	4.8073	.077	5.1181	.084	6.1053	.285
1986	5.4346	.239	5.4740	.105	5.0251	.078	5.2018	.062	5.1843	.051	5.0963	.049	4.9997	.066	5.1387	.077	5.6961	.227
1988	4.7201	.154	4.9970	.097	4.7199	.085	4.8125	.060	4.8008	.049	4.9584	.042	4.8595	.059	4.9668	.064	5.4364	.153
1990	5.9926	.170	5.3380	.074	5.2330	.071	5.3410	.050	5.2604	.049	5.0654	.047	5.0131	.063	5.0989	.078	5.2575	.167
1992	5.0326	.135	4.6771	.069	4.7282	.067	4.7371	.046	4.7590	.046	4.9024	.037	4.8359	.054	4.9161	.057	5.2198	.123
1994	5.0838	.205	5.0494	.104	5.0972	.090	5.0764	.064	5.0512	.051	5.2538	.045	5.3596	.065	5.1939	.067	5.1060	.167
1996	4.9813	.279	4.9144	.085	5.1108	.068	5.0266	.053	5.1199	.050	5.0940	.040	5.0588	.057	5.0929	.059	5.3134	.166
1998	4.6534	.440	5.1568	.270	5.3589	.208	5.1989	.155	5.7609	.133	5.3215	.134	5.4788	.177	5.1258	.213	5.3245	.583
2000	4.7124	.293	4.9085	.144	4.9876	.115	4.9275	.087	5.1284	.083	5.2266	.071	5.3543	.106	5.2209	.104	4.7020	.227
2002	4.2229	.303	4.1350	.110	4.3202	.104	4.2162	.074	4.3743	.077	4.2331	.061	4.2042	.095	4.3051	.083	3.9658	.209
2004	5.2536	.249	4.7626	.103	4.8442	.117	4.8522	.075	4.9537	.070	5.2231	.062	4.9590	.099	5.3286	.082	5.7010	.208
2008	4.5602	.199	4.3772	.093	4.5541	.085	4.4716	.062	4.7771	.055	4.8811	.049	4.8947	.075	4.8404	.072	5.0072	.155
Total	4.6389	.104	4.5314	.045	4.4885	.038	4.9812	.022	4.6250	.025	5.1221	.018	4.5748	.031	4.6941	.033	4.9425	.087

Next, to test Hypothesis 2, overall mean incongruence scores by seven-point self-identified ideology are shown in Table 4.6 and Figure 4.4, with standard error bars. Interestingly, extreme liberals stand out on the left side, demonstrating the second-highest average incongruence scores, essentially tied with extreme conservatives. Utilizing a collapsed three-point ideological identification scale (shown in Table 4.7 and Figure 4.5 with standard error bars) shows that extreme liberals' higher average overall incongruence is washed out by the other liberal groups. Conservative identifiers wind up with the highest average incongruence scores, followed by moderates, followed by liberals. While this appears to be a partial confirmation of Hypothesis 2, an ANOVA F-test demonstrates these differences to be significant, $F(2,17691) = 12.252, p < .001$, but not strong enough; the effect size of .037 is not large enough to be able to dismiss the possibility of a Type I error (Cohen, 1988). Additionally, ignoring moderates and only comparing left- and right-leaning identifiers also yields significant mean differences using an ANOVA F-test, $F(1,11893) = 23.900, p < .001$, although, again, the effect size of .043 is not large enough to dismiss the possibility of a false positive (Cohen, 1988). Therefore, there is no *overall* effect of ideology on incongruence.




Comparing average incongruence scores between ideological identifiers by year, however, does demonstrate key significant differences. Looking at ideological identification by year—in other words, testing whether the differences between the ideological groups in Figure 4.3 are significant—ANOVA F-tests reveal that in almost every survey, there were significant differences between the groups, with the results of the tests for seven-point ideological identification shown in Table 4.8 and three-point ideological identification shown in Table 4.9.

To demonstrate the potential significance further, for the seven-point self-identified ideology comparisons, for each F with $p < .001$, the effect sizes are significant and powerful as well, but *only* if $p < .001$ —for example, the smallest F with $p < .05$ is the ANOVA comparing incongruence scores by seven-point self-identified ideology for the 2000 ANES, and its effect size of .144 with a doubled average n by condition of 192 is

less than the 343 required for that effect size to be able to dismiss the possibility of a Type I error (Cohen, 1988).

Table 4.8: ANOVA F-Test of Mean Incongruence Score between Seven-Point Self-Identified Ideology by Year		Table 4.9: ANOVA F-Test of Mean Incongruence Score between Three-Point Self-Identified Ideology by Year	
Year	ANOVA	Year	ANOVA
1980	F(6,975) = 6.653***	1980	F(2,981) = 7.959***
1982	F(6,886) = 3.522**	1982	F(2,892) = 6.787***
1984	F(6,1546) = 9.951***	1984	F(2,1552) = 4.936**
1986	F(6,1626) = 4.077***	1986	F(2,1632) = 1.164
1988	F(6,1417) = 4.490***	1988	F(2,1423) = 3.607*
1990	F(6,1310) = 5.300***	1990	F(2,1316) = 8.273***
1992	F(6,1816) = 3.640***	1992	F(2,1822) = 4.808**
1994	F(6,1393) = 2.459*	1994	F(2,1399) = 5.206**
1996	F(6,1322) = 1.236	1996	F(2,1328) = 0.879
1998	F(6,1001) = 2.055	1998	F(2,1007) = 4.378*
2000	F(6,666) = 2.341*	2000	F(2,672) = 3.440*
2002	F(6,1110) = 1.208	2002	F(2,1116) = 1.317
2004	F(6,911) = 5.881***	2004	F(2,917) = 8.272***
2008	F(6,1617) = 5.444***	2008	F(2,1623) = 14.621***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001		* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001	

It is not as simple for the three-point self-identified ideology comparisons. To illustrate, even though $p < .001$ for the ANOVA comparing incongruence scores in, as one example, 1982, the effect size of .122 requires a doubled average n by condition of 781—greater than the observed 595.3, meaning that the effect is not powerful enough to be able to dismiss the possibility of a Type I error (Cohen, 1988). In fact, the only years for which the scores' mean differences have powerful enough effect sizes to be able to dismiss the Type I error possibility are 1990, 2004, and 2008. This is evident when looking at *only* the three collapsed groups' average incongruence scores by year, pictured in Figure 4.6 with standard error bars. Interestingly, liberals are more incongruent than conservatives in 1990, but the opposite is true in 2004 and 2008.



Still, the eight powerful and significant mean differences when looking at the seven groups by year are intriguing, especially considering that the same general mean differences are observed for 1990, 2004, and 2008.

All told, then, Hypothesis 2 is mostly rejected, but it *is* confirmed for 2004 and 2008. In going off of the theses from section 3.2.1, section 3.2.2., and section 3.2.3, the ideologies—or, in this case, the ideological *identities*—had their most readily observed differences in incongruence only beginning in 2004, at which point they emerged from being ostensibly identical in how low their average incongruence scores were in 2002.

It may be a bit of a grasp, given the survey's temporal distance from the events themselves, but the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, *may* have been congruence-driving events, with the lowest average incongruence scores for *every* group being observed in 2002. If the conclusions of Kesebir et al. (2013) are to be believed, this apparent increase of congruence is due to the national MS prime caused by the attacks.

Investigating this further, and ensuring this is not a statistical fluke resulting from using standard error metrics to compare standard deviations, I made a new incongruence variable that only includes the 10 items that were asked in 2002, instead of the 19 included in the total incongruence variable. The average recalculated incongruence scores by group across the available years are pictured in Figure 4.7. ANOVA F-tests comparing each ideological identity's mean incongruence score by year (for both the seven- and three-point ideological identification variables) are shown in Table 4.10.

Significant and statistically powerful—that is, effect sizes and corresponding samples wielding greater than 80% statistical power (see Cohen, 1988)—differences are demonstrated for both identification scales in 1988, the 7-point scale in 1994, *almost* the 3-point scale in 2004 (power > 70%), and both scales in 2008.

Just testing the differences between the liberal identifiers and conservative identifiers, and ignoring moderates, the results are similar, and shown in Table 4.11. Self-identified conservatives have significantly and powerfully higher 2002-adjusted average incongruence scores than self-identified liberals in 1988, 2000, and 2008, but the non-significant F scores are otherwise identical within each year. Fisher's Z tests confirm this, with the best-case-scenario Z for the differences in effect sizes between 1996 (.0242) and 2004 (.0742) being less than the 1.96 needed to reject the null at $p < .05$ ($Z = .964$).




Table 4.10: ANOVA F-Tests of Mean Recalculated Incongruence Scores between Ideological Identifications by Year

Year	ANOVA (Seven-Point Ident.)	ANOVA (Three-Point Ident.)
1984	F(6,1376) = 1.217	F(2,1376) = .090
1986	F(6,1631) = .228	F(2,1631) = .266
1988	F(6,1423) = 7.313***	F(2,1423) = 12.905***
1990	F(6,1315) = 1.254	F(2,1315) = 1.407
1992	F(6,1821) = 2.216	F(2,1821) = 4.760**
1994	F(6,1398) = 4.708***	F(2,1398) = 4.338*
1996	F(6,1326) = 1.034	F(2,1326) = .427
2000	F(6,672) = 2.847**	F(2,672) = 4.074*
2002	F(6,1116) = 1.276	F(2,1116) = 1.189
2004	F(6,917) = 1.863	F(2,917) = 5.073**
2008	F(6,1621) = 5.656***	F(2,1621) = 12.235***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001		

Table 4.11: ANOVA F-Tests of Mean Recalculated Incongruence Scores by Year (Conservative and Liberal Identifiers Only)	
Year	ANOVA
1984	F(1,928) = .172
1986	F(1,1028) = .218
1988	F(1,977) = 23.989***
1990	F(1,834) = 2.413
1992	F(1,1250) = 5.773*
1994	F(1,920) = 7.208**
1996	F(1,925) = .544
2000	F(1,457) = 8.253**
2002	F(1,819) = 2.394
2004	F(1,621) = 3.440
2008	F(1,1110) = 23.369***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001	

Putting the previous ANOVA results together with the differences pictured in Figure 4.7, the results suggest that ideological identity played a role in only a few years. Statistically speaking, nothing important surfaces in comparing the ideological identities' incongruence scores in 2002 compared to 2004 or 1996, as they are all statistically identical effects. Thus, although the results are intriguing and worthy of further exploration, 2002's identical rates of adjusted incongruence scores across ideological identification groups are not *more* identical than those in 2004. Hence, the mortality-salience idea of Kesebir et al. (2013) being manifested in the 2002 ANES is rejected.

A decline in incongruence is evident across the board in 2008. However, the differences between the groups remain significantly large. Since 2000, 2002 and 2004 are similar in that self-identified liberals became more congruent, and indistinguishable from self-identified conservatives, and every other group for that matter, in terms of that congruence. However, self-identified liberals' incongruence seemed to increase as much as self-identified conservatives' in 2004, although they *decreased more* in 2008.

But, while 2002 is no different from 2004, 2008 is significantly different from both, regardless of the incongruence scale used. What is happening to in 2008 compared to recent years is difficult to discern. What is clear, though, is that, in 2008, liberals and conservatives exhibited their lowest average rates of incongruence in at least three decades. So, incongruence has indeed changed over time.

One potential explanation for the shifts is that the demographics of the sample shift readily, as do the attitudes used in the calculation as a result—and as a result of the fact that people have unstable attitudes over time (Converse, 1964). I welcome this possibility.

A complementary explanation, however, serves to illustrate a thus-far little-explored central idea quite well. **Context** is vital—that is, the environmental, historical, and political settings in which people are situated at local, state, and national levels will affect people's attitudes and, subsequently, the way they indicate their attitudes on surveys. In terms of the IEM, **context** is an *external* force that glides over everything else, and is captured by virtue of the survey-year variable. Before leading to attitude structures, internal and other external forces first must, by the nature of attitudes and survey research, encounter forces of context. Thus, in Figure 2.2, before the arrows of exemplary forces (e.g., epistemic motivations, social identity, etc.) actually lead to attitude structures, they may be affected by contextual forces—for example, the perceived state of the economy and approval of the president.

In fact, as evidence for this postulation, a linear regression predicting incongruence with seven-point ideological identification and year as predictors (respective standardized Beta coefficients are .048 and -.146, with 6.385 and -19.302 for

t-tests, both $p < .001$) and perceived state of the economy (Beta = $-.054$, $t = -2.393$, $p < .05$) and attitude toward the president (Beta = $-.054$, $t = -6.813$, $p < .001$) is still a weak model (adjusted R-squared = $.024$), but the predictors are all significant.

To explore this further, and actually test my central theory, a linear regression predicting incongruence separately by ideology using survey year, perceived state of the economy, and feelings toward the president as predictors demonstrates some interesting effects (see Table 4.12). Clearly, the model works best (but still not strongly, with adjusted R-squared values at $.109$ or below) for non-*slight* ideological identifiers, especially extreme identifiers—but, contrary to the asymmetric expectations of my central theory, there is no difference in model power between liberal and conservative identifiers; each of those models explain equal proportions of the variance. The difference between self-identified moderates and everyone else, however, is intriguing—the predictors account for a paltry $.7\%$ of the variation for them, compared to at least double that amount for each other group.

Predictor	Extremely lib.	Lib.	Slightly lib.	<i>Collapsed Lib.</i>	Moderate	<i>Collapsed Conserv.</i>	Slightly conserv.	Conserv.	Extremely conserv.
Year	-.329***	-.248***	-.142***	-.206***	-.081***	-.158***	-.102***	-.186***	-.321***
Econ. Percept.	.114*	.010	-.027	.001	-.028*	-.009	-.032	.008	.011
Feel. Twd Pres.	-.019	.072*	.012	.027	-.048***	-.096***	-.105***	-.114***	.016
Adj. R-Squared	.109	.070	.021	.044	.007	.031	.017	.044	.099

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Nevertheless, according to the results of Study 4.1, contextual forces like year of the study, economy perceptions, and presidential approval are essentially identical in explanatory power to the more *specifically* external—and, as noted, somewhat internal as

well (see Federico et al., 2012; Malka & Lelkes, 2010; Chapter 2 of this dissertation)—force of ideological identification.

But, with the effect of the setting—again, captured indirectly by considering the study year its own variable—quite difficult to overstate (and, realistically speaking, *measure* with full validity), what does appear to be the case is that study year, on its own, is a stronger predictor of incongruence for self-identified liberals than self-identified conservatives. Using a Fisher's Z-test to compare the effect of study year on incongruence across the collapsed ideological groups, study year has a demonstrably stronger relationship with incongruence for self-identified liberals ($R = -.204$) than it does for self-identified conservatives ($R = -.147$), with $Z = 3.096$, $p < .01$. This aspect of my central theoretical framework, then, is confirmed.

In fact, these results even hold up when controlling for age, gender, union membership, and income—thought to be among the most analytically important social characteristics (see Abramowitz & Saunders, 2006, p. 176)—in which case, a Fisher's Z-test again confirms that the amount of variation explained by the model for self-identified liberals (adjusted R-squared = .037) is significantly stronger than it is for self-identified conservatives (adjusted R-squared = .013), $Z = 3.911$, $p < .01$. Survey year is still a significant predictor of incongruence for conservative identifiers (Beta = $-.101$, $t = -7.988$, $p < .001$) when controlling for age, gender, union membership, and income, but, *again*, the model is stronger for liberal identifiers (Beta = $-.171$, $t = -10.706$, $p < .001$). Nevertheless, it is clear that the external factor of context is significantly stronger in predicting incongruence for liberal identifiers than it is for conservative identifiers.

Beyond that, for all subjects, context is obviously not everything, with the internal force of ideological identification remaining a significant predictor in the model when controlling for the contextual forces of economic perceptions and presidential approval. Overall, though, the conclusion that can be drawn from Study 4.1 is that, consistent with Kinder and Sears (1985) and their assertion that inspired this dissertation's title (p. 682; see also Chapter 1), it is quite clear that, indeed, from the Eighties to the modern day, Americans *were not* and *are not* creatures of logically coherent belief systems. Incongruence is variable, but, like the *oni* mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 3, pervasive and inescapable (Publick & Hammer, 2006; Reider, 2003). For virtually every person, it is always a sizeable numeric distance from zero, regardless of what appears to be a slight decline over time. Still, the potential is high for a role played by individual differences—that is, internal and additional external forces that go beyond the social identity tested here—in attitudinal incongruence in the American body politic.

Study 4.2 and Study 4.3 seek to demonstrate the impact of internal forces, and some more external forces as well, on attitudinal incongruence. The final section of this chapter will compare and discuss the relative effects of internal and external forces across all three studies.

4.2.1. Study 4.2: Methods & Hypotheses

In the summer of 2010, 384 adults from Lincoln, Nebraska, and the surrounding area were recruited via a participant-recruitment organization and paid \$50 to participate in a study on their personal politics. Subjects came to the University of Nebraska-Lincoln

and were asked to complete a computerized survey with a series of demographic, political, personality, psychological, and philosophy items (see Appendix).

In terms of demographics, the full sample (n=345, after excluding participants who did not respond to the relevant demographic or political items) was moderately representative of the general population, but not entirely—hence, external validity of the sample, while better than an undergraduate sample, is not fully achieved. The participants were 54% female, with an average income range of \$40,000-\$60,000. 55% indicated “some” college education or more. The representativeness of the sample was most hindered by the fact that 90% of the participants classified themselves as white. Thus, I do not claim the sample to be nationally representative, although the internal validity of the sample is strong.

Participants will be given an incongruence score in accordance with the Barton and Parsons (1977) methodology, based on their responses to an updated Wilson-Patterson (1968) Attitude Inventory (Smith, Oxley, et al., 2011). Using the available data, in accordance with the typology used earlier, participants will be also be categorized as symbolic and/or substantive members of an ideological group, and given ideological scores denoting the magnitude of their adherence to conservatism and libertarianism—and, ostensibly conversely, liberalism and populism (see Table 4.13). Although, note that, due to the lack of symbolic libertarianism or populism variables, the use of the libertarianism score will be almost non-existent in this chapter due to the inability to properly compare the differential facets of the symbolic and substantive ideologies.

Item	Included in Calculation of		
	Conservatism	Libertarianism	Incongruence
School prayer	Yes		
Pacifism	Yes*		
Stop illegal immigration	Yes	Yes*	Yes
Death penalty	Yes	Yes*	
Government-arranged healthcare	Yes*	Yes*	Yes
Premarital sex	Yes*		
Gay marriage	Yes*	Yes	Yes*
Abortion rights	Yes*	Yes	Yes*
Evolution			
Biblical truth			
Increase welfare spending	Yes*	Yes*	Yes
Protect gun rights	Yes	Yes	Yes*
Increase military spending	Yes	Yes*	Yes
Government regulation of business	Yes*	Yes*	Yes
Small government	Yes	Yes	Yes*
Foreign aide	Yes*	Yes*	Yes
Lower taxes	Yes	Yes	
Stem cell research	Yes*	Yes	
Abstinence-only sex education	Yes	Yes*	Yes
Allow torture of terrorism suspects	Yes	Yes*	
* = Reverse-coded			

It should be noted that, again, the attitude inventory used in this experiment did not have all of its issue items in line with a libertarian-authoritarian lens; for example, the item “evolution” has no explicit relevance to a government acting or not acting, which means that including responses to it in the calculation of the Barton and Parsons standard deviation metric will, for lack of a better word, deviate the eventual score from the desired attitudinal incongruence score. To compensate for the smaller relative number of items used in calculating the incongruence statistic, the incongruence score will be calculated also uses political philosophy items that specifically measure degrees of support or opposition to government involvement (see Appendix).

Also available and relevant (see section 2.1.1) are three series of psychological and personality scores for participants, including scores on the five Moral Foundations (Haidt, 2012a), a shortened NFS scale, and scores on the Big Five personality traits calculated from a ten-item battery (see Appendix for full batteries).

- Hypothesis 1: Incongruence will correlate positively with Openness, “Binding” Moral Foundations, and Need for Structure scores. The correlations will *increase* when looking only at self-identified and substantive conservatives compared to everyone else.

This hypothesis is derived from work demonstrating epistemic motivations’ (viz., NFS and *reverse*-Openness) impact on traditionalist issue stances and the importance thereof to the wielder of those stances (Jost et al., 2003a), as well as Moral Foundations work demonstrating the overarching impact of the “binding” foundations on conservative attitudes, especially on cultural issues (see Graham et al., 2009). It is the fact that conservatism’s strand of traditionalism is so key to the modern conservative belief system—and, as discussed in Chapter 3, has been for decades—that these correlations should be strengthened when only looking at conservatives.

- Hypothesis 2a: Internal factors (viz., the factors listed in H1) will be stronger predictors of incongruence for self-identified and substantive conservatives than they will be for self-identified and substantive liberals.
- Hypothesis 2b: External factors (viz., education, income, and ideological identification) will be stronger predictors of incongruence for self-identified and substantive liberals than they will be for self-identified and substantive conservatism.

While far from a perfect test given the sample’s lack of external validity and the comparatively incomplete amount of external factors available to test, H2 overall is nonetheless a vital test of this dissertation’s central theory, and derived from assertions of

the IEM (see section 2.2.2), in which it is expected that internal factors will drive conservatives' incongruence more than liberals', and that external factors will drive liberals' incongruence more than conservatives'. These effects are expected as a result of the greater relative impact of heretofore-researched psychological factors—that is, *internal* factors—on conservatism and conservative attitudes (see Jost et al., 2003a; Chapter 2 of this dissertation), and vice versa for liberalism and liberal attitudes.

4.2.2. Study 4.2: Results

To test H1, bivariate correlations were run correlating incongruence with the available and hypothesized psychological factors. The results are shown in Table 4.14.

The results are a rejection of most of the first half of H1. Only two hypothesized relationships are observed: the binding foundations Authority and Ingroup have a significant and positive effect on incongruence overall, and only Authority's effect size is large enough to be able to dismiss the possibility of a Type I error (Cohen, 1988), which means that the first half of H1 is confirmed in that respect. Otherwise, the hypothesized relationships are either not observed or are inversely observed—H1 is rejected for each of those psychological factors.

The tests for the second half of H1 are shown in Table 4.15. All correlation coefficients with p-values less than .05 are powerful enough to dismiss the possibility of a Type I error (Cohen, 1988). The hypothesis is confirmed with respect to the Authority and Ingroup Moral Foundations, but rejected in every other respect. Additionally, the hypothesis is, intriguingly, contradicted outright with regard to Openness. Only for *non-conservatives* does Openness correlate with incongruence. Also intriguing is the negative

correlation of incongruence with Agreeableness for self-identified conservatives, meaning that incongruence increases as Agreeableness decreases—although this is not replicated with substantive conservatives, so the relationship is limited to an interaction with the effect of social identity and not substantive ideology.

Factor	R
Conscientiousness	.121*
Emotional Stability	.041
Openness	.102
Extroversion	.085
Agreeableness	-.092
NFS	-.005
MF-Authority	.145***
MF-Fairness	-.093
MF-Harm	-.126*
MF-Ingroup	.120*
MF-Purity	.082

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

Factor	Not Self-identified Conservative (n=211)	Self-identified Conservative (n=128)	75% Least Substantively Conservative (n=253)	25% Most Substantively Conservative (N=87)
Conscientiousness	.062	.160	.103	.043
Emotional Stability	-.015	.054	.047	-.009
Openness	.373***	-.020	.322***	-.129
Extroversion	.051	.116	.037	-.004
Agreeableness	-.005	-.263**	-.035	-.149
NFS	.016	-.116	.012	-.196
MF-Authority	-.135	.377***	-.108	.290**
MF-Fairness	.132	-.149	.042	-.023
MF-Harm	.045	-.213*	-.040	-.073
MF-Ingroup	-.069	.239**	-.057	.220*
MF-Purity	-.129	.150	-.164**	.126

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

To test H2, two linear regressions were first run comparing the relative impact of internal factors on incongruence scores by *self-identified* ideology, using Big Five personality traits, NFS, and Moral Foundations as predictors. The results are shown in Table 4.16.

For self-identified ideological adherents, H2a is confirmed. Internal factors predict incongruence significantly more for conservative identifiers than liberal identifiers—although, importantly, a majority of the factors have no significant effect for identifiers one way or the other.

Predictor	Liberal	Conservative
Conscientiousness	.035	.183*
Emotional Stability	-.123	.014
Openness	.327**	-.068
Extroversion	-.069	.124
Agreeableness	-.081	-.233**
NFS	.240*	-.220**
MF-Authority	-.194	.342***
MF-Fairness	.104	-.146
MF-Harm	-.062	-.113
MF-Ingroup	.222	.133
MF-Purity	-.148	.035
Adjusted R-Squared	.181	.283
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001		

To more specifically test the rest of H2, additional regressions were run comparing substantive ideological groups—which were identified by taking those who scored in the top quartile (n = 87) and bottom quartile (n = 81) on the Conservatism scale—and the predictive capacity of the earlier-included internal factors, *and including the external factors of ideological identification, marital status, family status, education, and income* as dummy variables, in order to test the differential impact of external factors

compared to internal factors, by ideology. Results are shown in the “Both” column of Table 4.17.

H2 appears to be again confirmed, but with some caveats. First, the overall adjusted R-squared is larger for conservatives, and a Fisher’s Z-test shows that the difference is greater than the required critical value ($Z = 2.211$, $p < .05$), meaning that the difference is more than marginal. Thus, when comparing the predictive capacity of internal and external factors on incongruence by substantive ideology, **including both factor types explains more of the variation for conservatives than for liberals.**

Predictor	Liberal			Conservative		
	Internal	External	Both	Internal	External	Both
Conscientiousness	-.045		.083	.042		.173
Emotional Stability	-.144		-.127	.052		.067
Openness	.159		.047	-.155		-.053
Extroversion	.020		.052	.058		.143
Agreeableness	.016		.041	-.173		-.197
NFS	.247		.298*	-.213		-.317**
MF-Authority	-.218		-.168	.349**		.316**
MF-Fairness	.141		.202	-.123		-.091
MF-Harm	.088		.000	-.080		-.097
MF-Ingroup	.145		.190	.191		.186
MF-Purity	-.115		-.202	-.049		-.021
Liberal ident.		.048	-.003		-.116	-.117
Conservative ident.		-.098	-.022		.270*	.321**
Single		-.058	.016		-.030	-.046
Married		-.124	-.089		.209	.324
Children		-.217	-.155		-.155	-.188
Doctoral		.215	.065		.175	.117
Master’s or Higher		.071	.162		-.402**	-.318**
College or Higher		-.289*	-.302*		-.091	-.147
Over \$100K		-.118	-.192		-.035	-.140
\$80K-\$100K		-.130	-.223		-.334*	-.444***
\$60K-\$80K		-.184	-.221		-.251*	-.351**
\$40K-\$60K		-.122	-.156		-.316*	-.408***
Adj. R-Squared	.097	.081	.172	.122	.204	.433
* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$						

Running the regressions again, but using two regressions consisting of only internal or external predictors demonstrates several key addenda (see Table 4.17). Fisher's Z-tests for both the internal-only ($Z = .271$) and external-only ($Z = 1.233$) models demonstrate that the adjusted R-squared values are not significantly different from each other, because in neither case does Z exceed the $Z = 1.96$ required for $p < .05$.

Finally, once again running two separate regressions including all of the variables but this time using a forward-removal deletion method clarifies the results.

First, for substantive liberals, Openness (Beta = .262, $t = 2.528$, $p < .05$), NFS (Beta = .283, $t = 2.595$, $p < .05$), and being married (Beta = -.353, $t = -3.276$, $p < .01$), become significant predictors of incongruence, accounting for about 16.2 percent of the variation (adjusted R-squared = .1616).

For substantive conservatives, some earlier predictors remain significant—Agreeableness (Beta = -.267, $t = -3.040$, $p < .01$), NFS (Beta = -.307, $t = -3.509$, $p < .001$), MF-Authority (Beta = .356, $t = 4.102$, $p < .001$), conservative identification (Beta = .387, $t = 4.488$, $p < .001$), having a Master's degree or higher (Beta = -.286, $t = -3.271$, $p < .01$), having an annual income \$80,001–\$100,000 (Beta = -.244, $t = -2.699$, $p < .01$), and having an annual income \$40,001–\$60,000 (Beta = -.274, $t = -3.048$, $p < .01$)—accounting for about 39.1 percent of the variation (adjusted R-squared = .391).

Putting everything together, then, substantive liberals' incongruence is not as effectively predicted as substantive conservatives' incongruence by internal and external factors put together.

What does this mean for the IEM, and my central theory of asymmetry? The evidence provided in Study 4.2 appears to support and contradict some of my central

theoretical framework, with the theory being supported for self-identified ideological adherents, but somewhat contradicted when looking at substantive ideologues. Perhaps most interestingly, compared to liberal incongruence, conservative incongruence is more readily predicted by both internal and external factors together. How all of the above connects to the broader picture of attitudinal incongruence will be fully explored in section 4.4.1 below.

4.3.1. Study 4.3: Methods & Hypotheses

In the fall of 2013, 247 undergraduates enrolled in introductory political science courses at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln were recruited via email to participate in an online research survey using the Qualtrics software suite (Provo, UT) for course credit. The research project itself was a cognitive dissonance experiment (see Chapter 5). Study 4.3 as an analysis does not utilize the data gathered from *that* aspect of the project, however.

Participants completed some demographic questions, a new Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory designed in accordance with my libertarian-authoritarian lens, and then completed the experimental manipulation, after which they responded in sequence to several political and psychological trait batteries (see Appendix for specific items) including, but not limited to, the following:

- The 18-item Preference for Consistency Scale (Cialdini et al., 1995);
- An updated 15-item political knowledge battery (see Federico et al., 2009; adapted from Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996);
- The 27-item Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (Freeston et al., 1994);
- The 10 items of the NFCC scale measuring a need for order (NFCC-Order; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011);
- The 12-item Need for Structure Scale (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993);
- The 10 items of the Big Five battery measuring Openness (John et al., 1991);

- The 20-item shortened Dogmatism Scale (Troidahl & Powell, 1965);
- The 18-item combined Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale (Kirton, 1981); and
- The 16-item Need to Evaluate Scale (Jarvis & Petty, 1996).

As was done in Study 4.2, incongruence scores will be calculated for each subject from their responses to, in the case of this study, the *updated* WPAI in accordance with the operationalization procedure for government involvement shown in Table 1.1.

Demographically, the sample (n=247, 44.9% female, median age of 19) is mostly typical for an undergraduate sample, although in terms of ideological identification and party identification, it skews more conservative and Republican than most (see Table 5.1). Again, additionally, participants will be classified as substantive ideological adherents based on their WPAI responses in accordance with Table 1.1, with substantive conservatives calculated as the top quartile and decile in scorers on the conservatism scale calculated from the WPAI, and vice versa for substantive liberals (see Appendix).

- Hypothesis 1: Overall, incongruence will correlate positively with IU, NFCC-Order, NFS, Openness, Dogmatism, IA, and NE. For self-identified and substantive conservatives, incongruence will also correlate positively with PFC, and more strongly with all of the above factors.

As it was in Study 4.2, this hypothesis is derived from work demonstrating epistemic motivations' (viz., IU, NFCC-Order, etc.) impact on attitudes in general, but especially on conservative attitudes, which are somewhat naturally more incongruent than liberal attitudes, but should be especially more incongruent when taking ideological conservatism into account.

- Hypothesis 2: Internal factors (that is, the factors listed in H1) will be stronger predictors of incongruence for self-identified and substantive conservatives than they will be for self-identified and substantive liberals.

Again, while far from a perfect test given the lack of ability to test more explicitly *external* factors' impact—the sample is too homogeneous in terms of external factors, given the fact that it is constituted by a population that is essentially identical in most of those attributes—this hypothesis is once again central to this dissertation's central theory, and derived from assertions of the IEM (see section 2.2.2).

Additionally, although I only expect null results, I will include the total number of political knowledge items correctly answered in tests for H2. The somewhat enigmatic relationship that knowledge has been shown to have with incongruence (see section 1.3.2) weakens the ability to make predictive claims about its role, especially in terms of differential relationships between the ideologies. Nevertheless, it will be included in tests for H2.

4.3.2. Study 4.3: Results

To test the first part of H1, correlations were run between incongruence and the available psychological traits. The results, shown in Table 4.18, partially confirm and partially reject the hypothesis, with support coming from the positive correlations of incongruence with Openness and Need to Evaluate, but nothing else. In fact, Intolerance of Uncertainty and Intolerance of Ambiguity both *negatively* correlate with incongruence, contrary to the hypothesis. Although, the effect sizes are small, and, in the case of IA (but not IU), lack the necessary sample sizes to be able to dismiss the possibility of a Type I error (Cohen, 1988).

Factor	R
IU	-.162*
NFCC-O	.074
NFS	-.094
Openness	.199**
Dogmatism	-.087
IA	-.131*
NE	.277***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001	

To test the second part of H1, the same procedure was used as in Study 4.2. The results are shown in Table 4.19, and are once again somewhat contrary to the hypothesis. Again, for non-conservatives only, Openness is positively associated with incongruence, contrary to expectation. However, Need to Evaluate remains a significant positive correlate, along with Preference for Consistency. Still, for conservatives, there are no other significant correlates. Only for non-conservatives does Intolerance of Uncertainty play a role, although it is not a powerful enough role to be able to dismiss a false positive (Cohen, 1988). Thus, overall, H1 is only partially supported.

Factor	Not Conservative Identifier (n=138)	Conservative Identifier (n=109)	75% Least Substantively Conservative (n=184)	25% Most Substantively Conservative (n=63)
PFC	.030	.208*	-.011	.253*
IU	-.168*	-.147	-.183*	-.097
NFCC-O	.119	.021	.076	.041
NFS	-.103	-.056	-.120	-.051
Openness	.201*	.165	.264***	.032
Dogmatism	-.083	-.069	-.122	-.016
IA	-.099	-.149	-.138	-.194
NE	.215*	.415***	.246***	.302*
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001				

To test Hypothesis 2, three models will be executed: Model 1, which tests within the same regression every participant who identified as liberal or conservative; Model 2, in which separate regressions are run for self-identified liberals and self-identified conservatives using the same predictors; and Model 3, which replicates Model 2 but uses top and bottom quartile conservatism scorers as a stand-in for substantive ideology. (Identification was not available to be used as a predictor for Model 3, because there were no liberal identifiers who scored in the top 25% on the conservatism scale.)

First, for Model 1, the regression was run, predicting incongruence with the psychological factor scores, *along with* (1) self-identified ideology as liberal (coded 1) or conservative (coded 2), (2) total conservatism score, and (3) total political knowledge score. The results for all three models are shown in Table 4.20.

After reducing the model to the factors that were significant predictors, only Intolerance of Ambiguity ($t = -3.790$), Need to Evaluate ($t = 5.268$), and self-identified ideology ($t = -2.665$) are shown to be significant predictors of incongruence, which partially confirms and partially rejects H2—most of the factors are not significant predictors of incongruence, but two psychological factors and ideological identification are. Interestingly, and quite contrary to my overall expectations, because of the coding scheme, the model suggests that identifying as a liberal ($n = 42$) predicts higher incongruence than identifying as a conservative ($n = 109$). An ANOVA F-test shows this to be the case, with self-identified liberals' average incongruence score (mean = 1.274, SE = .041) significantly higher than self-identified conservatives' (mean = 1.121, SE = .023), $F(1,149) = 11.979$, $p < .001$. No differences are observed, however, when comparing substantive ideological groups, either by top and bottom conservatism

quartiles ($F(1,130) = 2.100, p = .150$) or deciles ($F(1,51) = 2.252, p = .140$), meaning that **identity** is the key here.

Factor	Model 1: All Liberal and Conservative Identifiers		Model 2: Separated Regressions by Self-Identified Ideology				Model 3: Separated Regressions by Substantive Ideology			
			Liberals (n=42)		Conservatives (n=109)		Liberals (n=69)		Conservatives (n=63)	
	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced	Full	Reduced
PFC	.112		.051	-.240	.240*	.160	.042	-.010	.289*	.260*
IU	-.032		-.063		-.055		-.174		.029	
NFCC-O	.092		.099		.093		.265		.093	
NFS	-.080		.024		-.135		-.103		-.221	
Openness	.050		-.085		.029		-.151		-.033	
Dogmatism	-.099		-.068		-.099		.156		.049	
IA	-.262**	-.275***	-.456		-.145		-.184		-.221	
NE	.303***	.372***	.233	.261	.396***	.396***	.245*	.246*	.262*	.239
Identification	-.324**	-.193**								
Conservatism	.183									
Knowledge	.115		.124		.118		.380**	.372**	.210	.158
Adj. R-Squared	.280	.256	.112	.085	.229	.183	.205	.218	.113	.123

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Model 2, meanwhile, *seems* to present evidence for my central theory, but does not quite hold up under statistical scrutiny. When predicting incongruence by self-identified ideology using psychological factors and political knowledge, a Fisher's Z-test comparing the overall and reduced adjusted R-squared values shows that the values are not quite significantly different enough to say that the model is actually better for self-identified conservatives than self-identified liberals ($Z = .925$ for the full model, and $.837$ for the reduced model, both of which are under the 1.96 required).

The same story is true for Model 3, although the difference that appears to be the case (prior to dismissing it as non-significant) is that the model works better for substantive liberals than conservatives. Still, though, this difference is, in fact, dismissed

as non-significant after a null result of a Fisher's Z-test comparing the adjusted R-squared values for the full ($Z = .779$) and reduced ($Z = .783$) models.

For H2, then, no difference exists in predictive capacity of the internal factor predictors between ideologies, regardless of how ideology is operationalized. The political substance of H2 is rejected.

For Study 4.3 overall, however, the importance of psychological factors and social identity in the links to attitudinal incongruence is clear. The almost ever-present impact of Need to Evaluate, especially for self-identified conservatives in Model 2, is particularly interesting, and will be more fully explored and connected to the broader picture of incongruence in the following sections.

4.4.1. General Discussion

There are two broad and interacting takeaways from the three studies above: the importance of contextual factors specifically—that is, the external factor of political, historical, and environmental contexts that is captured by virtue of the year in which the attitudes are asked—and the importance of internal and other external factors.

In terms of external factors, the results demonstrated in Study 4.1 make their importance clear: even when taking into account the number of items available (as a natural result of standard measures of deviance in statistics), the year of the survey appears to have the strongest impact on incongruence of any factor, although ideological identification did appear to have a role at some avenues. On that fact, linear regression models—run separately for the collapsed ideological identification groups—using the year of the survey to predict incongruence demonstrated that survey year was a stronger

predictor for liberal identifiers than conservative identifiers, which supports the external side of my central theory of ideologically asymmetrical application of internal and external factors.

What also appears to be the case is that, over time, attitudinal incongruence has declined in prevalence in the general public. The average amount of incongruence in 1980 (6.152, SE = .0715) dwarfed the average amount in 2008 (4.711, SE = .0281), constituting a strong and significant difference, $F(1,3834) = 456.668, p < .001$. Whether this is reflective of a broader trend remains to be seen, but the differences are certainly intriguing.

The importance of internal factors is demonstrated in Study 4.2 with regard to, at different times, Openness, NFS, and MF-Authority, and Study 4.3 with regard to NE and, again, Openness. All four factors are internal due to the fact that they are derived through the use of abstract questionnaires. All four were strongly related to attitudinal incongruence *overall, and* in terms of subjects' substantive and symbolic ideologies, as observed in the factors' impact when looking across self-identified ideologies. As one example, in two of the three models in Study 4.3, as a conservative subject's individual Need to Evaluate increased, their attitudinal incongruence increased as well. Therefore, as predicted, something deeper than conscious deliberation and personal political identification and orientation appears to be driving a person to have attitudes that do not comport with one another. Although, in spite of my predictions, *many* of those factors that qualify as "something deeper" are *not*, in fact, playing a role—the internal factors that do play a role are actually quite limited in number, relatively speaking, due to the fact that many other internal factors did not have significant predictive effects.

External factors beyond context, meanwhile, also play varying roles, with ideological identification, marital status, income, education level, and political knowledge all serving as significant predictors of incongruence at some stage in the analyses in Study 4.2 or Study 4.3 above—for example, the effects of identifying as a conservative in Study 4.2 and as a liberal in Study 4.3 both have positive impacts on incongruence.

But, beyond context, there were no strong and *overall* ideological differences in terms of the utilization of external factors in predicting incongruence, however. While a few factors *were* predictors for one ideology but not another—for example, compared to the other income groups, for substantive conservatives in Study 4.2, having an annual income between \$40,001 and \$100,000 predicts lower incongruence, an effect that is not observed for substantive liberals—the observed effects were not broad enough to be able to confirm my central theory, save for the effect of education and political knowledge observed for liberals more than for conservatives.

To illustrate, both liberals with college degrees or more and conservatives with Master's degrees or more have lower incongruence scores than their education-category counterparts. However, the effect of political knowledge in Study 4.3 was only observed for substantive liberals—not substantive conservatives. The results suggest that political knowledge has a positive predictive effect on incongruence for liberals, meaning that, as liberals' ostensible political sophistication increases, incongruence does as well. This is likely a product of more knowledgeable liberals' heightened probability to associate liberal issues with a liberal belief system—that they may not personally espouse, given the exclusion of identity from Study 4.3's Model 3—and the fact that the liberal belief

system operationalized here, like the conservative belief system, is incongruent by its nature. However, it does not explain why the result is not replicated for conservatives in the same model. This is especially confusing given the combination of running standardized regression models and running the same models for both substantive ideological groups, on top of the fact that there was no significant difference between the groups in knowledge scores, $F(1,130) = .003, p = .958$. The role of political knowledge, then, is, as expected, enigmatic, if not wholly bizarre.

Nevertheless, the specific roles of the four internal factors shown in Study 4.2 and Study 4.3—each of which is defined and discussed in Chapter 2—to play roles in incongruence is important to explore more fully. For MF-Authority, or the authority/respect / authority/subversion Moral Foundation (Graham et al., 2013, p. 60), the fact that it is positively associated with incongruence overall, but *especially* for those who identify and qualify as conservatives, is logical for two reasons, both of which especially make sense in the context of conservatives' higher relative score on that Moral Foundation. First, conservatives' high degree of deference to authority as a result of their higher scores on both dimensions (RWA and SDO) suggests that they would wield the attitudes their authorities assert that they should have. Second, the fact that conservatives, and social conservatives in particular tend to see “obedience and deference” to authority as *virtues* in America (p. 70) means that they would not only be deferent to the opinions of the elites that drive incongruent attitudes beyond what would otherwise be predicted by RWA and SDO, but that they would be in stark contrast—qualitatively and statistically—to liberals, who tend to see those traits as vices (p. 70). Thus, the predictive

capacity of MF-Authority for incongruence should be strengthened for conservatives, which is the observed result (see Table 4.15).

Also logical is the strong positive effect of Openness to Experience for non-conservatives in Study 4.2 and Study 4.3. Those with higher Openness in general should be more willing to indicate attitudes that are incongruent with their other attitudes by nature of being Open (see section 2.1.1). The fact that the effect is not observed for symbolic or substantive conservatives is somewhat surprising; in this case, it demonstrates the relatively more powerful effect of personal politics on attitudinal incongruence, compared to the power of a personality trait. Thus, having a given personality trait here does not supersede having a political identity or ideology in terms of the wielding of attitudes that are incongruent with each other.

Need for Structure's effect in Study 4.2 is differentially predictive of incongruence: for substantive liberals, it is positively predictive; for substantive conservatives, negatively. The negative effect for conservatives is logical, due to NFS's association with a personal need to have an orderly, structured world. It makes less sense for liberals, however—why having a high need for structure in one's world would be positively predictive of having attitudes that are incongruent with each other is likely explained by the same, somewhat counterintuitive mechanisms that explain the overall importance of epistemic factors for conservatives that *should* drive well-structured attitudes but, instead, seem to do the opposite. It is still unclear, though, why this is happening for liberals.

The role shown in Study 4.3 to be played by the Need to Evaluate—positively predicting incongruence for subjects who identified with an ideology (and *especially* with

self-identified and substantive conservatives), and the fact that it appears to be a stronger predictor than ideological identification in Model 1—means that not all psychological factors are superseded by personal politics. The fact that the Need to Evaluate is positively associated with incongruence in general makes sense in terms of its relationship with having an absolutist worldview (see Jarvis & Petty, 1996), especially when combined with the fact that the association appears to be strongest for conservatives.

4.4.2. Conclusions: What Can be Said for the IEM and my Central Theory?

Obviously, the relationship between ideology, internal and external factors, and attitudinal incongruence is multifaceted and complex. The results of all three studies demonstrate that the IEM is a functional and effective lens for viewing the impact of internal and external factors on attitude structures and subsequent incongruence thereof.

However, do the results support my central theory that the IEM is asymmetric in its mechanisms with regard to political ideology? Not entirely. While it would be easy to blame the, cautiously-speaking, *limitations* of the theory observed in these studies on the limitations of the samples, the tests that were run to discern the statistical power of the potential effects served to alleviate the potential sample weaknesses. Thus, the overarching and broad explanatory power postulated by my central theory is superficially rejected, but narrowing the focus to be limited to the effects that were observed, two key aspects are **upheld and confirmed** by my study results.

First is the result that the effect of identity—confusingly, but appropriately (see section 2.2.1) an external factor by the IEM’s operationalization—has a significant role to

play at nearly all levels (demonstrated in each study), and that this effect may, as predicted, be stronger for liberal rather than conservative identifiers. This was shown most apparently in the cross-ideological effects of identity on incongruence in the 2008 ANES in Study 4.1, and the weaker relative regression model for liberal- rather than conservative-identifier groups (but not substantive ideology groups) in Study 4.2.

Second, and going off of that fact, models using internal factors to predict incongruence tended to have more explanatory power—that is, had higher R-squared values—for conservatives than they did for liberals. While power analyses showed most of these differences to be lacking in large enough sample sizes to be able to dismiss the possibility of Type I errors (Cohen, 1988), problems with statistical power are not contradictory evidence in themselves, but, rather, caveats and grains of salt. Importantly, three models *were* powerful enough: in Study 4.2, the internal factor regression (predicting incongruence with Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, Need for Structure, and MF-Authority) was significantly stronger for self-identified conservatives than self-identified liberals (see Table 4.16); in Study 4.3, both Model 1 and Model 2 replicated that effect in terms of including identity as a predictor itself alongside Intolerance of Ambiguity and Need to Evaluate for Model 1 and just Need to Evaluate for Model 2, and running the model separately for both political identities (see Table 4.20). The independent effect of the Preference for Consistency on incongruence for substantive conservatives is also worth mentioning in Study 4.3's Model 3, especially when comparing it to the effect of political knowledge for substantive liberals in the same model.

It is thus necessary to refine my central theory of asymmetric application of the IEM (see section 2.2.2) to make it congruent with the results observed in this chapter. The refined central theory is explicated as follows: the external factors of overall context (measured by survey year), ideological identification, education, political knowledge, and income, and the internal factors of the Authority/Subversion Moral Foundation, Openness to Experience, the Need for Structure, and the Need to Evaluate, are all significant predictors of incongruence—but the respective predictive powers are dependent on political ideology.

For conservatives specifically, attitudinal incongruence is dependent on the *interactional* utilization of the external factors of ideological identification, education, and income coupled with the internal factors of Agreeableness (negatively), the Need for Structure (negatively), MF-Authority (positively), the Need to Evaluate (positively), and the *independent* utilization of the Preference for Consistency (positively). Thus, **conservative incongruence is driven by a conglomeration of external and internal factors.**

For liberals specifically, attitudinal incongruence is dependent on the *interactional* utilization of the external factor of ideological identification coupled with the external factor of context and the internal factors of Openness and NFS, and the *independent* utilization of the external factor of political knowledge (positively). Thus, **liberal incongruence is driven more by external factors.**

Therefore, the evidence presented thus far demonstrates that there is an ideologically asymmetric application of the IEM in terms of attitudinal incongruence.

The following chapter sets out to explore whether the central theory of ideological asymmetry is also demonstrated in how ideological adherents *deal with* their incongruence and the incongruence of others.

CHAPTER 5

HAVING YOUR CAKE AND EATING IT TOO:

USING COGNITIVE DISSONANCE TO EXPLORE ATTITUDINAL
INCONGRUENCE¹³

Obviously they [conservatives] are hypocrites in that they want small government but then want to ban gay marriage and increase spending on national defense. You simply can't have the best of both worlds.

—Liberal experimental participant

Liberals are hypocrites because like Obama he wants equality but then he is exempt from Obamacare.

—Conservative experimental participant

5.1.1. The Importance of Leon Festinger

As previously discussed, a person who has attitudes that contradict each other is attitudinally incongruent. For many social psychology scholars, this person is exemplary of cognitive dissonance. This research field began in the Fifties with Leon Festinger (Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2007), and, subsequently, his landmark 1957 work—as of this writing, according to Google Scholar, Festinger's (1957) tome has been cited nearly 23,000 times, so its status as a landmark piece is essentially unquestionable—on people exhibiting attitudes or behaviors that are logically inconsistent with each other.

¹³ A shorter, more standalone version of this chapter—titled “Having Your Cake and Eating it Too: Cognitive Dissonance and the Psychological Underpinnings of Attitudinal Incongruence”—was prepared for, and presented at, the 2014 meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.

As an attitudinal example, for Festinger (1957), a white person may not think of themselves as racist, but they still oppose having non-whites living near their home (p. 1). As a behavioral example, Festinger uses a smoker who smokes even after learning of its dangers (pp. 5-6). It is apparent, then, that these people exhibit cognitive dissonance and, according to Festinger, they will try to deal with this discrepancy because it causes them discomfort, the “symptoms” of which can be observed (p. 24).

In terms of vocabulary, “dissonance” literally means the same thing as “inconsistency”—a fact Festinger (1957) acknowledges early on (p. 2). Festinger chooses “dissonance” instead to take his research outside of the “logical” realm that “inconsistency” occupies, definitionally (p. 2). “Consistency,” meanwhile, is replaced by “consonance” (p. 3). While these simple vocabulary changes simplify research in cognitive dissonance, they also wall the research off from similar work in the structure of attitudes that may not specifically explore *dissonance*, but still explores the way attitudes will affect other attitudes (e.g., Judd & Downing, 1990; Judd, Krosnick, & Milburn, 1981; Lavine et al., 1997)—although, it should be noted that some related scholarship has briefly noted the connection between dissonance and attitude structures (e.g., Critcher et al., 2009; Hoffman, 1971; Lavine, Borgida, & Sullivan, 2000).

For political psychology research in particular, then, Converse’s (1964) massively influential work on ideology is ostensibly one step removed from Festinger—a branch away on a tree of psychology scholarship.

This dissertation and this chapter in particular serve as a direct unification of Converse’s belief system constraint and Festinger’s cognitive dissonance. For Converse (1964) and his followers, people have belief systems—probably not very stable ones, but

belief systems nonetheless—that dictate their political attitudes. For Festinger (1957) and his followers, people have political attitudes, many of which will contradict each other—and if, or when, people figure this out, they will try to deal with it. Combining the two lenses, then, **when people encounter attitudinal incongruence, it should, at some level, cause them to experience psychological arousal and discomfort.** This is the central thinking behind this chapter.

Before continuing, I must make a definition clear: I will employ “cognitive dissonance” when specifically discussing cognitive dissonance literature, but use “congruence” and “incongruence” when explicitly deviating from previous research on dissonance and focusing instead on my specific dissertation topic.

5.1.2. Cognitive Dissonance & Attitudinal Incongruence

Festinger’s (1957) model holds that people will naturally be motivated to deal with dissonance, either because they may otherwise damage their self-image (Aronson, 1992) or other people (Cooper & Fazio, 1984), or because they are fulfilling a commitment (Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2007), or, as simply put by Festinger (1957), because dissonance “is extremely painful and intolerable” for some people (p. 266). Whatever the underlying cause of dissonance may be, the negative psychological arousal and emotional discomfort (Cooper & Fazio, 1984, p. 257) that people will feel in response to their dissonant attitudes or behaviors is obviously dependent on whether they *realize* the dissonance.

Realizing dissonance, or even general awareness of dissonance and the effect it can have, is an idea that, according to some, has been “seldom” investigated (Lieberman,

Ochsner, Gilbert, & Schacter, 2001, p. 138), in spite of the obvious notion that it should be an important aspect of the topic of dissonance. Although, research *has* demonstrated that dissonance reduction is largely automatic (Brock & Grant, 1963), with amnesiacs and people placed under cognitive load reducing dissonance to nearly the same degree as a control group (Lieberman et al., 2001). Additionally, research has found that monkeys and, to a lesser degree, toddlers may be subject to a drive to reduce cognitive dissonance to a similar degree as adult humans (Egan, Santos, & Bloom, 2007). These findings mean that cognitive dissonance reduction does not require higher-order thinking and high cognitive complexity. For dissonance scholars, people are not *rational*, but they are, or at least *try* to be, *rationalizing* (Aronson, 1969, p. 3); or, if not, then they at least tend to wind up dealing with dissonance in similar ways to people who are relatively rational (Brock & Grant, 1963; Egan et al., 2007; Lieberman et al., 2001).

Accordingly, people will *deal with* dissonance in one of three ways: *Modification* of dissonant elements, *addition* of elements that are not dissonant, or *minimization* of dissonant elements (Festinger, 1957). Others have since hypothesized and demonstrated additional dissonance-reduction strategies, but each tends to be variations on or combinations of the original three. For example, *denial / denial of responsibility* (Gosling, Denizeau, & Oberlé, 2006; Reicherter, Aylward, Student, & Koopman, 2010) and *trivialization* (Simon, Greenberg, & Brehm, 1995) are both forms of minimization, while *attitude bolstering*—for example, self-identified feminists *strengthening*, or at least *superficially strengthening* pro-woman attitudes after being made to look anti-woman (Sherman & Gorkin, 1980)—is a form of addition and modification. Along that notion, making subjects acknowledge the importance of safe sex and the dangers of AIDS

increased those subjects' safe sex habits (Stone, Aronson, Crain, Winslow, & Fried, 1994). In any case, it is clear that *people react* when they confront dissonance, one way or another.

Reviews of cognitive dissonance research suggest that the “most often assessed” form of dissonance reduction is modification, in which people simply change their attitudes to make them more consonant (Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2007, p. 8)—or, in my terminology, congruent. Others have demonstrated that people will cope with dissonance with whatever method is presented to them first (Voisin, Stone, & Becker, 2013, p. 58), with experimental context being key to how participants will react (Lasorsa, 2009), as well as individual characteristics of those participants—for example, smoking behavior (Brock & Balloun, 1967) and political orientation (Critcher et al., 2009; Nam et al., 2013).

I suggest an overarching alternative explored by Brehm and Cohen (1962), among others (e.g., Cohen, 1960), in their assessments of the widely differing reactions to dissonance-arousing stimuli, in which *individual differences* and, in an experimental situation, *context* will first dictate *whether* a person will attempt to reduce dissonance—that is, if they discern that they are being incongruent in the first place—and, if they will, what method they will use. In other words, all people will not react to dissonance in the same way; a person's reaction, if they have one, will depend on their individual psychological, cognitive, and biological composition, and the design of the experiment in which they are placed (e.g., Critcher et al., 2009; Nam et al., 2013; Newby-Clark, McGregor, & Zanna, 2002).

Clearly, individual differences people play a role in whether a person will be aware at the outset that they are being incongruent, with a large role played by a *resistance to change* (Scheier & Carver, 1980), and, consequently, likely the underlying factors that drive *it*—for example, dogmatism (Rokeach, 1954), IA (Budner, 1962), NFCC (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), and more (see sections 2.1.1, 2.1.2. and 2.1.3). It is an effort to reduce uncertainty and a dispositional preference for consistency that could drive attitude change for some people (Mills, 1965), along with other individual differences (Cohen, 1960, p. 316). Even Festinger (1957) noted this, stating that dissonance reduction’s effectiveness depends on “the resistance to change of the cognitive elements involved in the dissonance” (p. 265).

Festinger (1957) goes on to note that people with a *low tolerance of dissonance* are probably more likely to “see issues more in terms of ‘black and white,’” as opposed to others who can “maintain ‘greys’” (p. 267). Again, this clearly harkens back to the epistemic and existential drivers of political attitudes (see section 2.1.1), with NFCC, as one example, driving the absolutist worldview of conservatives (Golec de Zavala & Van Bergh, 2007). Cognitive dissonance obviously has a place in the assertions of the IEM (see section 5.1.3).

Meanwhile, dissonance in politics more generally is an obvious—because of the regularly exhibited hypocrisy of politicians and readily observable absurdity of modern political systems—but only negligibly-tread direct avenue of research (Bølstad, Dinas, & Riera, 2013; Elinder, 2012; Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Ni Sullivan, 2003; McGregor, 2013; Moshe, 2010; Mullainathan & Washington, 2009; Nam et al., 2013). Interest in the

strict applications of cognitive dissonance theory has only developed “recently” in political science (McGregor, 2013, p. 169).

Academically proximal applications, however, are found in a number of scholars using cognitive dissonance theory to explore the effects of selective political information exposure (Garrett, 2009a; 2009b; Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2009; Lavine, Lodge, & Freitas, 2005; Westerwick, Kleinman, Knobloch-Westerwick, 2013), due to the fact that people prefer to seek out information in line with beliefs that they already hold (Hyman & Sheatsley, 1947), a notion postulated by Festinger (1957, p. 128). These experiments generally conclude that people are going to seek out information that supports their pre-existing attitudes and avoid or dismiss information that might contradict them (Hart et al., 2009), but this exercise depends, again, on individual cognitive, psychological, and ideological differences (Case, Andrews, Johnson, & Allard, 2005; Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995; Nam et al., 2013; Newby-Clark et al., 2002), especially with regard to biases in general (Klaczynski & Robinson, 2000). It also depends on the method by which subjects are exposed to information (Schwind & Buder, 2012), and subjects’ respective familiarity with that information (Schwind & Buder, 2012; Schwind, Buder, Cress, & Hesse, 2012)—although, according to those scholars, incorporating high-involvement operational institutions like “politics or religion” could yield different results (p. 795).

5.1.3. Cognitive Dissonance & the IEM

The mechanisms through which cognitive dissonance research fits with and applies to attitudinal congruence and incongruence and political psychology more

generally are, again, obvious. It is important, then, to elucidate where and how cognitive dissonance fits into the IEM. Several articles exemplify the relationship.

After demonstrating how conservatives and liberals react differently to the idea that their stances on abortion and the death penalty may contradict each other, Critcher et al. (2009) point to cognitive dissonance reactions as a potential explanation. Conservatives simply reject the idea that their attitudes are incongruent, likely due to underlying motivations that drive a *desire* for consonance/congruence. So, whether or not they are actually attempting to cope with dissonance—that is, if they realize they are being incongruent—they are using a form of the *minimization* strategy, or even the *denial* strategy (Gosling et al., 2006). It is a safe bet that conservatives' tendency toward rejection of the mere idea that they are incongruent is, perhaps, reflective of an uncomplicated, absolutist worldview in which the only good belief system is theirs, and the supposed contradictions are nothing of the sort.

Liberals, meanwhile, exemplify the *addition* strategy by acknowledging their incongruence, but *justifying it* as a necessary compromise of principles and values, thereby adding a consonant cognition (Critcher et al., 2009, p. 201). Essentially, liberals agree that they are being incongruent, but that it does not matter in the larger scheme of things. This ambivalent ambiguity is fine in the minds of these liberals, which makes sense in light of their lower IA (Jost et al., 2003a).

Conservatives' absolute rejection and denial of the notion that they are incongruent is echoed in Nam et al.'s (2013) study of the degree to which conservatives and liberals are willing to write an essay that contradicts their stated political beliefs—a classic paradigm in cognitive dissonance research (see section 5.2.1). Neither group has

trouble writing an essay about why tea is better than coffee if they prefer coffee, or why PCs are better than Macs if they are Mac users, but when given the option to not do so—as opposed to another condition in which they were required to do so—*zero Bush supporters were willing to write an essay about why Barack Obama was a better president than George W. Bush was*, as opposed to over one-quarter of Obama supporters who were willing to write an essay about why George W. Bush was a better president than Barack Obama is. Nearly the same result was observed when looking at Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton instead, although about one-tenth of Reagan supporters were willing to write a counter-attitudinal essay versus one-fifth of Clinton supporters.

Although Nam et al. (2013) demonstrate that the effect does not extend to the apolitical realm—but acknowledge that their apolitical items were possibly “too weak” (p. 6)—considering that the Bush and Reagan supporters in the study were very likely to also identify as conservatives and vice versa for Obama and Clinton supporters and liberals (p. 3; p. 5), this is a clear confirmation of Critcher et al. (2009). Again, conservatives were largely unwilling to consider an idea that potentially contradicted their worldview, unless they were forced to do so. Most liberals were guilty of this as well, but not nearly to the same degree. It was “a *relative* (rather than an absolute) difference in dissonance avoidance” (Nam et al., 2013, p. 6, emphasis in original). It is important, then, that analyses of this effect treat it as a probability, not an absolute.¹⁴

I propose that internal factors’ greater relative effect on conservatives drive their more closed-minded approach to the dissonance inherent in wielding incongruent

¹⁴ Necessarily, analyses like these must be done in what could be considered to be a “liberal,” open-minded mindset. Absolute, deterministic conclusions should be avoided when trying to discern differences that are regularly shown to be probabilistic and not universal. Therefore, I want to make clear that this practice is not a reflection of political biases, but rather a reflection of what I hope is proper scientific thinking.

attitudes. While internal factors obviously play a role in liberals' incongruence in those two papers as well—with, for example, liberals' greater *tolerance* of ambiguity likely playing a key role, albeit not necessarily a direct one—liberals are also employing a fuller view of the experimental conditions. In other words, liberals are much more willing to accept the idea that they are incongruent than conservatives are because liberals are more likely to employ deliberation in their attitude formation (Jost et al., 2003a) and more likely to look at the world from other points of view, which is both a conscious and non-conscious trait (Choma, 2008; Jost et al., 2003a).

The IEM, then, is a valid lens for exploring cognitive dissonance, as it demonstrates the differential driving factors of attitudinal incongruence—that is, cognitive dissonance—by ideology. Of course, absent from dissonance literature are libertarians and populists, in spite of the fact they constitute empirically distinct groups from liberals and conservatives (Carmines et al., 2012; Iyer et al., 2012).

The experiment in this chapter will seek to explore conservatives' and liberals' reactions to dissonance, as well as libertarians' and populists'. By doing so, and using attitude structures as a common thread, the fields of political psychology and cognitive dissonance are unified and, as such, the central theory of this dissertation can be transpositionally tested in a way that logically follows from an extrapolation of my theoretical framework.

5.2.1. Exploring Cognitive Dissonance Experimentally

An oft-utilized methodological paradigm in cognitive dissonance research is the “induced compliance” paradigm—also occasionally called the “forced compliance”

paradigm (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959)—which was first executed by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959). Their original procedure had subjects perform the “repetitive, monotonous” hour-long individual task of tediously maneuvering spools (p. 204; also confirmed by a control group), and then receive either \$1 or \$20—according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Inflation Calculator, about \$8 and \$164 in 2014 dollars, respectively—and tell the subject coming in after them how enjoyable the experiment was. A significantly higher proportion of subjects who received \$1 later indicated that they *actually* enjoyed the experiment, compared to the subjects who received \$20. As explained by the authors, since those in the \$1 condition had a higher relative degree of dissonance compared to the \$20 group—because those who received \$20 had an external motivation to spend an hour being extremely bored—the \$1 group needed to resolve the tension from the dissonance of receiving very little money for a terrible task, and did so by changing their attitude. Although, it should be noted that replications of the experiment have found the same results, but also that the dissonance of the \$1 group depended on whether they thought they actually convinced the subject coming in after them (Cooper & Worchel, 1970), meaning that the attitude change depended on an additional, external influence—in this case, the influence of a situation that was “at odds with one’s self-interest” (p. 205).

Since the original publication, the procedure and its variants have been used in hundreds of studies, according to Google Scholar searches for “induced compliance paradigm” and “forced compliance paradigm.” An oft-used subsequent refinement of the design typically entails having subjects write a response to a statement or prompt with which the experimenter has already determined the subjects disagree (see Brock &

Blackwood, 1962; Rabbie, Brehm, & Cohen, 1959)—that is, a “counter-attitudinal” essay (Scheier & Carver, 1980). Subjects are generally either told that they *need* to respond, or that the experimenter would appreciate that they respond but they are free to not respond—“low-choice” and “high-choice” conditions, respectively.

The primary way of separating the two choice conditions is through the simple inclusion of a statement and question pairing—such as that used by Gosling et al. (2006), “You are of course free to accept or refuse. Do you accept?” (p. 724)—at the end of the prompt, which, in that case, turns the low-choice condition into the high-choice condition. A potential addition to some of the studies that use this paradigm is the inclusion of an additional consent form on which participants agree with a statement such as “I voluntarily give my consent to write this essay” on a separate page (Elliot & Devine, 1994; Wakslak, 2012). To *most* starkly separate the choice conditions, high-choice participants have read and signed release forms that state the following:

I realize what is involved in this task and that I am performing it of my own free will. The essay I write will be sent to a committee on campus that is intending to make decisions on this issue based on the arguments it receives from me and other students. I am aware that I may stop participating in this survey now without loss of participation credit. (Elkin & Leippe, 1986, p. 58)

While some experiments use the content of the responses as the dependent variable (e.g., Linder, Cooper, & Jones, 1967), others simply use *whether* the subjects wrote an essay *in compliance with* the essay prompt as the dependent variable (e.g., Gawronski & Strack, 2004; Harmon-Jones, 2000; Nam et al., 2013; Sénémeaud & Somat, 2009). This is *thought* to be measuring whether an individual was willing to confront a personally dissonant—or, in my case, hypocritical—cognition; although, as it will be noted in the results, it may also or even *alternatively* be measuring *not* sincere cognitive

compliance, but simple compliance with experimental-project essay-writing *instructions* in general.¹⁵

A commonly observed result of the induced compliance paradigm is that subjects in the high-choice condition will *change* their attitude to the one they were induced into writing about supporting, while the low-choice subjects will not (Devine, Tauer, Barron, Elliot, & Vance, 1999; Linder et al., 1967). This effect depends on subjects' individual PFC scores, with those who are higher in PFC more likely to change (Cialdini et al., 1995; Heitland & Bohner, 2010)—an effect that may persist at least one month after the experiment (Sénémeaud & Somat, 2009). Also shown to play a moderating role in the attitude change effect in general is, oddly enough, mixed-handedness (Jasper, Prothero, & Christman, 2009). More specifically playing a role in the induced compliance paradigm itself are the factors of IU (Case et al., 2005, p. 355), the NFCC subfactor of a need for order (Stalder, 2010)—but *not* overall NFCC (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994)—and the related NFS (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; Stalder, 2010).

Additionally, general psychopathic personality traits have a negative relationship with attitude change, with subjects with higher psychopathic personality traits less likely to experience a change in attitudes, although that particular set of results was fairly limited (Murray, Wood, & Lilienfeld, 2012). It is very likely that other factors play a role as well, as a large swath of motivational factors have a demonstrated role in structural changes of attitudes (see Briñol & Petty, 2005), but research has yet to catch up with hypotheses in this case. Either way, as will be noted in the following section, it is important to understand and, ultimately, control for factors that could lead to the effect of

¹⁵ This idea was conceived most explicitly—as opposed to the, at most, *implied* conception by myself—by discussant Brendan Nyhan, who deserves sincere thanks here for pointing that out.

attitude change because the definitive purpose herein is to explore either/or compliance with the idea.

In any experiment in which the desire is to simply see how and why people react when confronting an idea, a focus should be placed on the factors above that have shown conclusively to play a role therein (see Harmon-Jones, Amodio, & Harmon-Jones, 2009). In the next section, I outline an experimental procedure that employs the induced compliance paradigm, and the method by which those factors will be recorded and analyzed in accordance with participants' behavior within the paradigm.

5.2.2. Methods & Procedure

The induced compliance paradigm is a solid experimental tool for exploring how subjects will deal with the confrontation of, in this case, their own contradictions and attitudinal incongruence. Therefore, this chapter will employ a version of the paradigm in an experiment designed to elucidate what, if anything, happens when people are shown their ostensible hypocrisy in their attitudes regarding when the government should be involved in something.

The experiment—performed on the participants in Study 4.3—will be conducted with the use of Qualtrics Research Suite (Provo, UT) online survey software. An email will be sent to the participant pool with a link to the survey and IRB information. Those who choose to participate will click the link and complete the web-based survey on an internet-enabled computer.

First, each subject will be asked to indicate their age and gender. Since the participant pool consists of students enrolled in introductory undergraduate political

science courses at a large Midwestern university who receive course credit for participating in experiments, two additional attributes will be obtained, both of which have been shown to have *some* effect in experiments on undergraduates: year in college (Matthews, Levin, & Sidanius, 2009; Reyna, Henry, Korfmacher, & Tucker, 2006), and major (Sidanius, Pratto, Martin, & Stallworth, 1991). Additionally, due to the strong effects of wielding a symbolic, self-identified ideology (Cohen, 2003; Ellis & Stimson, 2009; Hartman & Weber, 2009; Malka & Lelkes, 2010; Smith et al., 2012)—and, subsequently, the potential effects of group identity on dissonance response (Matz & Wood, 2005)—participants will also be asked to indicate their *party* identification on a seven-point scale and their *ideological* identification on a categorical list, including *Liberal, Conservative, Moderate, Libertarian, Socialist, and None*. (I choose to include *Socialist* over *Populist* because of the former’s higher relative recognition rate compared to the latter.)

Next, subjects will respond to a version of the Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory (1968), in which they will be asked to indicate the degree to which they agree with or are uncertain or undecided about—using a five-point Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree scale—21 political issues (see Appendix). The 21-item version used in this experiment most closely resembles that used by Smith, Oxley, et al. (2011, p. 392), although mine substitutes in a few items more related to current events and ensures that the items fit within my government intervention lens by wording them to necessitate government action or not, based on the agreement or disagreement with the item. For example, instead of participants indicating their level of agreement with “Illegal immigration,” the item I use will be “Border wall” (see section 1.3.1 for my reasoning).

Subjects will be asked to indicate their ideology and positions on political issues prior to—as opposed to following—the administration of the counter-attitudinal essay-writing aspect of the induced compliance paradigm so that the issues are fresh in their minds for the subsequent essay-writing. Essentially, then, participants are receiving a non-negligible priming effect about their own political attitudes and ideology. The purpose of the experiment is to see *what* affects *how* they respond or refuse to respond to a counter-attitudinal proposition. For ideologues, the counter-attitudinal proposition is that participants' respective ideologies' political attitudes are incongruent with each other. Therefore, after the preceding sections, each subject will be randomly divided into one of two choice conditions and asked to respond in essay form to one prompt, then another prompt. **The prompts will ask all participants to write an essay agreeing with the idea that conservatives contradict themselves in their political attitudes, and the idea that liberals contradict themselves.**

The order of the two prompts will be randomly determined, meaning that each subject will be in one of a total of four conditions, listed as follows:

- Condition 1: Low-choice condition A: “Conservatives contradict themselves,” followed by “liberals contradict themselves.”
- Condition 2: Low-choice condition B: “Liberals contradict themselves,” followed by “conservatives contradict themselves.”
- Condition 3: High-choice condition A: “Conservatives contradict themselves,” followed by “liberals contradict themselves.”
- Condition 4: High-choice condition B: “Liberals contradict themselves,” followed by “conservatives contradict themselves.”

In accordance with other induced compliance experiments, each low-choice prompt is preceded by the following statement, with the text box into which they will type their essay below the prompt:

The purpose of this study is to gather student opinions about politics. You have been assigned to write an essay in response to a particular issue in the study of politics. Please take a total of five minutes to write a short essay responding to the following prompt:

Participants in the high-choice conditions will receive a similar prompt; however, theirs will be different in that it includes additions to the prompt that make it clear to the participants that they have a choice to participate or not, and that they will receive course credit for participating either way. The high-choice prompts will, thus, be preceded by the following statement:

The purpose of this study is to gather student opinions about politics. You have been assigned to write an essay in response to a particular issue in the study of politics. You are free to accept or to refuse. You will receive course credit regardless of whether you respond. Please take a total of five minutes to write a short essay responding to the following prompt:

The prompts for the “Conservatives contradict themselves” and “liberals contradict themselves” conditions are, respectively, as follows:

- a) Most political conservatives contradict themselves. For example, they say they want a small government, but they also want to ban gay marriage and increase spending on national defense. Conservatives, then, are hypocrites. In the box below, write an essay explaining why.
- b) Most political liberals contradict themselves. For example, they think the government can regulate the financial system, but they don't want the government to get involved in social issues, and they want to decrease spending on national defense. Liberals, then, are hypocrites. In the box below, write an essay explaining why.

For those in the high-choice conditions, above the essay text-box will be two boxes corresponding to the following statements (Elkin & Leippe, 1986):

- a) By checking this box, I realize what is involved in this task and that I am performing it of my own free will. The essay I write will be sent to a committee on campus that is intending to design polls based on the arguments it receives from me and other students. I am aware that I may stop participating in this survey now without loss of credit.
- b) By checking this box, I choose not to write an essay. I understand that I will not lose course credit as a result of not participating.

At the bottom of the page will be a button for participants to click after they finish an essay, or after they check the second box. The following page will consist of the other respective ideology prompt and also contain the statements from the first page amended to reference the fact that they have already completed an essay.

While many other experiments that use the induced compliance paradigm only have participants write one essay, having participants respond to two prompts enables the analysis of how participants view the supposed contradictions of the other ideology, as well as how they view those contradictions in relation to those of their own ideology. Moreover, randomizing the order will help to alleviate any potential order effects. The fact that having a total of four, instead of two, conditions halves the number of participants otherwise available is admittedly a potential limitation of the study. However, the benefits and greater statistical control of randomization outweigh the risks of problems with statistical power.

As made clear in Chapter 1 of this dissertation, because my intentions are not to *change* attitudes, but rather to see *how*, or even *if* people *react* to their incongruent attitudes—although, reactions could obviously include attitude change—it is important to take steps to reduce the possibility that subjects' attitudes could be changed, or at least to provide for a method of determining what may cause potential attitude change. Therefore, it is necessary to design the procedure to provide for those potential causes of attitude change as well as potential covariates in driving how subjects may react in general within the experiment. Included in this chapter's experimental procedure must be a handedness scale (The Edinburgh Handedness Inventory; Oldfield, 1971), as well as the PFC Scale

(Cialdini et al., 1995), the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (Freeston et al., 1994), the NFCC subscale measuring a need for order (Stalder, 2010), and the NFS Scale (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993).

Moreover, because attitudinal congruence itself, and a greater understanding of what that may mean, has been shown to be dependent, in large part, on political expertise and sophistication (Federico & Hunt, 2013; Federico et al., 2009; Federico & Schneider, 2007; Griffin, 2013; Jennings, 1992), a measure of political sophistication should also be included.

It is important to gather as much relevant information about experimental participants without over-doing it, so to speak, by including as many measures as possible with the fewest possible response items. So, subjects will be given shortened scales when possible.

Accordingly, following the two essays will be batteries for the scales above, as well as a few other batteries and items that have been shown to have, or *potentially* have a role in cognitive dissonance: Openness, which has been shown to have an indirect role (Cialdini et al., 1995), measured with ten of the items from the Big Five battery (John et al., 1991); Dogmatism, shown to have a role by Feather (1969), and logically plays a role due to its inclusion of “double-think” items (Rokeach, 1960, p. 74), measured with a shortened scale (Troidahl & Powell, 1965); Intolerance of Ambiguity (Budner, 1962), shown to have a role by Shaffer and Hendrick (1974), measured with the Kirton (1981) shortened Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale; and Need to Evaluate—which has not yet been shown to have a clear role in cognitive dissonance, but, with its role in opinion formation

and strength, and attitude accessibility (Federico, 2007; Tormala & Petty, 2001), it is worth including—measured with the Need to Evaluate Scale (Jarvis & Petty, 1996).

In total, the following batteries will be used after the two essay prompts, in the order presented (see Appendix):

- The 18-item Preference for Consistency Scale (Cialdini et al., 1995);
- An updated 15-item political knowledge battery (see Federico et al., 2009; adapted from Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996);
- The 27-item Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (Freeston et al., 1994);
- The 10 items of the NFCC scale measuring a need for order (NFCC-Order; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011);
- The 12-item Need for Structure Scale (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993);
- The 10 items of the Big Five battery measuring Openness (John et al., 1991);
- The 20-item shortened Dogmatism Scale (Troidahl & Powell, 1965);
- The 18-item combined Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale (Kirton, 1981);
- The 16-item Need to Evaluate Scale (Jarvis & Petty, 1996); and
- The 9-item Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971).

It is important that the order of the batteries be organized to maximize honest, valid answers and, subsequently, proper analysis. I expect participant fatigue given the number of batteries, so the most important items should be earlier on. Since the primary target of study is whether participants in the high-choice conditions are willing to write counter-attitudinal essays, focusing on potential driving factors of attitude change in response to the induced compliance paradigm should take a backseat to dispositional factors that may play a role in the dependent variable. The Handedness Inventory, then, should be the final set of items of the batteries above, since handedness likely does not have much to do with whether participants will write a counter-attitudinal essay, and is only included because of the role it plays in attitude change (Jasper et al., 2009).

The final page of the survey will include several manipulation check questions, including questions asking whether the subject believes they had a choice in writing an essay or not writing an essay, whether the subject indicates that they were paying

attention during the whole survey, and whether they subject was only doing the survey to earn course credit. Before those questions, participants will be informed that their answers will have no effect on whether they receive credit for the survey, meaning they will not be punished if they say they simply breezed through the survey without paying attention.

5.2.3. Hypotheses

In terms of general results, I expect the following variable interrelationships, without regard for the experimental paradigm:

- Hypothesis 1a: Dogmatism, NE, NFCC-Order, NFS, PFC, IA, and IU will be positively correlated with each other and negatively correlated with Openness.
- Hypothesis 1b: Political knowledge will have no significant main-effect relationships with any psychological factors.
- Hypothesis 1c: For conservatives, political knowledge will have a positive relationship with Dogmatism, NE, NFCC-Order, NFS, PFC, IA, and IU, and a negative relationship with Openness; the opposite effect will be observed for liberals.

H1a echoes the mountains of research on the interrelatedness of those psychological factors (Jost et al., 2003a), and as a result, also serves as a manipulation check for the experiment. In other words, if H1a is not confirmed, something has probably gone wrong with the experimental procedure or with the participants.

H1b and H1c are attempts at replicating the findings of Federico et al. (2009), who found that those highest in political sophistication tended to have the strongest relationships between the respective psychological—or, to use the language of the authors, “pre-political”—factors and ideological affinities. This is a very common finding (Sidanius et al., 1996), which makes H1c in particular an additional manipulation check.

Altogether, H1 can be thought of as a sub-hypothesis to the rest of the chapter's experiment. It is not *directly* applicable to the point of the manipulation, but it is relevant to gain a better understanding of the participants who *are* applicable to the point of the manipulation.

Next, in terms of the experimental paradigm, I expect an overall replication of Nam et al. (2013), with a few additions:

- Hypothesis 2a: Conservatives—self-identified *and* calculated with post-hoc issue-stance composites, so symbolic *and* operational conservatives—in high-choice conditions will be almost universally unwilling to write an essay about why conservatives are incongruent.
- Hypothesis 2b: Liberals in high-choice conditions will be more unwilling than willing to write a counter-behavioral essay, but they will be significantly more willing to write an essay than conservatives.
- Hypothesis 2c: Libertarians and populists—calculated post-hoc, not via self-identification—in high-choice conditions will readily write both essays when their self-identification is neither conservative nor liberal.
- Hypothesis 2d: Conservatives in *low*-choice conditions will be more likely to write both types of essays than liberals in low-choice conditions.

H2a's substance relating to conservatives obviously presents the most interesting potential result, since such a result would figuratively separate conservatives—in terms of responding to their own attitudinal incongruity—from the other groups to the greatest relative degree. The hypothesis also stems from research similar to that of Nam et al. (2013), and cited by Nam et al. (2013, p. 7) in explaining their findings, that demonstrates that conservatives are more likely to strengthen their attitudes when confronted with contradictory information (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010) and weigh morality more favorably than pragmatism (Liu & Ditto, 2013).

H2b and H2c are simple extensions of those findings, treating the other ideological groups as decreasingly reliant on epistemic motivations in formulating and

understanding their political attitudes (Iyer et al., 2012). But, as noted earlier in this dissertation (see section 1.2.2), the dearth of literature on populists' underlying motivations hinders the prediction of their responses, meaning that this specific hypothesis is somewhat of a figurative shot in the dark.

H2d contradicts the null result of low-choice participants' compliance rates in Nam et al.'s (2013) sample, but I nevertheless would expect it to be true in this design due to conservatives' high rates of RWA—not to mention the fact that my experiment does not ask them to justify an idea as antithetical to their identity as the notion that Bill Clinton was a better president than Ronald Reagan—and as a result, conservatives' higher relative willingness to submit to established authorities. If the choice to *not* write an essay is *not* made clear, conservatives' general tendency to follow the instructions given by the authorities (see Dodd et al., 2011) should drive them to be more compliant than liberals, regardless of the content of the prompt in-question.

Breaking down the psychological factors and their relationships with the overall results, I expect the following results, consistent, for the most part, with respective findings in the literature related to those factors:

- **Hypothesis 3a:** Refusal to write a counter-behavioral essay will increase with Dogmatism, NE, NFCC-Order, NFS, PFC, IA, and IU, and decrease with Openness and mixed-handedness, especially for participants in high-choice conditions, and even more so for conservatives.
- **Hypothesis 3b:** Willingness to write the essay in either choice condition will increase with mixed-handedness and Openness, especially for liberals, and for conservatives as well (especially in low-choice conditions) but to a significantly smaller degree.

Because Dogmatism, NE, NFCC-Order, NFS, PFC, IA, and IU, and, inversely, Openness drive a conservative ideological affinity, and conservatives will refuse to write

counter-attitudinal essays in high-choice conditions (Nam et al., 2013), it stands to reason that these, ostensibly, “super-conservatives” will be most apt to exhibit the effect because they have all of the characteristics that have been shown to drive this response to dissonant cognitions. Although, conservatives in low-choice conditions again present an interesting group, and I expect that they will be more likely to be compliant more generally as a result of the instruction-following effects described earlier (see Dodd et al., 2011). Meanwhile, because a great deal of collinearity is expected when including all of the dispositional factors alongside each other, the dispositional traits that drive conservative attitudes with batteries that are *not* included in the experiment (see Chapter 2) will be reflected by including substantive conservatism as an additional predictor. Conversely, for H3b, increased mixed-handedness (Jasper et al., 2009) and Openness are drivers of willingness to write a counter-attitudinal essay (Cialdini et al., 1995), so they—especially for adherents to Openness’s basic political counterpart of liberalism (Carney et al., 2008)—should have the opposite effect.

5.3.1. General Results

The political demographics of the total sample ($n = 247$, 44.9% female, median age = 19) are shown in Table 5.1. A plurality (44.1%) of the sample identified as conservative, while a majority (54.7%) indicated at least a moderate affiliation with the Republican Party—indicating a fairly conservative sample.

Next, a composite ideological variable was calculated using participant responses to the updated Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory, with issues re-scaled along the lines of a conservative political orientation—in accordance with Pew Research Center’s (2011)

issue analysis—summed together to form a substantive “conservatism” variable (see Appendix), and standardized using z-score standardization. Additionally, two categorical variables were constructed from this composite variable: a quartile variable, with those who scored in the top 25%, middle 50%, and bottom 25% computed as three separate groups; and a decile variable, with the top 10%, middle 80%, and bottom 10% computed as three separate groups. Unfortunately, the negligible percentage of libertarian identifiers—not to mention the non-existent percentage of socialist identifiers—does not bode well for the analysis thereof. On top of that, the calculation of a libertarian score showed significantly less deviation than that found in the conservatism score. Thus, the ability to make broad claims about libertarians and populists is already threatened.

Table 5.1: Political Demographics	
Self-identified Ideology	Percent of Sample
Conservative	44.1
Moderate	27.9
Liberal	17
Libertarian	5.3
Socialist	0
None	5.7
Partisanship	Percent of Sample
Strong Democrat	3.6
Democrat	6.1
Moderate Democrat	14.6
No Party Affiliation	21.1
Moderate Republican	23.1
Republican	25.5
Strong Republican	6.1

5.3.2. Dispositional Trait Results

In terms of the dispositional variables, each scale was calculated and z-score standardized. Their inter-correlations are shown in Table 5.2.

The traits correlate with each other to considerable degrees. Of note are the moderate-to-strong correlations of PFC with all but two psychological factors and the moderate-to-strong correlations of IU with all but one. Even the trait of mixed-handedness appears to have a significant relationship with IA—although this is not statistically powerful enough to dismiss the possibility of a Type I error (Cohen, 1988), as its power is less than 80%.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Conservatism										
2. Knowledge	-.063									
3. PFC	.300***	-.091								
4. IU	.107	-.281***	.358***							
5. NFCCO	.057	.001	.401***	.314***						
6. NFS	.153*	-.086	.454***	.616***	.676***					
7. Openness	-.218***	.190**	-.009	-.242***	-.085	-.231***				
8. Dogmatism	.181**	-.250***	.304***	.500***	.076	.243***	-.069			
9. IA	.269***	-.145*	.415***	.441***	.338***	.483***	-.291***	.501***		
10. NE	.210***	.184**	.100	.013	.078	.037	.101	.049	.095	
11. Mxd-hnd	.025	.122	-.009	-.015	-.091	.002	.066	-.085	-.129*	-.087

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05

Trait correlations with political knowledge by self-identified ideology (see Table 5.3) revealed a few significant relationships of note, but only for political conservatives ($n = 109$), for whom political knowledge was negatively correlated with IU ($R = -.242$, $p < .05$), and positively correlated with NE ($R = .257$, $p < .01$). Neither effect was powerful enough to dismiss the possibility of a Type I error, however. This presents an almost-complete rejection of H1c in terms of self-identified ideology.

For substantive ideology, there were more significant relationships (see Table 5.3). The least-conservative quartile's political knowledge scores had significant correlations with PFC, IU, NFS, Openness, Dogmatism, IA, and NE. The most

conservative quartile's political knowledge scores had significant relationships with IU and NE. However, **only the effect sizes over .350 or under -.350**—namely, substantive liberals' knowledge correlations with IU, NFS, Openness, Dogmatism, and IA—had enough statistical power, given the sample sizes. (No significant relationships were observed for the least and most conservative deciles.) This is mostly a rejection, then, of H1c, meaning that something is strange and unexpected with regard to participants political knowledge scores.

Factor	Self Identified		Substantive	
	Conservative (n = 109)	Liberal (n = 42)	Conservative (n = 63)	Liberal (n = 69)
Conservatism	.276**	-.497***	.208	-.422***
PFC	-.029	-.153	-.176	-.251*
IU	-.242*	-.174	-.274*	-.447***
NFCCO	.063	-.059	.066	-.214
NFS	.079	-.192	.099	-.363**
Open	.159	.277	.022	.429***
DOG	-.118	-.185	-.239	-.371**
IA	.016	-.239	.079	-.375**
NE	.257**	.267	.263*	.283*
Mix-hand	.172	-.070	.191	.055

***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05

5.3.3. Essay Compliance: General Results

Essay compliance—the dependent variable of the study—was determined for both essay types in accordance with previous research, with full compliance-with-the-prompt noted in comparison to partial compliance (in which subjects were coded as having written an essay that ignored the explicit instructions of the prompt¹⁶) and full non-compliance (in which subjects were coded as having either not written anything or having

¹⁶ For example, in responding to the conservatives essay, if a respondent wrote about why liberals are *also* hypocrites.

written something to the effect of “I will not write this.”). In previous research, those who were *partially* compliant are not generally used in analyses or are included with those who are non-compliant; the focus is only on those who were *fully* compliant or *not-at-all* compliant; I will be proceeding along this line and *also* include those who are partially compliant as another category when doing so is applicable.

Pearson chi-squared tests reveal that the choice manipulation worked splendidly. Low-choice participants were significantly more likely to comply with the prompt than high-choice participants than would be expected by chance, as determined when comparing the full compliance variable for both the conservative-hypocrisy ($X^2 = 96.505$, $p < .001$) and liberal-hypocrisy ($X^2 = 108.927$, $p < .001$) essays and the *strict* compliance variable for both the conservative-hypocrisy ($X^2 = 85.152$, $p < .001$) and liberal-hypocrisy ($X^2 = 103.802$, $p < .001$) essays. Moreover, significantly more high-choice than low-choice participants agreed with the statement “I felt like I had a choice in writing an essay or not writing an essay,” $F(1,245) = 108.149$, $p < .001$.

In total, the number of participants in each condition was nearly identical, with 63, 62, 60, and 62 in conditions 1 through 4 respectively.

Compliance with the essays was first compared across ideological types for high-choice participants. Chi-squared tests reveal that, for high-choice participants, self-identified ideology had no significant effect on non-, partial-, or full-compliance with writing either the conservative essay ($X^2 = 1.122$, $df = 2$, $p = .571$) or the liberal essay ($X^2 = 5.576$, $df = 2$, $p = .062$). It also had no effect on strict compliance with writing the conservative ($X^2 = .242$, $df = 1$, $p = .739$) or liberal essay ($X^2 = .077$, $df = 1$, $p = .743$).

Chi-squared tests reveal that substantive ideology *does* appear to have played a general role in compliance for high-choice participants. For the full three-category compliance variable, substantive conservatives were *more partially compliant* and *less non-compliant* with the conservative essay ($X^2 = 6.516$, $df = 2$, $p < .05$) and the liberal essay ($X^2 = 6.550$, $df = 2$, $p < .05$) than substantive liberals.

However, the more reliable *strict* compliance variable tells a different story for these high-choice participants. There was no difference between substantive conservatives and liberals in strict compliance with the conservative essay ($X^2 = 1.267$, $df = 1$, $p = .260$). Although, substantive conservatives did prove to be more compliant with the liberal essay than substantive liberals were ($X^2 = 5.064$, $df = 1$, $p < .05$). Either way, though, either the null hypothesis is confirmed or the opposite of the hypothesized effect is confirmed, meaning that H2b is rejected.

For substantive libertarians and populists, meanwhile—calculated in the quartile and decile manner as above, except scored as the sum of issues that require government intervention; so, an anti-libertarianism/populism score—there was no significant effect on compliance for either essay for high-choice participants (all p-values $> .05$). In other words, neither substantive libertarians nor substantive populists were more or less likely to comply with either essay than would otherwise be expected by random chance; libertarianism score has no role in compliance. H2c is fully rejected.

To explore the low-choice participants for H2d, chi-squared tests seem to demonstrate a statistically significant role for self-identified ideology, but only for three-category compliance with the conservative essay—not for the liberal essay ($X^2 = 2.003$, $df = 2$, $p = .367$)—and in the non-hypothesized direction. 12 of the 17 self-identified

liberals (70.6%) in low-choice conditions were fully compliant with the conservative essay, compared to 23 of 58 self-identified conservatives (39.7%); interestingly, though, 17.6% of self-identified liberals were partially compliant, compared to 55.2% of self-identified conservatives. A chi-squared test of the three-category compliance variable ($X^2 = 7.520$, $df = 2$, $p < .05$), and a cursory comparison of the compliance rates across self-identified ideologies seems to suggest that self-identified liberals were more compliant than conservatives, but the effect does *not* remain significant when comparing strict compliance rates ($X^2 = .063$, $df = 1$, $p = .802$), suggesting that the significance is likely a false alarm, and a product of the low accordant statistical power derived from the small sample size for this comparison. Again, only 42 out of 247 subjects identified as liberal, which necessarily drives low accordant power with regard to ideological identification, especially when considering the fact that—in terms of issue stances—*too many* subjects identified as conservative.

The trend above is repeated when analyzing substantive ideologies. First, 23 of 37 (62.2%) substantive liberals in low-choice conditions were fully compliant with the conservative essay, compared to 11 of 34 (32.4%) substantive conservatives. Moreover, 29.7% of substantive liberals were partially compliant, compared to 61.8% of substantive conservatives. Again, a chi-squared test of this three-category compliance variable for the conservative essay demonstrates that the effect appears to be significant ($X^2 = 7.447$, $df = 2$, $p < .05$). Although, comparing strict compliance rates between conservatism quartiles demonstrates no significant difference ($X^2 = .115$, $df = 1$, $p = .735$).


Unlike the tests comparing self-identified ideologies, however, compliance with the *liberal* essay actually does demonstrate a significant effect, and a strong one at that


($X^2 = 10.456$, $df = 2$, $p < .01$), with 59.5% of substantive liberals being fully compliant and 37.8% being partially compliant, while 88.2% of substantive conservatives are fully compliant and just 5.9% are partially compliant. However, the significance again vanishes when only comparing rates of strict compliance ($X^2 = .094$, $df = 1$, $p = .759$).

In essentially every case, then, H2d is completely rejected.

Full results for both essays are shown in Table 5.4. Conservative essay results are pictured in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2; liberal essay results are pictured in Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4.

				Conservative Essay		Liberal Essay	
				<i>Three-Category</i>		<i>Three-Category</i>	
				Partial	Full	Partial	Full
Low-Choice	Self-identified	Conservative	55.2%	39.7%	19.0%	74.1%	
		Liberal	17.6%	70.6%	35.3%	58.8%	
	Substantive	Conservative	61.8%	32.4%	5.9%	88.2%	
		Liberal	29.7%	62.2%	37.8%	59.5%	
High-Choice	Self-identified	Conservative	25.5%	13.7%	7.8%	17.6%	
		Liberal	16.0%	20.0%	28.0%	16.0%	
	Substantive	Conservative	37.9%	17.2%	10.3%	24.1%	
		Liberal	12.5%	12.5%	21.9%	3.1%	
				<i>Strict Compliance</i>		<i>Strict Compliance</i>	
				Non	Full	Non	Full
Low-Choice	Self-identified	Conservative	11.5%	88.5%	8.5%	91.5%	
		Liberal	14.3%	85.7%	9.1%	90.9%	
	Substantive	Conservative	15.4%	84.6%	6.3%	93.8%	
		Liberal	11.5%	88.5%	4.3%	95.7%	
High-Choice	Self-identified	Conservative	81.6%	18.4%	80.9%	19.1%	
		Liberal	76.2%	23.8%	77.8%	22.2%	
	Substantive	Conservative	72.2%	27.8%	73.1%	26.9%	
		Liberal	85.7%	14.3%	96.0%	4.0%	





5.3.4. Essay Compliance & Dispositional Traits

Using ANOVA F-tests to compare the dispositional trait scores between strict compliance groups for both high-choice and low-choice participants, only a few significant mean differences are observed (see Table 5.5). For high-choice participants writing the conservative essay, those who were strictly compliant had higher average Dogmatism scores than those who were strictly non-compliant; however, its respective effect size of .221 requires a larger sample size (about 191) in order to eliminate the possibility of a Type I error (see Cohen, 1988), meaning that this mean difference should be taken with a grain of salt. Meanwhile, there were no mean differences in writing the liberal essay in high-choice conditions.

	High-Choice Strict Compliance F-Tests		Low-Choice Strict Compliance F-Tests	
	Conservative Essay, F(1,99)	Liberal Essay, F(1,102)	Conservative Essay, F(1,72)	Liberal Essay, F(1,89)
Knowledge	2.795	2.963	0.000	0.032
Conservatism	0.081	2.957	0.026	0.475
PFC	0.025	1.011	1.117	1.829
IU	0.027	0.006	1.199	1.664
NFCCO	0.141	0.249	4.741*	2.543
NFS	0.053	0.211	2.660	1.860
Open	2.969	0.027	3.649	0.062
Dog	5.085*	1.494	0.047	0.510
IA	0.015	0.023	1.527	7.117**
NE	0.000	0.012	0.013	2.878
Mixed	0.021	0.371	0.010	0.159
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05				

For low-choice participants writing the conservative essay, non-compliant participants had significantly higher average NFCCO scores than strictly compliant participants. Again, however, its respective effect size of .249 requires a larger sample size (about 120) in order to eliminate the possibility of a Type I error, which again leads

me to advise caution in assigning extensive meaning to the results. For the liberal essay, meanwhile, non-compliant participants had significantly lower average IA scores, with an effect size of .272; the sample size is actually large enough to eliminate the possibility of a Type I error, but just barely.

All of this suggests that the only legitimate dispositional trait effect on any compliance type is that of IA in the low-choice liberal essay condition, with non-compliance wielding lower average scores in IA than strict compliance. In other words, willingness to write an essay stating that liberals are hypocrites when it is not made clear that writing the essay is optional appears to be positively associated with IA.

Next, a binary logit for strict compliance with the *conservative* essay prompt was run using the dispositional trait scores as predictors, as well as the following: whether the subject was in the low- (1) or high-choice (0) condition; which prompt they received first (1=conservative; 0=liberal); self-identified liberalism (1) or conservatism (0); gender (1=female); and conservatism score. Because the high collinearity of all of the predictors suggests that including every dispositional trait score will lead to a great deal of overlap, the full model will be subject to an automatic reduction in a forward-conditional method to only include the significant predictors. The reduced model is shown in Table 5.6.

As expected, choice is an extremely strong predictor. Outside of it and the constant, two other predictors approach significance: Openness and Dogmatism. Therefore, strict compliance with the conservative essay is predicted most strongly by being in the high-choice condition, and by increasing scores in Openness and Dogmatism.

Predictor	B	SE	Wald
Choice	4.110***	.771	28.391
Openness	1.000**	.369	7.359
Dogmatism	0.897*	.353	6.480
Constant	-1.668***	.394	17.906

Chi-squared = 62.323, df = 3, p < .001; Nagelkerke R Square = .623; ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05

The same model was run for strict compliance with the *liberal* essay prompt. Unlike the conservative essay, only *one* model predictor was significant in the non-reduced model—the obvious choice condition variable (B = 4.972, SE = .911, Wald = 29.755, p < .001). Choice was also significant in the reduced model (B = 3.818, SE = .440, Wald = 75.189, p < .001)—which included only choice as a predictor—with the model’s strength demonstrated in its omnibus chi-squared test ($X^2 = 116.716$, df = 1, p < .001) and Nagelkerke pseudo R-squared of .605.

Thus, these results are almost complete rejections of H3a and H3b. The only hypothesized relationship that was confirmed was Openness’s positive impact on compliance for the conservative essay. Beyond that, no political or psychological factors proved to drive the hypothesized effect. In fact, Dogmatism played a positive role in the conservative essay, the opposite of what was expected. The fact that no predictors proved significant for the liberal essay serves as a categorical rejection of the hypotheses as well, in spite of the attempts to control for other potential effects (viz., essay order, age, and gender).

5.4.1. Discussion of General Results

It is immediately apparent that the notion that conservatives, however they are defined or operationalized, would be unwilling to write an essay about why conservatives

are hypocritical was false. The use of a student sample, however, does make the findings questionable—at least at the outset—for a few reasons.

First, it would be understandable to expect that undergraduates are not as politically knowledgeable enough for the sample to wield external validity. However, compared to the mean (.43) and standard error (.014) of the fairly externally valid sample of Federico et al. (2009)—after using the same methodology to calculate them—the mean (.51) and accordant standard error (.014) of my sample actually appears to demonstrate that my sample has significantly higher political knowledge, $F(1,533) = 15.886, p < .001$. This indicates that a lack of political knowledge is not a problem for my sample. In fact, this likely explains the almost-complete rejection of H1b and H1c: the high average political knowledge scores overall likely washed out any potential effects, in *addition* to the fact that political knowledge is not, by its somewhat trivial nature, measuring political sophistication—the variable of interest here, really—necessarily (see Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996).

It is also worth mentioning that a few participants, in spite of the explicit instructions within the survey to not do so, appeared to look up the answers to the knowledge questions, as demonstrated by the fact that a non-negligible number of responses to items asking, for example, the office currently held by Chuck Grassley were along the lines of “Senior United States Senator from Iowa since 1981,” which likely means that they simply searched for the answer to the item in another browser tab and typed in the first result. In other words, it is very unlikely that even the most politically sophisticated respondents would reply with *that* much information about Senator Grassley, but it is next to impossible to control for this apparent cheating outside of

analytically denoting those participants who gave too much information, so to speak. Nevertheless, I choose to give participants here the benefit of the doubt.

Second, because the participants were students enrolled in a political science course, they may have felt compelled to write the essay even in high-choice conditions, since they knew they were receiving course credit for participating in the survey, in spite of the respective notations in the survey text. But, again, as mentioned above, this was *also* not the case, as compliance with both essays was heavily dependent on the choice condition. Moreover, responses to the final-page manipulation check item “I felt like I had a choice in writing an essay or not writing an essay” demonstrated a strongly significant mean difference between choice conditions in the expected direction, $F(1,245) = 108.149, p < .001$. Therefore, this was most assuredly not a methodological problem.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, the student sample did not prove to be particularly ideological, only demonstrating a minor slant toward substantive conservatism. This is likely the only real weakness of my student sample, as the non-compliance effect was hypothesized to occur for conservatives. Without a legitimately large frequency of legitimate conservatives, then, it is not particularly shocking that the effect was not observed because, if the effect was going to exist, it would be most readily visible for strong conservatives.

However, this weakness is perhaps the only problem with my sample, and it was likely not enough of a drawback to prevent my central hypotheses from being confirmed—the effect should have been at least *marginally* observed. Instead, compliance did not play a significant role with regard to ideological metrics.

This result means that, unless something went horribly and unnoticeably wrong with the experiment, the conservatives-will-not-comply findings of Nam et al. (2013)—and, accordingly, the conservatives-will-not-acknowledge-their-hypocrisy findings of Critcher et al. (2009)—are the products of poor sampling or improper experimental manipulation. After all, in spite of comparing between every potential ideological dividing variable, and in spite of the experimental manipulation working properly, **there were very few significant differences between conservatives and liberals with regard to whether they would be willing to write an essay stating that they have hypocritical attitudes.**

Critcher et al. (2009) acknowledge that their sample is far from nationally representative and externally valid, emphasizing that the effects they observe are not universal across the ideologies, but are, instead, likely reflective of *some* underlying differences between the ideologies. Nam et al. (2013) make no such acknowledgement, but also do not claim that their findings are universal. Interestingly, it is important to note that a more direct attempted replication of Nam et al. also found null results (Brandt & Crawford, 2013). The replication authors were quick to note the difference in the political context during the given sampling frames was the most likely driver of this finding (p. 20), meaning that something probably happened to drive the Nam et al. (2013) effect in their time frame of late 2011 versus the replication's time frame of 2013—the same rough time period as my experiment. This again emphasizes the importance of historico-political context on this, and related topics (see Study 4.1).

Nevertheless, like Critcher et al. (2009), I do not claim that my results are externally valid, and I do not claim that the findings are universal across the American

population. Their *internal* validity is without question, however. What is more, the significant positive effect of Openness to Experience and Dogmatism on compliance with the conservative-hypocrisy essay offers a potential addendum to the limited literature on ideological differences in dissonance reaction, and clarifies the latent impact of ideology. Instead of simple political ideology—both in terms of identity and substance—being the chief driver of compliance, the increasing degrees of Openness and Dogmatism are the *only* potential drivers, in addition to the explicitly-stated ability to choose to not be compliant. But, again, the liberal essay had no predictors outside of the choice condition.

So, to briefly investigate liberal essay compliance further, utilizing a kitchen-sink approach and throwing in to the binary logit model the only remaining information about the participants—that is, their stated major—a significant forward-reduced model does emerge (see Table 5.7). In this case, subjects who indicated being physical, chemical, or computer engineering majors ($n = 20$) were more likely to comply with the liberal essay than non-engineering majors, with PFC also emerging as a significant positive predictor in this case—a sibling effect, if you will. In all likelihood, however, this is a mere statistical fluke; given the nature of logistic regression models, being an engineering major versus not being an engineering major technically only constitutes a small difference in the logged odds of compliance—which translates to being a basically non-existent effect—meaning that the PFC factor in that case is not meaningful.

Predictor	B	SE	Wald
Choice	4.151***	.496	69.958
Engineering Major	1.962*	.819	5.736
PFC	.485*	.237	4.175
Constant	.029	.753	.001
Chi-squared = 125.150, df = 3, $p < .001$; Nagelkerke R Square = .636; *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$			

Thus, the only truly significant predictors of essay compliance for either case are Openness and Dogmatism, and even then, only for the conservative essay.

Openness to Experience increasing the likelihood of compliance makes sense, as the trait is essentially an indirect measure of, ostensibly, creative and divergent thinking and imagination (McCrae, 1987). Logically, Openness *should* drive the divergent thinking that could lead one to being compliant with a possibly counter-attitudinal essay prompt. It is more surprising that Openness does not have a significant role in *both* essay conditions, and it remains unclear as to why this may be the case.

Breaking down the effect of Openness further, it appears that the effect of Openness on compliance with the conservatives-are-hypocrites essay is limited to self-identified conservatives. Openness does not have a significant effect for those who identify as something other than conservative ($B = .317$, $SE = .296$, $Wald = 1.150$, $p = .284$), but it does have a significant effect for those who identify as conservative ($B = 1.259$, $SE = .483$, $Wald = 6.803$, $p < .01$). However, again, this is the ostensible limit of the effect of Openness, even though it *should*, logically, have an effect on open-minded thinking across all conditions. It does make sense, though, that Openness would drive conservatives to be more willing to write an essay about why their attitudes are hypocritical.

Dogmatism's role is less intuitive, however. After all, why should this indirect metric of closed-mindedness (see Webster & Kruglanski, 1994, p. 1054) be positively associated with ostensible *open*-mindedness with regard to writing the conservatives-are-hypocrites essay? The logit model demonstrates a main effect of Dogmatism; the significance is *removed* when running the model for only one ideological group at a

time—for example, running the model with only the most conservative 25% ($B = 3.204$, $SE = 2.109$, $Wald = 2.306$, $p = .129$) or only the least conservative 75% ($B = .498$, $SE = .337$, $Wald = 2.183$, $p = .140$)—meaning that Dogmatism only has this effect when analyzing all participants. The main effect of Dogmatism, then, may be a statistical fluke, which would make sense because of what Dogmatism actually measures. However, this may be a partial confirmation of my earlier suspicions about Dogmatic conservatives' higher likelihood of being willing to follow instructions. If highly Dogmatic individuals are more willing, under some conditions, to write an essay about why their beliefs are hypocritical, this may simply be a product of high RWA—a strong positive correlate of Dogmatism (Crowson, 2009b; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993)—and its increased willingness to follow instructions. I did not expect this degree of an effect, however.

Still, these results all continue to point toward only moderate effects of dispositional, ideological, or demographic traits on compliance. This suggests no legitimate difference between conservatives and liberals when it comes to the respective ways they react to and deal with the cognitive dissonance of being attitudinally incongruent, in spite of the expectations that conservatives would be almost universally non-compliant. Instead, the only real differences that are observed are the product of two pre-ideological dispositional traits, and even then, only for one of the essay conditions. Therefore, the broad conclusion that can be made about the non-null observed effects here is that ability and/or willingness to recognize one's hypocrisy—or, as is likely the case of some Dogmatic individuals, ability and/or willingness to follow instructions—is

not subject to ideological factors directly, but, rather, *indirectly* through the associated psychological factors.

5.4.2. Qualitative Discussion: “Maybe we are All Hypocrites”

All of that is not to say that there were *zero* examples of those effects. Notably, for conservatives’ reactions, there were a number of instances of conservatives rejecting the premise of the conservatives-are-hypocrites essay; this effect was qualitatively—albeit, non-scientifically—reflected in the content of a few essays. Several self-identified conservatives noted the “unfairness” of the conservatives-are-hypocrites prompt, and—as an elegant and vivid example of the *minimization* strategy of dissonance reduction (see Simon et al., 1995)—pointed out that, even though they want to ban gay marriage, gay marriage “is a very minor issue.” Other self-identified conservatives appeared to either completely ignore the segment of the prompt about defense spending, or asserted that supporting increased defense spending does not contradict supporting a smaller government because, according to one participant, the Constitution says “that is the duty of the federal government.”

Interestingly, the self-identified conservatives who acknowledged that banning gay marriage, increasing defense spending, and supporting a small government were contradictory *universally* noted something to the effect of this set of stances not constituting “true conservatism.” Those who made this argument also had stances that were more reflective of legitimate libertarianism than conservatism; although there were not enough of these respondents to demonstrate differences in their composite ideological scores and dispositional scores with enough statistical power.

The qualitative content of the liberals-are-hypocrites essays was less clearly reflective of underlying individual differences, however. Some conservatives were, indeed, quick to point to this as an example of liberal inferiority, noting that liberals “are selfish,” “uneducated about everything, especially government,” and “can never make up their minds.” One conservative’s essay in particular took this idea to a particularly confusing extreme, stating that liberals

are cry-babies and want so many things but they don’t realize that everything is intertwined together. Like, they want us to get our national debt down but they keep increasing the debt ceiling and spending millions of dollars on pointless things. Obama is a great example, he is the ring leader of Obamacare and wants everyone to have affordable health insurance but the Affordable Care Act isn’t affordable at all. They are more than hypocrites, they are more along the lines of socialists.

Others writing that essay were not as sympathetic and extended their arguments to make broader conclusions, with one conservative stating that liberals

want religious freedoms for all religions except Christianity, with such things as a nativity scene and a cross in the front yard or prayer during school. At the same time, Christianity is the only religion that tolerates other religions. I think Liberal beliefs are mostly anti-God.

Both of the two previous essays demonstrated factual errors and over-generalizations, a characteristic also demonstrated by the conservatives in the Nam et al. (2013) sample (see also Mooney, 2012; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). It should be noted, though, that although those essays were not the only clear examples of factual errors and over-generalizations, a real conclusion cannot be drawn from only a few samples.

One conservative, meanwhile, writing the liberal essay noted, somewhat warmly (emphasis added),

...maybe we are all hypocrites...just because I am a conservative does not mean that I am going to say that liberals are hypocrites. They are humans just like me, **we are not robots.**

Coincidentally, two participants independently used a variation of the cliché, “You can’t have your cake and eat it.” Oddly, this metaphor was only used for the liberal essay, but an essentially identical point was raised in both conditions, with subjects of all political varieties noting that entire sectors of issues cannot be “compartmentalized” just because of personal preferences, and that the government cannot only regulate one system without regulating another.

Meanwhile, after pouring over the essays, the only superficial, non-scientific, and non-empirical claim that can be made is that liberals demonstrated both the minimization strategy that conservatives seem to use fairly often—one liberal’s liberal essay literally consisted only of “Liberals are not hypocrites”—*and* general compliance with the prompt. However, only 17% of the sample identified as liberal, meaning that any effect of *identifying* as a liberal would be reflected only minimally within the content of the essays, compared to the conservative-identity effects that follow from 44.1% of the sample identifying as conservative. In other words, because conservative identifiers were over-sampled—even though, again, the sample was *substantively* fairly moderate—the output of the conservative-identity disposition is seen more readily in the content of the essays as a result, in addition to the fact that the essays were *about* respective political identities.

Moreover, many of the essays were both confirmations of the personal discomfort with admitting incongruence and hypocrisy in one’s own attitudes *and* the willingness to attack the other side for the same thing. **This is demonstrative of the notion that attitudinal incongruence still constitutes a common source of both (1) political attacks and (2) personal political anxiety.** Given the fact that incongruence has been,

currently is, and perhaps always *will be* virtually universal in the national electorate (see Study 4.1), perhaps it should **not** be a source for either of those.

5.5.1. Conclusion

Cognitive dissonance functions as a lens through which attitudinal incongruence reactions can be analyzed, but in this case, conservatives and liberals largely react the same way. However, in spite of the fact that no significant ideological differences in dissonance reactions were demonstrated, there are clear ideological differences in psychological dispositions that did not surface in dissonance reactions, as shown in section 5.3.2.

The implications of these differences on the IEM are clear, and will be explored more fully in the following chapters, the first of which is a necessary analysis of the deeper, biological differences between different political orientations that was done in order to explore what, in addition to dispositional factors, drives attitudinal incongruence. Subsequently, additional tenets of the IEM can be elucidated and tested.

CHAPTER 6

THE BIOLOGICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF ATTITUDE STRUCTURES:
 COULD BIOLOGY EXPLAIN ATTITUDINAL INCONGRUENCE?¹⁷

The two parties which divide the state, the party of Conservatism and that of Innovation, are very old, and have disputed the possession of the world ever since it was made. This quarrel is the subject of civil history....Such an irreconcilable antagonism, of course, must have a correspondent depth of seat in the human constitution.

—Ralph Waldo Emerson, 1841 (Emerson, 1903, p. 295)

By documenting that political differences are not necessarily traceable to misinformation or ignorance on the part of one side or the other, scientific understanding of the broader and deeper bases of political diversity may make it possible for Emerson’s forces of tradition and innovation to live together, if not more profitably, at least less violently.

—John Hibbing, Kevin Smith, and John Alford (2014, p. 307)

6.1.1. Introducing Biology & Politics

There is more to the study of dispositional factors associated with—if not themselves drivers *of*—political attitudes than the psychological constructs previously discussed (see section 2.1.1). In fact, an emerging literature area has continually

¹⁷ A shorter, more standalone version of this chapter—titled “The biology of attitudinal congruence: Is inter-attitudinal consistency driven by biological dispositions?”—was prepared for, and presented at, the 2014 meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.

demonstrated strong links between political attitudes and biological, physiological, and genetic traits (Hibbing et al., 2013).

This chapter begins with a review of research related to attitudes—**and, subsequently, attitudinal congruence and incongruence**—in that quasi-embryonic field of biology and politics, and then, in an analysis of biological data, elucidates the connections between biology and attitudinal congruence and incongruence. In a bizarre twist, and perhaps the most consequential finding of this entire dissertation, I find a near-negligible role for physiology, but a strong and independent role for *genetics*: a single allele, in fact, is associated with more congruent attitudes, compared to its two counterparts' more incongruent attitudes, even when controlling for demographic and psychological factors.

The central question of this chapter is as follows: What role do biological factors play in attitudinal congruence? The central *answer* is difficult to explain.

6.1.2. Biological Underpinnings of Political Attitudes

For the purposes of this chapter, several key ideas related to biology, physiology, genetics, and the subsequent ideas' connection to political attitudes and ideologies should be presented. Table 6.1 lists the data that will be used in this chapter.

Table 6.1: Biological Traits Available to be Tested	
Trait	Measure
Electrodermal responses to threatening, disgusting, sexual, and political stimuli	SCL (micro-Siemens)
Cardiovascular responses to threatening stimuli	RSA
Electromyographic responses to threatening stimuli	Amplitude of eyeblink
Cortisol concentrations at baseline and in a stressful situation	Volume
DRD4, 5-HTTLPR, and OR7D4 Genotypes	DNA sequencing

First is the research topic of physiological response to stimuli. Typically, physiological responses are measured through the use of tools designed to quantify and record the degree of electrodermal, cardiovascular, and facial muscle activity.

Electrodermal activity (EDA) is generally measured with electrodes attached to a subject's fingers that record the degree of electrical conductance, operating under the notion that skin will be more electrically conductive with more moisture (see Dawson, Schell, & Fillion, 2007)—a by-product of activation and arousal of the sympathetic nervous system (Smith & Hibbing, 2011, p. 232), the subsystem of the autonomic nervous system dedicated primarily to the “fight or flight” response (p. 230).

Cardiovascular activity, meanwhile, obviously relates to the activity of the heart, which is influenced by both the sympathetic nervous system and the parasympathetic nervous system (Smith & Hibbing, 2011, 236)—the latter of which is dedicated to the “rest and digest” response (p. 230), essentially constituting an antagonist to the sympathetic nervous system—and is measured with electrocardiographic instruments that detect and record the beating pattern of the heart (p. 236). Worth mentioning here is the, evolutionarily-speaking, “newer” (Woody & Szechtman, 2011, pp. 1025) mammalian mechanism known as the respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA), a between-heartbeats measurement of variability in heart-rate that is a product of the cardiovascular and respiratory systems interacting (Grossman & Taylor, 2007, p. 263), and that serves as a fairly direct measurement of parasympathetic nervous system activation. RSA has been shown to be, at the very least, involved in emotional responses and general emotional reactivity (Butler, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2006).

Facial muscle activity is predicated on the notion that a person's face expresses non-conscious outputs of behavioral states (see Tassinari, Cacioppo, & Vanman, 2007). Electromyography—a common metric for recording muscular activity (Smith & Hibbing, 2011, p. 233)—uses electrodes to record facial muscle activation. In the case of political physiology research and this chapter in particular, the relevant muscle is the orbicularis oculi, which, among other things, measures the amplitude of eye blinks, which correlates positively with heightened states of fear (Oxley et al., 2008, p. 1668), since a “startle blink” is a reflexive reaction to threat from an environment (Smith & Hibbing, 2011, p. 235).

Oxley et al. (2008) demonstrated that people with conservative political attitudes tend to have higher physiological reactivity to threatening stimuli—measured in skin conductance response and eye-blink amplitude—than people with liberal attitudes. These findings make sense in light of the oft-noted connection between conservatism and a response to threat (Carraro, Castelli, & Macchiella, 2011; Joel, Burton, & Plaks, 2013; Jost et al., 2007; Shook & Clay, 2011; Shook & Fazio, 2009), especially given the notion that heightened threat experience will generally be associated with conservative *shifts* in issue preferences (see Smith, Oxley, et al., 2011, p. 381), as well as studies of ideological differences in threat-related neural structures and the functions thereof (Kanai, Feilden, Firth, & Rees, 2011; Schreiber et al., 2013).

Second is the role of a person's endocrine system in political attitudes—an understudied, but important topic. The hormonal data available to be used in this chapter's

analysis are experimentally limited to the hormone cortisol. Thus, I will limit my explanation to cortisol, specifically.

Cortisol—*officially* known as hydrocortisone (French, Smith, Guck, Alford, & Hibbing, 2011, p. 5) and one of the five hormones of note in the study of biology and politics (McDermott, 2011, p. 254)—is regularly demonstrated to be positively associated with increases in stress (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004; Smyth, Hucklebridge, Thorn, Evans, & Clow, 2013). In terms of politics, it may have a correlational relationship with election results (Stanton, LaBar, Saini, Kuhn, & Beehner, 2010), if not an effectively *moderator* relationship between conservative ideology and losing an election, with conservatives exhibiting higher concentrations of intra-system cortisol after not winning the 2008 Presidential Election (Blanton, Strauts, & Perez, 2012).

Cortisol is typically recorded with salivary sampling (Smyth et al., 2013), in which participants simply spit into organized test tubes several times over the course of an experimental procedure, typically one related to stress (e.g., French et al., 2011; French et al., 2014). The samples are then stored and analyzed using one of several techniques (Smyth et al., 2013, p. 609)—in the case of this chapter’s data, the samples were analyzed in accordance with the cortisol enzyme immunoassay method (Minton, Hertzog, Barron, French, & Reiter-Palmon, 2009; Smith & French, 1997). This method, to describe it very briefly (for a review of the full procedure, see Minton et al., 2009, pp. 1041-1042), involves using computerized chemical concentration detection equipment to determine the concentrations of cortisol in each sample, and quantifying it.¹⁸

¹⁸ It should be noted that the cortisol data used in this analysis are the same data used in the French et al. (2011; 2014) studies.

Meanwhile, although it is not directly related to the endocrine system, also worth mentioning is androstenone, a steroid, molecularly similar to testosterone, secreted by humans and many other mammals in, among other bodily discharges, sweat (Smith, Balzer, et al., 2011). Androstenone and its molecular relatives are thought to be involved in social signaling and social hierarchy (Hummer & McClintock, 2009; Smith, Balzer, et al., 2011), which makes it an ideal candidate molecule in political science studies with foci thereon. Smith, Balzer, et al. (2011) demonstrated that those who are able to detect an intense androstenone odor tend to hold conservative political attitudes, while liberals tended to be less able to detect it. Relevant for this chapter's research, then, is the assertion by several researchers that the detection of androstenone and the subsequent social signaling properties of the chemical and its close molecular relatives may be a remnant of earlier humanity (Huoviala & Rantala, 2013, p. 6); it would logically follow that, given the assumptions of the IEM that are shared with those in evolutionary psychology (see section 2.2.2), the detection of androstenone could play a role in attitude formation and subsequent attitudinal incongruence.

Finally, with the availability of several specific genetic factors—a DRD4 allele genotype, a 5-HTTLPR allele genotype, and the androstenone-detection single-nucleotide pair (SNP) of rs61729907 from the OR7D4 gene—it is necessary to review the role they could potentially play. Although, it must first be noted, however, that the connection between specific genetic factors and politics, like the connection between specific genetic factors and any behavioral or attitudinal output (Smith, Oxley, et al., 2011), is hazy at best and, more realistically, near impenetrable. So, I will not be delving into the specific

mechanisms by which genotypes are instantiated in social behavior, but providing a very brief overview of the minimal amount of research that broadly ties the genotypes to certain general social behavior. The focus, as it will become clear, will be on one genetic factor in particular, without much discussion of the other two, as only one (5-HTTLPR) *should* be related to the output of incongruent attitudes.

The DRD4 gene and its long-form allele (7R), broadly, have been shown to be moderately associated with social network size (Settle, Dawes, Christakis, & Fowler, 2010). The 5-HTTLPR gene's short-form allele is more prevalent than the long-form allele in collectivistic cultures versus individualistic cultures *and* seems to be associated with higher degrees of general anxiety and higher degrees of bias toward negative stimuli when compared to the long-form (Chiao & Blizinsky, 2010)—it should be noted that those two sets of effects are somewhat contradictory, given individualism's link to conservatism and conservatism's link to the second set of attributes. Lastly, a single nucleotide pair (SNP) from the OR7D4 gene is known to be associated with the innate ability to detect the androstenone odor (Keller, Zhuang, Chi, Vosshall, & Matsunami, 2007; Smith, Balzer, et al., 2011). Again, as will be noted in the hypotheses, and as should be apparent from this paragraph, the only genetic factor expected to play a role is that of the 5-HTTLPR alleles.

6.2.1. Exploring the Potential Biological Roots of Attitudinal Incongruence

It is clear from the literature, then, that there are biological drivers of politics—including genetic and physiological differences between ideological groups—namely, the findings that conservatives tend to be more physiologically reactive than liberals, that

cortisol and androstenone are associated with certain aspects of political behavior, and that there are genes related to politically-relevant personality factors, attention differences and cognitions, and novelty-seeking behaviors. In order to answer the central and titular question of this chapter, then, certain biological traits will be analyzed in accordance with their potential function in driving attitudinal congruence.

6.2.2. Methods

The data used in this chapter are from the same project as the data analyzed in Study 4.2 of Chapter 4. As a reminder, in the summer of 2010, adults from Lincoln, Nebraska, and the surrounding area were recruited via a participant-recruitment organization and paid \$50 to participate.

Following completion of the previously-analyzed computerized questionnaire with a series of demographic, political, and personality items (see Appendix for relevant items), one at a time, participants were brought into a laboratory and affixed with respective electrodes designed to detect and record the following: EDA, or skin response; cardiovascular and respiratory activity, which can then be used to calculate RSA; and the activation of certain facial muscles—most notably the orbicularis oculi. Subjects were shown a series of 34 images¹⁹ in random order for 14 seconds at a time, with a 9-second inter-stimulus screen. Interspersed within the image presentation were three loud “static” noises designed to evoke surprise and a startle eyeblink. Saliva samples were obtained from the participants that were later DNA-sequenced in the standard fashion (see French

¹⁹ Images shown include pictures of Hillary Clinton, Bill Clinton, Dick Cheney, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Nancy Pelosi, Abraham Lincoln, John McCain, Sarah Palin, and Adolf Hitler; as well as images of a baby, a gun, a laundry basket, a knife, another knife, a couple kissing, a man groping a woman, a person vomiting, a filthy toilet, triangles, roaches on a pizza, a water-skier, a snow-skier, an iron, a burn victim, a corpse, another corpse, a couple having sex, Niagara Falls, and a gun pointed at the camera.

et al., 2011; 2014; Fowler & Dawes, 2008) for the most oft-explored DRD4, 5-HTTLPR, and OR7D4 genotype forms.

For the cortisol section of the experiment, participants who indicated willingness to continue being involved in this project on the initial computerized survey were invited to participate in a follow-up experiment. 105 of the original participants arrived on campus again, were paid \$50, and participated in a version of the Trier Social Stress Test (Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer, 1993), a common and widely accepted experimental procedure that, in this case, included a cortisol test. The procedure is as follows: subjects are first told to sit across from a confederate expert and follow their instructions; then, they are told to spend ten minutes preparing to give a videotaped and expert-judged three-to five-minute speech about why they would be a good candidate for a generic job; then, subjects are given a challenging math task in which they must, without the use of notes, continuously count backwards by a given number (e.g., 17) from a high number (e.g., 1020), going as far as they can until they miss a digit, at which point they must begin again. Following this, they are told they will not be giving a speech after all, and then spend the next sixty minutes watching a dry and emotionally-unstimulating video of countryside scenery while their cortisol concentrations—which can lag upwards of an hour behind a stressful stimulus—peaked and began to return to baseline. Saliva samples were obtained from the participants—who spit into small vials labeled with the participant's subject ID and assayed for cortisol concentration through the use of an enzyme immunoassay (for a further explanation of the collection procedure, see French et al., 2011; 2014)—upon entering the lab, then at 15, 20, 30, 40, 60, and 75 minutes thereafter, meaning that cortisol concentrations were recorded before the stress-inducing

procedure as a baseline, then throughout exposure to a stressful situation. Due to the fact that cortisol is affected by digestion and recent nutritional intake, participants were asked to refrain from eating or drinking for the two hours prior to the experiment.

Demographically, the sample ($n = 345$, after excluding participants who did not respond to the relevant demographic or political items) was moderately representative of the general population, but not entirely; therefore, external validity of the sample, while better than an undergraduate sample, is not fully achieved. The participants were 54% female, with an average income range of \$40,000-\$60,000. 55% indicated “some” college education or more. The representativeness of the sample was also hindered by the fact that 90% of the participants classified themselves as white. Like others who have used the data collected from these participants (e.g., French et al., 2011; 2014), I do not claim that this sample is generalizable to the American electorate.

As done with Study 4.2, participants will be given a post-hoc incongruence score in accordance with the Barton and Parsons (1977) methodology, based on their responses to an updated Wilson-Patterson (1968) Attitude Inventory (Smith, Oxley, et al., 2011). Additionally, using the available data, in accordance with the typology used in Chapter 4, participants will be categorized as symbolic and/or substantive members of an ideological group, and given ideological scores denoting the magnitude of their adherence to conservatism, and, ostensibly conversely, liberalism (see Table 4.13).

It should be noted again, however, that the attitude inventory used in this experiment did not have all of its issue items in line with a libertarian-authoritarian lens; for example, the item “evolution” has no explicit relevance to a government acting or not

acting, which means that including responses to it in the calculation of the Barton and Parsons standard deviation metric will, for lack of a better word, deviate the eventual score from the desired attitudinal incongruence score. To compensate for the smaller relative number of items used in calculating the incongruence statistic, the incongruence score will be calculated also uses political philosophy items that specifically measure degrees of support or opposition to government involvement (see Appendix).

Several biological measurements will be analyzed in accordance with hypothesized relationships with incongruence scores, and incongruence-by-ideology scores, including the following:

- Skin conductance response to threatening stimuli;
- Skin conductance response to disgusting stimuli;
- Skin conductance response to sexual stimuli;
- Skin conductance response to political figures;
- RSA;
- Startle eyeblink amplitude;
- Baseline cortisol concentration, peak cortisol concentration, relative cortisol concentration change, and total cortisol elicited in response to a stressful situation;
- Detection of androstenone odor; and
- 5-HTTLPR genotypes.

6.2.3. Hypotheses

As a natural result of attempting to demonstrate relationships between a set of biological measurements and the measurement of an abstract concept, this analysis is somewhat limited at the outset. The abstract concept here—attitudinal incongruence—is an indirect measurement, calculated after the attitudinal responses were recorded. As a result, the analyses in this chapter are not meant to constitute end-all conclusions, but

rather, mostly-indirect inspections for what could be playing a role in driving someone to have a given degree of attitudinally incongruence.

The hypotheses are, overall, predicated on the assumption that **incongruence and biological reactivity should be positively correlated**. This expectation is based on the notion that those who are more reactive in general would have probably—as a result of their worldviews being more focused on and around threats to their survival than other events and ideas—*devoted relatively less time to thinking about their belief systems and the logic or illogic inherent to them*. This is consistent with the aforementioned work demonstrating differences in incongruence based on whether subjects have been told to spend some time thinking through the logical implications of their attitudes (e.g., Judd & Downing, 1990)—although there are caveats to that finding (see section 1.3.3)—but seemingly inconsistent with the Kesebir et al. (2013) finding that Mortality Salience is positively associated with higher congruence of attitudes. However, this inconsistency is leveled off by virtue of the fact that the Kesebir et al. experiment involved a truly direct and explicit test of MS, whereas I demonstrated in Study 4.1 that increasing temporal distance from an event that instills MS appears to eventually drive the MS effect to lose significance.

- **Hypothesis 1**: Independent of ideology, physiological reactivity (measured by SCL response, RSA, and startle eyeblink amplitude) to threat, disgust, sexuality, and politics will positively correlate with attitudinal incongruence.

H1 operates under the assumption that conservative attitudes and general political conservatism are rooted in higher relative physiological reactivity to certain stimuli (Oxley et al., 2008). The line of thinking herein is largely a product of aforementioned

ideology and physiology research, but *also* a product of work in ideology and *locus of control*, which finds that conservatives tend to have a more internal—that is, more driven by non-conscious factors than by conscious ones—type of “deliberation” style, and framework of logic in their worldview (see Abramowitz, 1973; Gootnick, 1974; Gurin et al., 1978; Sweetser, 2014).

I will seek to demonstrate that it is the same underlying mechanisms that drive political conservatism and its underlying correlates that also drive attitudinal incongruence. Conservatism and having conservative attitudes, in this view, serve as side-effects, somewhat, of general reactivity. Therefore, *independent of ideology*, general physiological reactivity should positively correlate with attitudinal incongruence.

- Hypothesis 2: Baseline cortisol concentrations, peak cortisol concentrations, the relative percentage change in cortisol concentrations, and total cortisol concentration in response to stress will positively correlate with attitudinal incongruence.

This hypothesis follows from extrapolating the findings of recent work which shows that higher baseline cortisol, higher peak cortisol in response to stress, higher change in cortisol in response to stress, and total cortisol change in response to stress all appear to be associated with decreased general political involvement (French et al., 2011). Because, generally speaking, political involvement is negatively associated with attitudinal incongruence—or rather, positively associated with attitudinal congruence (Federico & Hunt, 2013; Griffin, 2013; Hagner & Pierce, 1983; Jennings, 1992; Miller et al., 1995; Wyckoff, 1987a; 1987b)—this hypothesis is a natural extension of those findings.

- Hypothesis 3: Those with the ability to detect androstenone, especially those who detect it and perceive it to exhibit an aversive odor, will have higher average incongruence scores than those without the ability, and those who detect the odor as non-aversive.

This follows from the findings of Smith, Balzer, et al. (2011), who demonstrated that conservatives tended to be most likely to follow the pattern hypothesized, and other work demonstrating conservatives' higher average rates of incongruence (Kesebir et al., 2013). The ability-to-detect trait is more generally thought to be reflective of very early periods of human history, during which many small-scale societies required heightened alertness to threats and social signaling cues—which necessitate differential and more complex olfactory perception—from which some scholars believe conservatives are more directly descended, so to speak. It is that set of traits, then, that I hypothesize are directly and indirectly driving typical conservative attitude structures which are, by their nature and by my definition of congruence, more incongruent. The independent effect of androstenone detection can be, at the very least, edged toward through the use of regression analyses that include controls for other potential explanatory factors.

- Hypothesis 4: Those with the short (S) allele of the 5-HTTLPR gene region will have the highest average incongruence scores.

While Arceneaux et al. (2012) demonstrated that incongruence was driven almost entirely by non-genetic factors, the genotype within this hypothesis *has* been shown to be associated with other sociocultural and political behaviors (see Chiao & Blizinsky, 2010). In this case of the 5-HTTLPR gene region, those with the short (S) form tend to have higher anxiety and harm avoidance levels, and a generally higher attentional bias toward negative information (p. 530)—although these effects are culture-dependent, with the

relationships observed significantly more readily in Western and, more specifically, non-East-Asian settings.

I hypothesize that this relatively higher bias toward fear- and anxiety-related negative information more generally, and the higher average level of anxiety may contribute to, ostensibly, the ability to devote lower magnitudes of cognitive resources to come to logically-constrained political attitude structures and, thus, will be associated with higher incongruence. Although, this hypothesis is not accordant with the fact that heightened attention to negative stimuli and threat appears to be negatively related to incongruence (Kesebir et al., 2013). I am instead depending on the assumption of a general negativity bias taking root and driving incongruence here (Hibbing et al., 2014).

In actuality, I suspect that the hypothesized mean-differences-by-genotypes relationship will not be direct differences in genotypes as much as they are differences in factors that are collinear with those genotypes (see Chiao & Blizinsky, 2010, pp. 530-531; see also Stoltenberg et al., 2002) and were not recorded within the study from which these data were collected. Controlling for psychological factors, however (see Hypothesis 5), should help to demonstrate what, exactly, is going on.

- Hypothesis 5: Each of the hypothesized effects above will be *strengthened* when including within the models factors shown to play a role in incongruence—including ideological identity (that is, when not already tested previously), Conscientiousness, Openness, Agreeableness, NFS, and the Moral Foundation dimensions of Authority, Fairness, Harm, and Ingroup—and *interactions with* those factors.

Using the results of Study 4.2 will enable the inclusion of psychological factors that were shown earlier in this dissertation to have some non-negligible role in incongruence. I expect that these inclusions will help to demonstrate not just the

importance of almost-fully non-conscious psychological (internal) factors once again—especially when combined with the external factor of ideological identity—but the importance of those factors in concert with the biological factors that emerge as significant within the prior analyses in this chapter. Thus, Hypothesis 5 is a test of everything available to me with these data.

6.2.4. Results

Overall, mean incongruence scores were higher for self-identified conservatives ($n = 128$, mean = 1.284, SE = .0269) than for self-identified liberals ($n = 97$, mean = 1.143, SE = .0217). An ANOVA F-test demonstrates that this difference is quite statistically significant, $F(1, 223) = 15.097$, $p < .001$.

In testing H1, correlations were run between incongruence and SCL responses to each of the available images. Only two significant main-effect correlations were observed: somewhat humorously, given the somewhat publicly-troublesome interconnected history of the two items pictured, a gun ($R = .120$, $p < .05$), and Dick Cheney ($R = .111$, $p < .05$). Neither effect size is large enough, however, to be able to dismiss the possibility of a Type I error (Cohen, 1988). Additionally, no main-effect significant correlations were observed for RSA or startle eyeblink magnitude.

Broken down by self-identified ideology, only one significant correlation was observed for any subjects; a positive correlation with incongruence for self-identified liberals for the picture of Dick Cheney ($R = .275$, $p < .01$)—which entails a large enough sample size assert that the effect is strong enough to dismiss the possibility of a Type I

error. In other words, for self-identified liberals, the more physiologically responsive they were to a picture of Dick Cheney, the more attitudinally incongruent they were.

No significant correlations were observed for RSA or the startle eyeblink magnitude for any of the self-identified ideologies—although the mean startle eyeblink magnitude for self-identified liberals approaches the standard significance threshold at $p = .060$, the coefficient ($R = -.198$) would demand a larger sample size to be a powerful enough sample, either way.

Broken down by *substantive* ideology, and only looking at the top and bottom quartiles in conservatism scores, only one significant correlation is observed: for substantive conservatives, skin conductance response to a picture of George W. Bush correlated positively with incongruence ($R = .224$, $p < .05$). The sample size ($n = 84$), however, is less than what is required for 80% power ($n = 191$), meaning that the effect is not powerful enough to be able to dismiss the possibility of a Type I error (Cohen, 1988).

No significant and powerful enough correlations were observed for substantive liberals or conservatives for RSA and startle eyeblink amplitude. While merely significant correlations are indeed observed for liberals and the average startle eyeblink amplitude ($R = -.244$, $p < .05$) and for conservatives and RSA ($R = .238$, $p < .05$), neither of the sample sizes are large enough to be able to dismiss the possibility of a Type I error—for both effects, the required sample size needs to be greater than or equal to 120 (Cohen, 1988). In spite of my personal confidence that a larger sample size would, indeed, verify the effects, there is still not enough evidence to be able to assert full statistical power here.

To ensure nothing is being missed, categorical data analyses should be conducted. Pulling apart the incongruence variable to compare the top and bottom quartiles, and the middle 50-percent, as well as dummy categories for the top quartile and top decile, additional analyses can be run.

Looking at SCL, two significant but not-powerful-enough effects are observed. The average reaction was larger for the most-incongruent quartile than for the least-incongruent quartile for the gun image ($F(1,160) = 4.568, p < .05$; effect size = .167) and the Nancy Pelosi image ($F(1,160) = 4.968, p < .05$, effect size = .174). Neither effect has greater than 80% power, however.

Looking at RSA, a significant difference was observed when looking at the most-incongruent quartile compared to everyone else, in which case the most-incongruent quartile had a significantly *higher* RSA ($F(1,314) = 5.224, p < .05$, effect size = .128). While the effect approaches 80% power, it is still not enough to be able to dismiss the possibility of a false positive.

All other differences across means—including startle eyeblink amplitude—and all models including each of the hypothesized effects were not significant, including when dividing the data by self-identified or substantive ideology. To illustrate this broadly null result, linear regression models using every potential predictor mentioned in Hypothesis 1 in separated models, looking at all participants, and the two substantive ideological quartiles, are shown in Table 6.2. Note that the SCL response to every image—essentially a kitchen sink model—in the study is included, as the regressions in question are meant as illustrations of these null results.

Table 6.2: Coefficients of Linear Regression Models Predicting Incongruence

Predictors	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	All	Substantive Ideology		All	Substantive Ideology		All	Substantive Ideology	
		Liberal	Conserv.		Liberal	Conserv.		Liberal	Conserv.
Gender	-.215***	-.213	.001	-.191***	-.102	-.023	-.211***	-.137	.093
Ideology	.180***	-.183	.160	.198***	-.301	.246*	.160**	-.043	.155
RSA	.098	.008	.189				.075	-.150	.407*
Startle Eyeblink	.001	-.122	.127				.016	-.080	.190
B. Clinton				.029	.918*	-.743	.056	.873	-.406
Obama				.019	-.624	-.578	.016	-.498	-.682
Basket				-.066	-.043	-.049	-.065	-.104	-.108
Knife				.101	-.022	.142	.102	.119	.218
Grope				-.088	.148	.161	-.091	.606	-.203
Vomit				-.048	.453	1.188	-.022	.086	1.086
Kiss				-.068	-.176	-.511	-.064	-.254	-1.571
Knife 2				-.094	-.315	-.755	-.098	-.308	-.195
Triangle				.073	-.594	-.176	.067	-.526	-.359
Lincoln				-.028	.044	.806*	-.029	-.114	.532
Hitler				.025	-.262	-.001	.007	-.450	-.078
Waterskiing				.003	.221	.112	-.080	.236	-.068
Anorexia				.007	.179	.113	-.002	.262	.143
Burn victim				-.063	.161	-.339	-.065	.189	-1.163
Gun				.105	-.596	.058	.163	-.960	1.304
Iron				-.030	1.349	-.130	-.055	1.535	-.706
Skiing				-.071	.092	.081	-.074	-.145	.556
Roaches				.016	.448	-.096	-.014	.516	-1.421
Worms				.083	-.214	.293	.099	-.151	.346
McCain				-.025	-.147	.484	-.019	-.399	1.244*
H. Clinton				.049	-.142	.586	.054	-.152	.822
Gunpoint				.008	.477	-.229	.011	.076	-.147
Bush				.033	.129	.753	.080	.202	.364
Corpse				-.065	-1.299	-.293	-.047	-1.543	-.888
Cheney				.075	-.278	.066	.067	.020	.484
Palin				.029	1.351*	-.048	.001	1.313	-.381
Sex				.008	-.154	.466	.009	-.494	.315
Toilet				.046	.100	.754	.058	.241	1.004*
Pelosi				.070	-.423	-.020	.036	-.657	.410
Corpse 2				.037	-.139	-.009	.021	-.300	.152
Baby				.138	-.158	-.007	.156*	-.220	.387
Niagara				-.077	-.430	.290	-.091	-.557	-.111
Adj. R-Squared	.081	.030	.022	.064	.000	.043	.067	.000	.139

All variables are z-score standardized. Females are the higher code. Ideology is 1=liberal, 2=moderate, 3=conservative.

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

A few general effects are apparent. First is the overall impact of gender, with a significant negative impact on incongruence in each of the three main-effect models, which suggests that women (the higher coded category) tend to have lower incongruence scores than men. An ANOVA F-test confirms this ($F(1,337) = 14.738, p < .001$), with women ($n = 183$) having an average incongruence score of 1.119 ($SE = .0191$) and men ($n = 156$) having an average incongruence score of 1.230 ($SE = .02159$). Interestingly, however, gender has no effect when predicting the incongruence of only substantive liberals or substantive conservatives.

Self-identified ideology plays a significant role in each main-effect model as well, with a positive effect on the criterion variable—meaning that conservative identification is associated with higher average incongruence scores, a finding noted at the outset of this section. This is also observed for substantive conservatives in Model 2.

Beyond those effects however, essentially no other predictors had significant effects on the criterion in the main effect models. SCL response to the image of the baby *barely* meets the traditional cutoff for significance ($p = .05$).

But, when running the models for substantive ideologues, a few predictors are shown to be significant. In Model 2, for liberals, reactions to Bill Clinton and Sarah Palin both positively predict incongruence—although both predictors lose their significance in a reduced model. For conservatives, reactions to Abraham Lincoln predict incongruence—although, again, the predictor loses significance in a reduced model.

In Model 3, for substantive conservatives, RSA, and reactions to images of John McCain and a toilet are all positive predictors. In a reduced model, however, with only those three predictors, only RSA remains significant. In fact, for substantive

conservatives, RSA remains a positive correlate and predictor of incongruence ($R = .238$, $p < .05$).

But all told, with a small number of exceptions, Hypothesis 1 is rejected.

In testing Hypothesis 2, correlations of incongruence scores with the variables expected to have an effect are shown in Table 6.3, along with partial correlations for gender, ideology, and both.

Variables	R	Partial Rs, Controlling for		
		Gender	Ideology	Both
Baseline	.060	.095	.022	.055
Peak	.013	.020	-.039	-.031
% Change	-.004	-.056	-.011	-.058
Total	.065	.069	.016	.021
n = 100. No significant correlations observed.				

None of the predicted cortisol variables have a significant effect one way or another on attitudinal incongruence. As an additional check, ANOVA F-tests were run that compared mean scores between the three primary binary incongruence variables, including the two quartile groups, the dummy variables for the top quartile and top decile in incongruence, and the dummy variables for the bottom quartile and bottom decile in incongruence. As shown in Table 6.4, there were no significant mean differences between any of the groups.

	Top vs. Bottom Quartile	Group vs. Everyone			
		Top Quartile	Top Decile	Bottom Quartile	Bottom Decile
	F (1,50)	F (1,102)	F (1,102)	F (1,102)	F (1,102)
Baseline	1.097	1.094	.448	.502	.009
Peak	.700	1.406	.097	.127	.017
% Change	.201	1.231	.787	.003	.007
Total	1.359	1.533	1.339	.529	.237
No significant mean differences observed.					

Hypothesis 2 is nearly entirely rejected, save for one observed effect: when looking at substantive ideologies independently, for the most conservative quartile of subjects who completed this part of the experiment ($n = 36$), incongruence positively correlates with baseline cortisol ($R = .428, p < .01$). This effect size is just powerful enough, given the small sample size but large effect size, to be able to dismiss the possibility of a Type I error. Thus, for substantive conservatives, baseline cortisol concentration is positively associated with attitudinal incongruence—that is, substantive conservatives with higher baseline cortisol tend to be more attitudinally incongruent. Whether this effect holds up when controlling for psychological factors, however, remains to be seen (see section 6.2.5).

To test Hypothesis 3, an ANOVA F-test was conducted comparing the average incongruence scores of those who reported detecting the androstenone odor ($n = 322$) and those who did not ($n = 17$). No significant mean difference was observed ($F(1,337) = .460, p = .498$).

No significant correlations were observed when bivariate correlations were run between incongruence scores and the degree to which the odor was detected as strong ($p = .642$) and the degree to which the odor was detected as pleasant versus aversive ($p = .271$). When looking only at self-identified liberals ($n = 66$), there was a significant positive correlation between the pleasantness of the odor and incongruence ($R = .248, p < .05$), but not enough statistical power ($< 80\%$); the same significant effect but lack of power was true for substantive liberals ($n = 61, R = .261, p < .05$). No significant effects

were observed for self-identified or substantive conservatives for odor strength or odor pleasantness.

Chi-squared tests were also conducted comparing incongruence categories and whether an odor was reported to have been detected. No significant differences of proportions were observed overall, by self-identified ideology, or substantive ideology. Hypothesis 3 is ostensibly rejected in its entirety, save for two significant but non-powerful effects.

In testing Hypothesis 4, chi-squared tests were conducted comparing the incongruence categories that were also used in Hypothesis 2 (and, again, shown in Table 6.4) and 5-HTTLPR genotypes. Table 6.5 shows the results.


	5-HTTLPR Genotype			X ²
	L/L	L/S	S/S	
Least Incongruent Quartile	46.15%	38.57%	72.09%	12.355**
Most Incongruent Quartile	53.85%	61.43%	27.91%	
Top Incongruent Quartile	26.17%	27.92%	17.14%	3.077
Most Incongruent Decile	16.82%	7.14%	5.71%	8.381*
Least Incongruent Quartile	22.43%	17.53%	44.29%	18.949***
Least Incongruent Decile	11.21%	3.90%	18.57%	12.847**

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

All but one chi-squared test demonstrate that the genotype has a significant effect on incongruence category, with less incongruent participants being more likely to have the short-form, s/s allele, and vice versa for more incongruent participants—a set of results inconsistent with Hypothesis 4. Figure 6.1 illustrates the effect.

An ANOVA F-test comparing the mean incongruence scores by genotype also confirms the significance of the mean differences ($F(2,328) = 8.707, p < .001$), with the

average incongruence score of the l/l genotype participants (n = 107) at 1.197 (SE = .0282), the l/s participants (n = 154) at 1.202 (SE = .0196), and the s/s participants (n = 70) at 1.053 (SE = .0303). Hypothesis 4 is fully rejected in that the opposite-direction effect was observed.



6.2.5. Results: Interactions of Psychological Factors

To test Hypothesis 5, the substances of each of the above hypotheses were essentially tested again; this time, while including—thus, controlling for—the eight hypothesized factors.

A regression testing the Dick Cheney result from earlier was run first, predicting incongruence for self-identified liberals using the skin conductance reaction to the image while controlling for gender, substantive conservatism, and the eight psychological factors. Replicating the earlier result, liberal identifiers' SCL response to Dick Cheney *remains a significant positive predictor of incongruence* (Beta = .217, $t = 2.240$, $p < .05$), even when controlling for gender, psychological factors, and substantive conservatism.

However, when attempting to replicate the RSA effect for substantive conservatives, including all of the above controls, RSA loses its significance as a predictor of incongruence (Beta = .104, $t = .985$, $p = .328$).

Nonetheless, beyond the one legitimate replication above for physiological reactivity, the same three regression models as before were run again. The results are shown in Table 6.6.

Overall, physiological reactivity plays a near-zero role in incongruence when incorporating the eight psychological factors. In fact, in only one case does a physiological variable have a significant predictive effect—for the full Model 3, skin conductance change in response to the image of the gun has a positive predictive effect. In a reduced Model 3 using only the significant predictors, it maintains its significance ($p < .05$). But, again, this is the only significant physiological effect that remains when incorporating psychological factors. If this aspect of H5 were confirmed, more than just one random image reaction should have played a role, meaning that this part of H5 is essentially rejected.

To test the impact of cortisol while incorporating the eight psychological factors, five regressions were run predicting incongruence that included the four cortisol variables separately and together, and the eight psychological factors, alongside gender, ideological identification, and score on the conservatism scale (that is, substantive ideology). Zero of the five main-effect regressions demonstrated significant predictive abilities for the cortisol variables.

Table 6.6: Coefficients of Linear Regression Models Predicting Incongruence with Psychological Factors

Variables	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	All	Substantive Ideology		All	Substantive Ideology		All	Substantive Ideology	
		Liberal	Conserv.		Liberal	Conserv.		Liberal	Conserv.
Gender	-.171**	-.210	.127	-.145*	-.184	.169	-.164*	-.110	.124
Ideology	.173**	-.027	.336**	.180**	.194	.450***	.127	.276	.383*
RSA	.067	.061	.077				.050	-.112	.200
Startle Eyeblink	-.004	.008	.086				.018	-.031	.064
B. Clinton				.043	.250	.031	.057	.448	.241
Obama				.012	-.460	-.712	.019	-.476	-.896
Basket				-.049	.229	-.273	-.024	-.015	-.374
Knife				.061	.429	-.044	.067	.670	-.154
Grope				-.071	.212	.219	-.069	.740	.144
Vomit				-.037	-.154	.373	-.014	-.201	.150
Kiss				-.083	.026	-.427	-.089	-.234	-.772
Knife 2				-.081	.061	.015	-.101	-.326	.073
Triangle				.081	-.125	-.470	.073	-.406	-.774
Lincoln				-.037	.378	.401	-.050	.067	.382
Hitler				.037	.139	.274	.011	-.477	.140
Waterskiing				-.007	-.089	.228	-.103	.182	.041
Anorexia				.013	-.058	.187	-.013	.018	.230
Burn victim				-.014	-.176	-.441	.001	.004	-.186
Gun				.104	-.256	.291	.176*	-1.024	.506
Iron				-.005	.609	.404	-.048	.875	.483
Skiing				-.064	-.137	-.008	-.065	-.406	.096
Roaches				.017	.160	.101	-.023	.290	-.131
Worms				.058	-.121	-.148	.085	-.126	-.010
McCain				-.019	-.187	-.037	.004	-1.036	.034
H. Clinton				.030	.121	.178	.031	.052	.336
Gunpoint				.046	-.036	-.257	.033	-.325	-.160
Bush				.019	.237	.377	.060	.709	.298
Corpse				-.041	-.445	.025	-.020	-1.252	-.253
Cheney				.071	.054	.169	.076	.350	.381
Palin				.018	.347	.101	-.020	1.056	.272
Sex				-.011	-.440	.452	.009	-.660	.462
Toilet				.041	.062	.401	.060	.124	.358
Pelosi				.065	-.073	-.177	.030	-.650	-.206
Corpse 2				.025	-.247	.104	.005	-.665	.059
Baby				.110	-.121	.199	.122	-.261	.352
Niagara				-.062	-.179	.201	-.074	-.399	.083
Conscientiousness	.149*	-.089	.040	.137*	-.264	.275	.158*	-.157	.150
Openness	.159**	.174	.066	.176**	.103	.190	.153*	.044	.218
Agreeableness	-.128*	-.029	-.287*	-.073	.086	-.300	-.097	.016	-.260
NFS	-.061	.258	-.348**	-.088	.314	-.429*	-.074	.231	-.366
MF-Authority	.090	-.236	.339**	.110	-.277	.338*	.126	-.312	.371
MF-Fairness	-.002	.203	-.155	-.018	.158	.063	-.021	.224	.026
MF-Harm	-.027	.086	.000	-.059	.163	-.131	-.051	.084	-.040
MF-Ingroup	.025	.108	.173	.019	.227	.213	.033	.347	.185
Adj. R-Squared	.119	.114	.283	.098	.017	.253	.106	.000	.161

All variables are z-score standardized. Females are the higher code. Ideology is 1=liberal, 2=moderate, 3=conservative.

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

However, when running the five regressions separated by substantive ideology—again, using the eight psychological factors, ideological identification, and gender as controls—the regression including just baseline cortisol demonstrated that it had a significant positive impact for substantive liberals (Beta = .322, $t = 2.234$, $p < .05$) and *nearly*, but not quite, for substantive conservatives (Beta = .278, $t = 1.815$, $p = .082$). Additionally, for substantive liberals for the peak cortisol concentration-only regression, it had a significant positive impact (Beta = .340, $t = 2.357$, $p < .05$). This effect was also observed (albeit only for peak cortisol concentration) when including each of the four cortisol variables in the model (Beta = 2.238, $t = 2.344$, $p < .05$) for substantive liberals. While, for the most part, these results reject much of H2, there does appear to be an effect of cortisol when controlling for psychological factors, but only for substantive liberals.

In looking at the androstenone hypotheses, regressions were run that, again, used the eight psychological factors, gender, ideological identification, and subjects' substantive conservatism score as controls. In a model including just either/or detection as a predictor, detection showed no significance. The same was true for models including strength of odor and pleasantness of odor. When, once again, looking at just substantive liberals and just substantive conservatives—and including the psychological factors, identification, and gender as controls—still no significant effects are observed. So, when factoring in psychological factors, there continue to be no significant or powerful relationships between androstenone detection of any kind and incongruence, meaning that Hypothesis 4 is rejected in its entirety.

Finally, to examine the effects of 5-HTTLPR genotypes on incongruence when incorporating psychological factors, again, I return to the regressions that have been utilized repeatedly throughout the analyses above. This time, dummy variables for the genotypes were included alongside the other predictors. Table 6.7 shows the results.

Variables	All	Substantive Ideology	
		Liberal	Conserv.
Gender	-.171**	-.331**	.097
Identification	.014	-.029	.330**
Conscientiousness	.087	-.225	.091
Openness	.179***	.195	.013
Agreeableness	-.048	.127	-.252*
NFS	-.049	.304*	-.315**
Authority	-.022	-.236	.299*
Fairness	.037	.154	-.086
Harm	.005	.138	-.092
Ingroup	-.019	.111	.159
Conservatism	.372***		
5-HTTLPR (LL)	.003	-.047	.087
5-HTTLPR (SS)	-.188***	-.104	-.008
Adj. R-Squared	.199	.205	.237
All variables are z-score standardized. Females are the higher code. Identification is 1=liberal, 2=moderate, 3=conservative.			
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001			

The predictive effect of genotype as observed in the test of H4 *remains* for all subjects when controlling for the eight psychological factors, gender, ideological identification, and substantive conservatism—although it does lose significance when looking only at substantive ideologues. Meanwhile, the main effect model, when reduced to only the significant predictors, still demonstrates a significant predictive effect of the short/short allele genotype (Beta = -.191, t = 3.633, p < .001).

Additionally, a simple forward-reduced binary logit regression that includes all participants in predicting categorization as being in the most congruent quartile versus everyone else, using the same predictors as above, also demonstrates the significant predictive impact of the short/short allele ($b = -1.121$, $SE = .297$, $Wald = 14.208$, $p < .001$) compared to the other alleles, along with non-conservative identification ($b = .959$, $SE = .308$, $Wald = 9.687$, $p < .01$), and standardized Openness ($b = -.426$, $SE = .137$, $Wald = 9.659$, $p < .01$), leading to a Nagelkerke pseudo-R-squared of .142. To be sure, the effect in this case is small, but the fact that it is significant—and, in fact, *remains* significant in a full model that controls for each factor on top of a series of demographic factors (see Table 6.8)—is incredible, considering the figurative detachment of genetic factors in the long factor chain that ultimately leads to attitudes and subsequent incongruence thereof (see Smith, Oxley, et al., 2011).

Thus, H4 is rejected outright in favor of a significant effect in the *opposite* direction. The significance of a genetic factor remains noteworthy, though: even when controlling for psychological factors, demographics, ideological identification, and substantive ideology, having the short/short allele of the 5-HTTLPR gene has an independent and significant predictive effect on incongruence scores. The alternative hypothesis suggested by Kesebir et al. (2013) that relates the idea to Morality Salience appears to be the case instead, in that those with this ostensible-negativity-bias genotype were the most congruent.

Table 6.8: Binary Logit Predicting Classification in Most Congruent Quartile			
Predictor	b	SE	Wald
Gender (Male)	-.356	.334	1.134
Liberal ident.	1.370**	.466	8.628
Conservative ident.	.982*	.399	6.061
Conscientiousness	-.356	.169	4.459
Emotional Stability	.190	.170	1.259
Openness	-.545**	.174	9.786
Extroversion	.057	.168	.116
Agreeableness	.164	.177	.861
NFS	.045	.168	.072
MF-Authority	-.211	.218	.932
MF-Fairness	-.093	.204	.210
MF-Harm	.026	.207	.016
MF-Ingroup	.016	.192	.007
MF-Purity	.039	.211	.034
Conservatism	-.615*	.273	5.093
Single	.374	.570	.430
Married	.019	.453	.002
Children	.406	.455	.799
Doctoral	-.599	.810	.548
Master's or Higher	.033	.513	.004
College or Higher	-.571	.344	2.760
Over \$100K	.169	.515	.107
\$80K-\$100K	.646	.525	1.511
\$60K-\$80K	.322	.512	.395
\$40K-\$60K	.867*	.424	4.186
5-HTTLPR (LL)	-.353	.360	.962
5-HTTLPR (SS)	-1.142**	.360	10.041
Constant	-2.095*	.917	5.218
Chi-Squared = 63.534, df = 27, p < .001; Nagelkerke Pseudo-R-Squared = .259; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001			

6.3.1. Discussion

First things first: Aside from a few significant effects, the near-complete rejections of Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2, and Hypothesis 3 and their counterparts in Hypothesis 5 seem to throw out the notion that biological factors could contribute to

attitudinal incongruence in any meaningful or significant way. The effect observed in Hypothesis 4, however, suggests that something biological is, indeed, playing a role—albeit, as discussed earlier, a small one, and likely an indirect one at that. But, the fact that the significant predictive ability of the short/short 5-HTTLPR allele *remained* for the full-subjects model when controlling for demographic, political, and psychological factors demonstrates that the allele *somehow*—and as, quite frankly, *weird* as it is—has an independent effect on incongruence.

Still, a vast array of other factors unmeasured in this study that were picked up by the genomic separations (see Chiao & Blizinsky, 2010)—most of which lie outside of the realm of consciousness, logical deduction, and rationality—are more likely the *true*, so to speak, predictors of incongruence here. The link between genes and attitudes is clouded by a long chain of factors (see Smith, Oxley, et al., 2011), not least of which are environmental conditioning, upbringing, and other basic demographics. But then again, note that the lattermost set of variables may have been observed after all in the significant predictive capacity of gender, and the significant predictive capacity of the genotypes remained even when controlling for everything else that has been shown to play a role.

Nevertheless, the near-full retaining of the nulls in the first two hypotheses is quite compelling, and helps to illustrate the role of congruence and incongruence in modern political orientations. In spite of research showing that political attitudes are heavily, if not *mostly* driven by non-conscious, automatic, and often biological factors (see Hibbing et al., 2013; Jost et al., 2009; Lodge & Taber, 2013), the results here demonstrate evidence for, perhaps, indirect effects—by way of Hypothesis 4's overall results—of biological factors driving congruence and incongruence of those attitudes.

Although, upwards of one-fifth of the variation in any given model is explained by the inclusion of biological factors examined here alongside non-biological factors. Thus, while political attitudes themselves are driven to varying extents by biological factors (Hibbing et al., 2013; Oxley et al., 2008), an abstraction of the congruence or incongruence *of* those attitudes also appears to be driven significantly by an admittedly small number of biological factors—in this case, one SCL factor, an allele, and an assortment of other factors interacting with ideology.

This makes sense in the context of previous scholarship that emphasizes the importance of the political system and context on the way political orientations—and thus, attitudinal congruence—come together as larger “constellations” of attitudes (Jost et al., 2009, p. 328). As time marches on, and the system grows in complexity, it is, as previously noted, fundamentally *inevitable* that these constellations become more incongruent and more complex (Jost et al., 2003b, p. 387).

In fact, as noted further by Jost et al. (2003b), the logical conflicts that are observed within the attitudinal frameworks of modern American ideologies are the *socially*-constructed result of the ideology-driving non-consciousness operating within the given political system (p. 387). **Attitudinal incongruence, then, is likely a product of the constraints (no pun intended) on internal, non-conscious factors by the political system in which the factors are operating.** In the somewhat special case of America, this is logical in light of the comparatively unique definitions of conservatism and liberalism (see Gerring, 1997; Jost, Krochik, Gaucher, & Hennes, 2009). In much of Europe, for example, “conservatism” is typically defined by a general support for social welfare and cultural progressivism (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003; Muller, 2001), while

“liberalism” has been used somewhat interchangeably with “libertarianism” (see De Lange, 2007).

Putting all of that together, then, constructions of ideology *in general* are driven in no small part by the given political system. My results suggest that the manifestation of attitudinal incongruence is most likely the product of that ideological adherence, at least in terms of self-identified ideology; the attitudinal congruence and incongruence of the primary American ideologies is the natural result of the internal and external drivers of ideology *interacting with the American system*. The degree of incongruence between attitudes is *necessitated* by the system itself, which requires voting for political parties who reflect the many incongruities in their respective party platforms. In other words, Americans have to be incongruent because of their psychological underpinnings and because they have no non-incongruent alternatives in the political system.

Of course, my results are by no means conclusive or generalizable to any population beyond the internal subject pool. Future research would be well-served to examine other non-conscious, more cognition-based factors in terms of the roles that they may play on attitudinal congruence—for example, the psychological factors that have been shown to play a role in other analyses within this dissertation (e.g., Dogmatism, NE, etc.). Additionally, cross-national work, comparing rates of incongruence across cultures and political contexts would be quite useful as well, and potentially illustrative of the central conclusions of this chapter and the dissertation more generally.

Nevertheless, the results serve as a step into a new potential field of study for social and political psychology scholars. While most of the hypotheses were, by and large, rejected in favor of the respective nulls, null results are still results; absence of

evidence is evidence of absence, after all. Meanwhile, the effect observed the tests of H4 means that, at the very least, biological factors—in particular, as strange as it may seem, a specific genotype—have an *independent*, if indirect, role to play in the ultimate degree to which a person will wield and/or indicate attitudes that are logically incongruent with each other.

But, at the risk of selling myself short, while I have demonstrated that being in possession of a specific allele increases the likelihood of having higher attitudinal incongruence than someone else with a different allele—even after controlling for other potential factors—I am deeply hesitant to claim that this is definitively the case. It may well be that an unmeasured covariate of the alleles is what is truly driving incongruence. But, then again, to be *congruent* with my own absence-of-evidence assertion, until that additional covariate is observed, it is accurate and scientifically valid to state that, indeed, **a specific genotype is, at the very *least*, independently associated with incongruence for this population, if not actually a *driver* of it.**

What appears to be going on with the 5-HTTLPR allele effect, then, is one of two things: Either (1) the “culture-gene interaction” (see Chiao & Blizinsky, 2010) that *should* logically lead those with the collectivist short/short allele to congruence—given collectivism’s political output of populism, and the more logically-congruent attitude structures of populist-collectivist parties and states (see Holsti & Rosenau, 1996), and individuals (see Carmines et al., 2012; Pew Research Center, 2011)—is **overriding** the higher general anxiety and negativity bias also observed in that allele, which should themselves otherwise lead to more *authoritarian-conservative* attitudes and ideologies and, naturally, higher incongruence; or (2) the relationship of higher anxiety and

negativity bias with Mortality Saliency (Greenberg et al., 1990; Nail et al., 2009; Rosenblatt et al., 1989), and MS's positive relationship with attitudinal congruence (Kesebir et al., 2013) is, itself, overriding everything else. In either case, given the internal validity of my results—at the very least—the intriguing effect observed in this chapter of the 5-HTTLPR alleles' impact on the logical congruence of attitudes necessitates further research.

6.3.2. Conclusion

In any case, the concept of attitudinal congruence and incongruence once again proves to be a useful lens through which political attitudes and their overarching constellations can be observed—in this case, also through the up-and-coming research area and lens of biology and politics. The concept of incongruence is, as noted many times throughout this dissertation, reflective of general themes within the political psychology discipline: Specifically, external processes like social identity and internal processes like epistemic psychological factors and genetics (see Jost et al., 2009) that interact to drive, if not *determine* a large degree of people's political attitudes and behaviors. In demonstrating a number of relationships between biology and attitudinal incongruence, this chapter has shined a light *not* in favor of the lens of environmental determinism, but, rather, *toward* the two-tiered model of attitude formation supported by Hibbing et al. (2013)—via biological factors and environmental factors. That is the defining characteristic here, and the study of attitudinal congruence and incongruence more than anything else serves as a reminder of the importance of approaching the study of political attitudes in that fashion.

CHAPTER 7
WHAT GOOD IS CAKE IF YOU CAN'T EAT IT?
PRESCRIPTIONS FOR AND CONCLUSIONS ABOUT
AMERICAN ATTITUDINAL INCONGRUENCE

My candle burns at both ends;
It will not last the night;
But ah, my foes, and oh, my friends—
It gives a lovely light!
—Edna St. Vincent Millay, “First Fig”

7.1.1. The Central Findings: Clarifying the Theory of Asymmetry

Nearly all Americans have political attitudes that are, in varying degrees, logically incongruent with other attitudes. It is not an attribute specific to those with stated ideological identifications, but rather, an attribute that applies to all except a very small proportion of the electorate.

In fact, in the Study 4.1, in only two ANES sample years did the percentage of those who scored a “0” in the incongruence score exceed 1% of the sample: 1980, when it was 1.4%—and when only four items were included, meaning that it should be expected that some would score a 0 by random chance—and 2002, when it was 2.7%. The proportion of that 2.7%, meanwhile, that is not attributable to random chance is likely attributable to the *exclusive* inclusion of items related to federal spending—not even abortion rights were included in that year’s survey—meaning that some proportion

of spending-avoidant respondents were subject to conformity effects (see Tourangeau et al., 1991), and perhaps in some part to post-September-11 Mortality Salience effects (see Kesebir et al., 2013).

1980 and 2002 aside, the average number of yearly “0” scorers is .22% of the total number of subjects, meaning perfect attitudinal congruence is *incredibly* unlikely to be observed in the electorate. Virtually every American, it turns out, is attitudinally incongruent; virtually every American is a political hypocrite.

In this dissertation, I have sought to explain what drives the attitudinal incongruence within that 99.78% of the electorate, with specific and primary foci on the near-majority of the electorate who either identify as or qualify as one of the two major political orientations (Jones et al., 2013; Pew Research Center, 2011; 2014b; Public Religion Research Institute, 2013). Mostly in line with my expectations, but with a few exceptions, in a series of studies, I demonstrated *differential* and *asymmetric* impacts of some internal and external forces on incongruence for conservatives versus liberals. Specifically—and even after controlling for the fact that conservatives *tended* to have higher incongruence than liberals—relative to liberals and to everyone else, *conservatives’* incongruence scores were *more* readily and strongly predicted by **internal** factors. For *liberals*, meanwhile, using the same models as above, incongruence scores were driven *primarily* by *more* conscious **external** factors, save for a few observations (see section 4.4.1 and section 4.4.2) of internal factors playing a role as well. Meanwhile, the stronger overall effect of the external factor of study year on incongruence for self-identified liberals compared to self-identified conservatives that was observed in Study 4.1 is also important to note.

To further analyze the implications of the findings for my central theory, some more specific results should be noted. When focusing on the factors that **positively predicted incongruence**—as opposed to negatively predicting incongruence / positively predicting *congruence* or, as done above, predicting incongruence scores—those general effects remained. All told, **conservatives' incongruence** was predicted positively by the following **internal** factors: adherence to the Moral Foundation of Authority/Subversion, the Preference for Consistency, and the Need to Evaluate. Meanwhile, for **liberals**, in focusing specifically on the **external** factors that predicted incongruence positively, the following factors were shown to be significant: political/historical/social context, political knowledge, and ideological identification.

There were, of course, a number of exceptions to the pattern above. For **conservatives**, two factors were predictors of **congruence**, as opposed to incongruence: Agreeableness and the Need for Structure. For **liberals**, some **internal** factors were predictive of **incongruence**: Openness, the Need for Structure, the Need to Evaluate, and adherence to the Moral Foundation of Fairness/Reciprocity. These exceptions tended to be relatively small in magnitude, however, especially when compared to the sizes of the effects that were hypothesized—thus, they serve more as *clarifications* than full contradictions of the central theory.

It is worth noting once again that the distinction between internal and external factors is difficult to draw—considering, for example, the fact that ideological identification is nearly as *internal* and non-conscious, so to speak, as the psychological traits that were tested; and the fact that the distinction is not a clean, absolute dichotomy—the understanding of external factors as *being able to be* consciously

motivated **mixed** with the understanding of ideological differences in locus-of-control (see Abramowitz, 1973; Sweetser, 2014) means that the distinction not only makes sense, but that it works empirically *and* holds up within my central theory, for the most part.

Nevertheless, most inconsistent with my central theoretical expectations were the biological factors tested in Chapter 6. The limitations of most of the biological factors in predicting incongruence scores, especially after factoring in the aforementioned external and other internal factors, and the subsequent limitations of *those* internal factors in predicting incongruence scores, were made starkly apparent. In fact, there were nearly zero statistically significant and statistically powerful biological predictors—especially when controlling for psychological factors—aside from a few notable effects: (1) self-identified liberals’ skin conductance reactions to a picture of Dick Cheney positively predicted incongruence; (2) substantive liberals’ baseline cortisol positively predicted incongruence; (3) substantive liberals’ peak cortisol positively predicted incongruence; and (4) skin conductance reactions for *all* participants to a picture of a firearm positively predicted incongruence. Effects (1) through (3) above serve as exceptions to that aspect of my theory; in other words, when controlling for other internal factors *and* a few external factors, liberals’ incongruence appears to be impacted by biological factors, whereas, in the same conditions, conservatives’ are not. My central theory, then, seems to be flawed and/or in need of some repair.

Moreover, the additional finding of the 5-HTTLPR allele having an independent role in predicting incongruence for the sample population is undeniably fascinating. Put simply, the evidence suggests that, regardless of their substantive psychological and demographic profile and the respective traits thereof, **if a non-ideological person has**

this singularly specific genetic trait, they are more likely than everyone else to have a lower incongruence score.

Does this mean that obtaining a genomic dossier of any random individual in the electorate will allow for the prediction of whether they are likely to have a lower-than-average degree of attitudinal incongruence? No—again, I make no claims of external validity of the sample. On top of that, the model that incorporates the alleles only explains around 25.9% of the variation (pseudo R-squared = .259), and only demonstrates an ultimate difference in incongruence of $b = -1.142$ ($SE = .360$)—which may not seem like much until it is noted that 90% of the incongruence scores were between .802 and 1.681 (mean = 1.170, $SE = .015$). So, for those within the sample, the allele is an important independent predictor, but it has its limits.

Additionally, limitations were also observed in Chapter 5, in which it was demonstrated that—in spite of the assertions about differences in reactions to dissonance between conservatives and liberals of previous research (viz., Critcher et al., 2009; Nam et al., 2013; cf. Brandt & Crawford, 2013), *and* in spite of the hypotheses derived from my central theory—the willingness to acknowledge one's own incongruence was **not** driven by personal politics, but rather, by psychological traits; namely, and to varying degrees, Openness, Dogmatism, and Preference for Consistency. In other words, conservatives and liberals are more alike than they realize when forced to confront the idea that their attitudes *and* the attitudes of other members of their ideology make them—in the words of the prompt to which they were instructed to reply—hypocrites.

So, do the flaws and limitations of my theory mean it is useless? Certainly not, given the measured accuracy and utility of *much* of the theory—on the whole, in fact, the

theorized asymmetric application of the IEM by ideology was demonstrated—coupled with the fact that many of the supposed limits serve to clarify the expectations of my theoretical framework. Put differently, much of my theory was confirmed, and what *appeared* to be contradictions were either (1) confirmations, given the contextualist—for example, I did not postulate that conservatives would *only* use internal factors, but rather, use internal factors *more than* external factors, and to a greater degree than liberals would—nature of the theory; or (2) opportunities for theoretical refinements.

To quantify the *relative* impact of each factor on incongruence, the next step would be a cross-study comparison. However, comparing effects across studies—Study 4.2 and Study 4.3, and not Study 4.1, because of the stark difference between the items used to create the incongruence scales between Study 4.1 and Studies 4.2 and 4.3, in which cases it was very similar—is not possible without a large enough degree of identical items in each study; and, given the negligible item overlap between the two studies, putting together a framework that shows the exact relative impact of every factor—and, therefore, allows for the quantification thereof—in one total model is impossible. This is in spite of the fact that, for example, Openness, substantive conservatism, and ideological identification were, at some point, shown to be significant predictors in both Study 4.2 and Study 4.3; only substantive conservatism and ideological identification should be able to be considered the same item *across both studies* because of the similarity in item wording and operationalized conception in both studies, in contrast to the Openness score in Study 4.2, which was based off of *two* total responses, versus the Openness score in Study 4.3, which was based off of *ten* total responses.

Thus, I offer two cross-study compilation methods; both of which will—due to the limits of statistics—not achieve full accuracy, but will at least edge toward a clear and accurate picture. The **first** method is a series of **best-case-scenario**—albeit very unlikely—models in which the underlying assumptions are that (1) there is no overlap between the predictive capacities of the factors; and that (2) in spite of the differences in the samples' subjects (one being of adult Nebraskans and one being of undergraduates), the factors included would be explaining the same degree of sample variation in both populations.

Table 7.1 shows the estimates of the cross-study models for all participants; Table 7.2 shows the estimates of the cross-study model for only non-moderate identifiers. Both models are reduced via forward-deletion to end up *only* including the significant ($p < .05$) predictors, a process that meant the eventual exclusion of factors such as education and income, neither of which—in spite of what was demonstrated in Study 4.2—demonstrated significant predictive ability using this procedure. It should be noted, though, that the understanding of each of these factors as *external*, mixed with their null impact on incongruence, means that these external factors were not implicated in incongruence, which was expected (see section 2.2.1). For each model, *total* estimated variation explained by the models is shown as well, calculated as simply the sum of the two adjusted R-squared values.

While, again, taking into account the fact that this appropriation is the best possible scenario, a decent extent of the variation in the samples is explained—in fact, when only looking at self-identified conservatives and liberals, over (a maximum of) half (51.9%) is, and almost entirely by non-conscious forces at that.

Table 7.1: Standardized Regression Coefficients Predicting Incongruence Scores Across Studies for All Participants		Table 7.2: Standardized Regression Coefficients Predicting Incongruence Scores Across Studies for Only Ideological Identifiers	
Factor	Beta	Factor	Beta
Conservatism	.408***	Conservatism	.422***
Liberal ident.	.307***	Gender	-.141*
Conservative ident.	.209***	5-HTTLPR (SS)	-.177**
Gender	-.176***	Openness	.171**
5-HTTLPR (SS Dummy)	-.147**	Agreeableness	-.151**
Partial Adj R-Squared	.243	Partial Adj R-Squared	.263
NE	.226***	NE	.372***
Knowledge	.203***	IA	-.275***
Openness	.138*	Conservative ident. dummy	-.193**
Partial Adj R-Squared	.135	Partial Adj R-Squared	.256
Total Adj. R-Squared (Estimated)	.378	Total Adj. R-Squared (Estimated)	.519
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001		* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001	

Proceeding along the lines above, and running cross-study models separated by self-identified and substantive ideology and, again, resulting in *only* including the predictors that are significant ($p < .05$) in forward-deletion linear regression models, some notable effects are apparent, as shown in Table 7.3 and Table 7.4 respectively.

Table 7.3: Standardized Regression Coefficients Predicting Incongruence Scores Across Studies by Identity			
Conservative		Liberal	
Factor	Beta	Factor	Beta
Conservatism	.630***	Openness	.378***
Gender	-.169**	Conservatism	-.338***
MF-Authority	.272***	5-HTTLPR (SS)	-.276**
MF-Purity	-.181*	MF-Ingroup	.221*
Partial Adj R-Squared	.263	Partial Adj R-Squared	.528
PFC	.195*	IA	-.439**
NE	.418***	NE	.286*
IU	-.227**		
Partial Adj R-Squared	.226	Partial Adj R-Squared	.227
Total Adj. R-Squared (Estimated)	.489	Total Adj. R-Squared (Estimated)	.755
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001			

Table 7.4: Standardized Regression Coefficients Predicting Incongruence Scores Across Studies by Substantive Ideology			
Conservative		Liberal	
Factor	Beta	Factor	Beta
MF-Authority	.370***	MF-Fairness	.378***
Conservative ident.	.338***	Gender	-.338***
NFS	-.287**	MF-Authority	-.276**
Agreeableness	-.237*		
Partial Adj R-Squared	.273	Partial Adj R-Squared	.158
NE	.302*	Knowledge	.396***
		Liberal ident.	.248*
Partial Adj R-Squared	.076	Partial Adj R-Squared	.234
Total Adj. R-Squared (Estimated)	.349	Total Adj. R-Squared (Estimated)	.392
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001			


The flaws in my central theory appear to be magnified by these tests, but are once again, mostly clarified; although, noteworthy is the 5-HTTLPR short/short allele's continued ability to explain incongruence scores—or, because it is a negative predictor, attitudinal *congruence*—for all participants and for self-identified liberals, but no other specific groups. However, what *appear* to be generally similar proportions of the sample variation that are explained by mostly internal factors—with a few other factors as well—actually, when further analyzed amount to essential clarifications of my theory. For example, even though a maximum of 75.5% of the variation is explained by *only* internal factors for self-identified liberals, the impacts of those internal factors are mostly negative—that is, except for Openness and the Need to Evaluate, the internal factors that have a significant impact on incongruence have a *negative* impact on incongruence, meaning that the degree to which self-identified liberals have attitudes that are logically *aligned* with one another is predicted positively by substantive policy conservatism, Intolerance of Ambiguity, and having the s/s 5-HTTLPR allele. Although, make no mistake: this does still contradict my central theory. Still, essentially the opposite effect is

true for self-identified conservatives (in which a maximum of 48.9% of the variation is explained by the model): except for MF-Purity and IU, each of the internal factors have a positive impact on attitudinal incongruence.


It is another story for substantive ideologues—the groups of greater concern for my overall argument (see section 1.2.2). Substantive conservatives' incongruence scores are predicted with a maximum of 34.9% accuracy positively by MF-Authority, conservative identification, and NE, and negatively by NFS and Agreeableness—of which four of five qualify as *internal* factors. Substantive liberals' incongruence scores are predicted with a maximum of 39.2% accuracy positively by their political knowledge, liberal identification, being a male, and MF-Fairness, and negatively by MF-Authority—of which three of the five qualify as *external* factors.

Putting those findings together, then, and once again noting the fact that this cross-study comparison represents a best-case-scenario test, the central theory is mostly confirmed, with a few clarifications, and a few contradictions. Admittedly, many of the factors that were expected to play a role did not, which seems to be suggestive of limits to what psychological dispositions can say about attitude structures (see Greenberg & Jonas, 2003). In general support of the theory, however, is the observation that, for all subjects, incongruence is explained most readily by substantive ideology (an internal factor), but *also* by—in order of relative impact on incongruence scores—ideological identification (external), the Need to Evaluate (internal), political knowledge (external), gender (internal—*although this will be more fully explained in a moment*), the short/short 5-HTTLPR allele (internal), and Openness (internal).

Assuming, yet again, the accuracy of the combined cross-study models, the relative impacts of internal versus external factors on incongruence for substantive conservatives and liberals are illustrated in Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2 respectively, in which the absolute values of the internal factors are added together, and the absolute values of the external factors are added together. Pictured in this way, it does appear to be the case that liberals are *slightly* more externally-driven than conservatives.



But, recall the factor of gender: whether it should, indeed, be considered a solely internal factor is a matter for further discussion. Gender, as a personal characteristic is obviously subject to differential biological attributes that follow from being born biologically male or female. But also, and perhaps more importantly for my methodological purposes here, gender is also subject to social and societal attributes—that is, the most strictly external forces—as well, including conforming to society’s expectations, treatment by others within the world, and other general norms related to gender (Balzer & Jacobs, 2011; Foels & Reid, 2010). Therefore, instead of considering gender to be a solely internal factor, more accurately, the best course of action would be to consider it both internal *and* external. Figure 7.3 uses this characterization and *excludes* gender from the illustration altogether, providing a more empirically appropriate picture of the external-internal distinction in what drives substantive liberals’ incongruence.




While once again noting the fact that the cross-study conglomeration of results pictured above is a series of estimations grounded in *best-case-scenario transpositions* of

the results of different samples and not direct observations, the estimates are nevertheless grounded at least indirectly in observed reality. Thus, the evidence suggests the following central results for substantive ideologues (unexplained-by-model variation notwithstanding):

- **The incongruence of conservatives' attitudes is 77.966% internal and 22.034% external;**
- **The incongruence of liberals' attitudes is 50.385% internal and 49.615% external.**

In other words, for conservatives, internal factors drive slightly over *three-quarters* of attitudinal incongruence scores; for liberals, internal factors drive almost exactly *half* of attitudinal incongruence scores. Recalling my central theoretical expectation from section 2.2.2, and pictured in Figure 2.3 therein, the indirectly-measured results are pictured more proportionally to my results in Figure 7.4.



The **second** method of compiling the cross-study results, detailed below, replicates these results. This method consists of much more realistic analyses that re-encompass what this dissertation has theorized and demonstrated, and includes in the results what constitutes *unexplained* variation alongside the purely observed internal-external distinction's effects.

First, this will be tested by utilizing the data of adult Nebraskans from the summer of 2010 used in Chapter 6, and Study 4.2, and, once again, including the heretofore-significant predictors *alongside ostensibly every available factor*. This means that included in the models alongside the factors already shown to have some significance (see Table 6.8) will be racial identity, occupation, and religiosity variables—not just because these variables are simply *there*, but because they are a part of the interconnected web of attitudes, ideologies, and the formations thereof.

The results are shown in Table 7.5, along with forward-reduced models that include significant predictors at the $p < .05$ level for (1) all subjects, (2) substantive liberals, and (3) substantive conservatives.²⁰

Using the additional demographic variables to predict incongruence for all subjects does appear to strengthen the model when compared to the earlier model pictured in Table 7.1; although realistically, the difference is negligible.

The same effect is true for substantive ideologues, for whom the amount of variation explained is .271 for liberals and .525 for conservatives, compared to the variation explained without the additional predictors (see Table 7.4). In this case, however, the differences do seem to be significant ones, with substantially more variation explained in both models and, again, much more of the sample variation explained for

²⁰The full model could not be run for substantive ideologues due to severe collinearity.

conservatives than for liberals; although the internal-external distinction by ideology is made a bit more hazy. Strictly speaking, the effects are reversed, with more incongruence explained by external factors for conservatives, and internal factors for liberals; however, when taking into account the actual degree of incongruence explained by the models compared to what is left unexplained, the effects are clearer, and not contrary to what has otherwise been measured (see Figure 7.5 and Figure 7.6).

Table 7.5: Standardized Linear Regression Coefficients Predicting Incongruence, Summer 2010 Data				
Predictors	Forward-Reduced Models			
	Full Model All Ss	All Ss	Subst. Lib.	Subst. Conserv.
Gender (Male)	.199***	.229***	.293**	
Liberal Ident.	.317***	.329***		
Conserv. Ident.	.236***	.218***		.388***
RSA	.089	.107*		
SCL-Gun	.085			
SCL-Cheney	.015			.210*
Conscientiousness	.108			
Openness	.151**	.161***		
Agreeableness	-.087			-.283***
NFS	-.078			-.299***
MF-Authority	.055		-.359***	.406***
MF-Fairness	.053		.332**	
MF-Harm	.009			
MF-Ingroup	.032			
MF-Purity	-.033			
Conservatism	.375***	.371***		
5-HTTLPR (LL)	-.039			
5-HTTLPR (SS)	-.133*	-.135**		
Age	.001			
Single	-.026			
Married	-.012			
Divorced	-.029			
Children	-.108			
Doctorate	.100			
Master's or Higher	-.034			-.363***
College or Higher	-.048		-.315**	
HS or Less	.009			
Over \$100K	-.099			
\$80K-\$100K	-.097			-.202*
\$60K-\$80K	-.070			
\$40K-\$60K	-.186**	-.108*		-.266**
Hispanic	.149*	.119*		
Native American	.040			
Asian	-.019			
Black	.011			
White	.050			
Clerical	.063			
Professional	.117			
Self-Employed	.030		-.328**	
White Collar	.042			
Service Ind.	.042			-.193*
Custodial	-.130*	-.102*		
Construction	-.043			-.237**
Blue Collar	.090			
Homemaker	.202*	.152**		
Student	.015			
Born-Again	.079			
Fundamentalist	-.079			
Catholic	-.096	-.112*		
Agnostic/Atheist	.030			
Adj. R-Squared	.316	.336	.271	.525

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

Figure 7.5: Factor Impact on Conservative Incongruence Scores (Summer 2010 Data)





Figure 7.6: Factor Impact on Liberal Incongruence Scores, Without Gender (Summer 2010 Data)



Next, utilizing the data of undergraduates from the fall of 2013 used in Chapter 5 and Study 4.3, the same types of tests were run, although the only as-of-yet-untested data available were, as mentioned in Chapter 5, college major. Results are shown in Table 7.6.

Additionally, forward-reduced models were once again calculated, with the subsequent results shown in Table 7.7.

Table 7.6: Standardized Regression Coefficients Predicting Incongruence Scores (Fall 2013 Undergraduates)			
Predictors	All Ss	Substantive	
		Liberals	Conservatives
Gender (Male)	-.008	.086	-.070
Age	.090	-.038	.453
Knowledge	.138*	.315	.227
Conservatism	-.054		
PFC	.167*	.054	.285*
IU	-.084	-.106	-.152
NFCCO	.227**	.402	.260
NFS	-.191	-.298	-.186
Openness	.023	-.146	-.191
DOG	.068	.161	.206
IA	-.096	-.196	-.278*
NE	.264***	.183	.429**
Mixed-Handedness	.027	.116	.302*
Liberal Identification	.124	.308*	N/A
Conservative Identification	-.039	-.131	.166
<i>Major Dummies</i>			
Undeclared	-.047	-.055	-.127
Medicine	-.114	-.026	-.106
Nutrition	-.073	-.004	-.176
Natural Sciences	-.030	.139	-.268*
Social Sciences	-.010	N/A	-.105
English/History	.050	-.014	.122
Communications	.014	.040	.210
Education	-.038	.239	-.169
Economics	-.086	.028	-.118
Physical Engineering	.128	.054	.083
Earth Sciences	.068	.135	-.143
Civil Engineering	.089	.211	N/A
Agriculture	N/A	.101	N/A
Adjusted R-Squared	.207	.204	.328
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001			

Several differences between these tests and their previous employment with these data are apparent. The reduced model for all subjects demonstrates the role played by the external factors of the two engineering majors in incongruence, on top of the already-observed effects of the Need to Evaluate, political knowledge, identifying as a liberal, and Openness. For substantive ideologues, however, some interesting effects are clear: for conservatives, only 7.6% of the variation in incongruence scores is explained, and only by the Need to Evaluate; and for liberals, 29.1% of the variation in incongruence scores is explained, and only by three external factors. These effects are illustrated in Figure 7.7 and Figure 7.8.

Table 7.7: Standardized Linear Regression Coefficients Predicting Incongruence for Fall 2013 Undergraduates, Reduced Models	
Predictors	All Ss
NE	.232***
Knowledge	.175**
Liberal Ident.	.160**
Phys. Engineering	.152**
Openness	.124*
Civ. Engineering	.120*
Adj. R-Squared	.190
	Substantive Liberals
Knowledge	.375***
Liberal Ident.	.279**
Civ. Engineering	.258*
Adj. R-Squared	.291
	Substantive Conservatives
NE	.302*
Adj. R-Squared	.076
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001	

Figure 7.7: Factor Impact on Conservative Incongruence (Fall 2013 Data)





Figure 7.8: Factor Impact on Liberal Incongruence (Fall 2013 Data)



Looking across the different data samples, my results are once again confirmatory of my central theory. Combining the purely-*observed* internal-external-unexplained percentages—an easy task compared to the previous method, considering the lack of predictors that remain in the reduced models in both data—the results are shown in Figure 7.9 for substantive conservatives and Figure 7.10 for substantive liberals.

Figure 7.9: Factor Impact Across Studies on Conservative Incongruence Scores





Figure 7.10: Factor Impact Across Studies on Liberal Incongruence Scores (Without Gender)



All told, the *purely observed*—thus, not best-case-scenario as they were earlier—results compiled across studies suggest the following central results for substantive ideologues:

- **Conservatives' incongruence score is 29.7% internal, 30.4% external, and 39.9% unexplained;**
- **Liberals' incongruence score is 14.0% internal, 39.6% external, and 46.4% unexplained.**

While it is important to take into account that a large proportion of each group's incongruence remains purely unexplained, when comparing the best-case-scenario and

purely-observed results across substantive ideologies, my central theory remains supported. Although, the *comparatively* stronger effect of external factors on conservative incongruence for the purely-observed results are noteworthy, but not contradictory of my theory when (1) compared to the best-case-scenario results, or (2) taking into account the inter-ideology relativity of the comparative effects—that is, even though external factors play a decently-sized role for conservatives, they play a role for liberals that is 9.2 percentage points larger, while the inverse effect is demonstrated for internal factors, which play a role for liberals, but 15.7 percentage points less than the role they play for conservatives.

Therefore, even though the effects observed in both cross-study comparisons are not as clean of a dichotomy as desired for the sake of parsimony, altogether and ultimately clear is the result that, indeed, **conservatives' attitudinal incongruities are more internally-driven than liberals' are, and liberals' attitudinal incongruities are more externally-driven than conservatives' are.** The differences are clear: an ideological asymmetry is confirmed, although the distinction is—as expected—not an absolute dichotomy.

These results are not only demonstrative of my central theory, but also serve to reject the assertions of those who criticize this brand of political science—for example, writers like Jonah Goldberg (2003)—who use the findings linking conservatism with psychological traits to do one of two things, or both. First, they accuse researchers of anti-conservative bias for not also linking liberalism to the traits (Goldberg, 2003)—in spite of the fact that researchers either actually *did so* (Altemeyer, 1998; Bizer et al.,

2004; Brandt & Reyna, 2010; Carney et al., 2008; Choma, 2008; Crowson, 2009a; Federico et al., 2012; Jost et al., 2003a; 2003b; Jost et al., 2009; Nail et al., 2009; Onraet et al., 2011; Wilson & Sibley, 2013), or *attempted to do so* and found that liberalism was *not* linked to some of the traits (see Jost et al., 2003a; 2003b).

Second, they use the conservatism findings to link, tongue-in-cheek, the psychological traits' *inverses* to liberalism. For example, instead of the conservatism and epistemic-needs linkages, Goldberg (2003) asserted linkages between liberalism and “comfort with confusion and ignorance” (para. 1). Instead, along with earlier work in psychological factors and political orientations (see Chapter 2), my results show that these traits **cannot always be thought to have ostensible inverses**; in other words, just because adherence to the Moral Foundation of Authority/Subversion drives *incongruence* for conservatives does not mean that it will drive *congruence* for liberals.

Indeed, as aptly stated by Conover and Feldman (1981), conservatives and liberals are not approaching the world “from different sides of the same coin, but rather, if you will, from the perspective of entirely different currencies” (p. 264). Again, in the best-case-scenario cross-study results compilation, conservatives' incongruence is essentially driven by only one external factor—conservative identification—constituting less than 25% of the incongruence score explained by the model; meanwhile, substantive liberals' incongruence is driven by two external factors—liberal identification and political knowledge, not to mention the excluded factor of context—constituting almost 50% of the incongruence score explained by the model.

Although, it is necessary once again to note that, in those cases, the approximate total adjusted R-squared values for these models means that, at most, only 34.9% and

39.2% of the variation in the samples is explained *by* the conservative and liberal models respectively, meaning that *most* of the remaining incongruence is explained by another factor or, most likely, more than one other factor.

Still, that degree of incongruence is, after all, explained by a mere five factors in each model. Where the remaining proportion originates is wholly unclear at this point—although the fact that context was not included as a factor in the best-case-scenario cross-study comparison is worth noting, alongside the fact that the purely-observed cross-study factor compilation was able to predict a *majority* of the variation in incongruence scores using only eleven factors for conservatives (29.7% internal and 30.4% external) and eight factors for liberals (14.0% internal and 39.6% external). What is clear overall is demonstrated by the observed results: that is, findings that confirm my theoretical expectations.

The remainder of this chapter seeks to *use* these findings to demonstrate the necessity, value, and beauty of attitudinal incongruence in America.

7.2.1. Prescriptions for Scholars

The topic of attitudinal incongruence has wide academic utility that should be employed in two vastly important ways: (1) as an illustration of political ideology, and (2) as an under-explored research avenue itself.

First, its role as an illustration of political orientations in general is vital for educators and students alike in political science. The overall topic perfectly elucidates the current understanding of the mechanisms by which our attitudes and ideologies originate and operate, and educators could use the topic as a branching and illustrative lecture for

an introductory political science or political behavior course—even without the use of the sometimes bizarre but nevertheless prominent imagery scattered throughout this dissertation. Via individual-level conscious, deliberative, and controlled, and non-conscious, automatic, and uncontrolled factors, we arrive at our political attitudes and our political ideologies—attitudes and ideologies may form the same time, or one before the other (Hatemi et al., 2014, p. 292)—and we use those attitudes and ideologies to act, to varying degrees, in political *and* apolitical contexts.

For virtually everyone, some attitudes will conflict with others, *because of those conscious and non-conscious factors*, and the fact that, by virtue of the American system and the party structures, the system *requires it*, and will for the foreseeable future. That is, in order to not be completely shut out of the political world, individuals must have attitudes that align, to some degree, with other individuals, including perhaps most importantly, the political figures for whom they will vote, whose stated belief systems are almost always incongruent (see Chapter 3), especially in today’s political world (see section 3.2.1 and section 3.2.2).

Therefore, **attitudinal incongruence is a vivid reflection of the drivers of personal politics interacting with the American political system.** Understanding **this** undoubtedly serves to help students and educators alike *understand* and/or *explain* personal politics, the political system, and the relationship between the two by shining a light on the idea from a previously-unseen direction.

The second prescription for scholars is the use and importance of attitudinal incongruence as a research topic. I have worked to demonstrate in this dissertation that

attitudinal incongruence offers something special that no other measure does, and it goes beyond the role of political sophistication that has already been well-explored (see section 1.3.3). Incongruence potentially serves as a psychological factor and predictor *itself* in that it has demonstrated its empirical value in this dissertation and deserves inclusion in future research models of political psychology and political behavior by virtue of that empirical value alone. Something special, it seems, is achieved by studying this abstraction of an ostensible human irrationality.

Additionally, it is unknown as to whether incongruence will be observed to the same degree or in the same respects in other political systems, or if it is a uniquely American construct. In either case, incongruence's marked and important role in the American context is definitive, and evocative of the aforementioned interaction of individual-level factors and system-level factors. Surely its utilization as a research avenue in other countries will serve to illustrate that idea as a comparison to America—as in, the uniqueness of American politics—or, potentially, illustrate that idea as *not* uniquely American. In both cases, the research would be objectively empirically useful as demonstrations of the way that individuals wield attitudes *within* a given system or *regardless* of the given system, respectively.

The importance of incongruence supersedes scholarly salience, however. Within the general public, its utility is similarly high.

7.2.2. Prescriptions for the Public

Attitudinal incongruence serves as an ostensible *meme* in the American polity in two ways. First, like the concept of memes in evolutionary biology (see Dawkins,

1976)—and the way the terminology has been co-opted in cultural studies to conceptually illustrate cultural transmission (Graham, 2002, pp. 86-87)—it is an ever-present, widespread, self-replicating, and environmentally responsive attack in political discourse. As one example, campaign advertisements regularly, and with apparent relish, accuse opponents of being hypocritical with regard to government involvement. These attacks are most likely hurled with the assumption that viewers will respond to those indictments with negative feelings toward the indicted because of a natural human tendency for to disdain hypocrisy and hypocritical behavior in any form. Whether or not the advertisements are actually effective is unclear, but their memetic manifestation on the airwaves, internet, and interpersonal discourse cannot be denied.

As another example—and one that bridges to the second form of incongruence as an ostensible meme—both traditional media outlets and especially internet media outlets offer regular exemplars of the incongruence attack. On top of the fact that searching for *big government hypocrisy* and *small government hypocrisy* retrieves upwards of five million results across search engines, the “#GOPocrisy” hashtag—that is, a Twitter keyword²¹—is illustratively contained in **tens of thousands** of individual tweets *per day*, and the term “GOPocrisy” is a category tag for at least two popular liberal blogs (viz., Daily Kos and Eclectablog). Of the tweets and blog posts that use the term, a cursory glance suggests that most of them do seem to be policy-related—for example, indicting conservative politicians for supporting a policy under Republican administrations and

²¹ “Hashtags” are used in tweets as keyword words or phrases preceded by the “#” symbol that—when clicked by a Twitter platform user—automatically bring a user to other popular or recent tweets using the same hashtag. Meanwhile, hashtags are exploding as a tool for analytical and empirical research (e.g., Ma, Sun, & Cong, 2013), demonstrated by the increasing number of scholarly articles with “hashtag” in the title, going from 10 works in 2010 to 15 in 2011, 27 in 2012, 33 in 2013, and 24 in the first six months of 2014, according to Google Scholar.

opposing the identical policy under the Obama administration—rather than being limited to the personal attacks that are also often contained in charges of political hypocrisy. (I recommend that future research explore this more fully, in order to test the accuracy of this glance.)

Second, those attempted indictments are frequently utilized in what are known as “internet memes” (see Bauckhage, 2011). These somewhat erroneously-named²² image macros typically consist of a photograph—often of a strange- or humorous-looking animal or person—with large text overlaid on the photograph that, in most cases, makes a joke. For example, as an attack on supposed liberal hypocrisy, a commonly-seen example is an image of a young white woman who appears to be a stereotypical hippie—with large hat and long dreadlocks—with the top line of text referring to a belief that more laws will prevent people from having firearms, and the bottom line inferring that she uses marijuana in spite of laws prohibiting its use. Or, additionally, another commonly-seen example is an image of comedian-activist Janeane Garofalo—a well-known liberal (Oravec, 2005), and frequent target of conservatives (see, e.g., St. John, 2003; Taylor, 2011, p. 41)—with the corresponding text referring to her apparent support for drug legalization and *prohibition* of high fructose corn syrup. Both of these macro templates are among the first-retrieved search results for *liberal hypocrisy*, demonstrating the pervasive power of the incongruence-as-meme metaphor.

In all of the cases above, those who employ incongruence as an attack at any interpersonal level would be well-served to self-reflect, as it is quite likely that they,

²² The terminology is somewhat inappropriate given that the word is meant to only describe something that fits the criteria listed above, and not anything that *anyone* can make for any audience size.

ironically, are incongruent as well—again, only a negligible number of subjects in only one of this dissertation’s analyses scored a zero for their incongruence score.

Additionally, the question of what, if anything, is actually *gained*, in any respect, by attacking someone for being attitudinally incongruent must also be raised.

Beyond that, after reviewing everything related to this topic, I question whether incongruence *should* be an attackable offense at all. A large extent—if not a majority—of our personal political orientations, attitudes, and incongruities lie outside of our conscious control (see Hibbing et al., 2013). They, much like our personalities, constitute a large aspect of who we are, or at least serve as bright reflections thereof. To attack each other for wielding attitudes that are incongruent with other attitudes is no different than attacking each other for our height—an individual’s attitudes and height are heavily outside of their conscious control—on top of the aforementioned fact that the structure of the American political system *necessitates* incongruence (see section 7.2.1). In fact, because an individual’s height is determined by a combination of uncontrollable forces, upbringing, and the overarching environment(s) of that upbringing (see Weedon et al., 2008), height really serves as an analogue of incongruence. Therefore, people of wildly differing respective heights—or respective amounts of attitudinal incongruence—may not very readily see eye-to-eye, but if they just move their heads a little bit, it is not that difficult.

Realizing that conservatives and liberals are different people at their respective cores is vital for the progress of our civilization (see Hibbing et al., 2013). The fact that, as I have shown in my analyses, they are *both* attitudinally incongruent—but for different reasons **that are reflective of their underlying differences**—is similarly imperative to

understand for the health of the republic, and the political and inter-ideological cooperation therein. I again question whether any good is done at any level by any definition in attacking others for what are actually *broad* and *virtually universal* trends of incongruence.

Moreover, this contention rests neither on whether incongruence is limited to the American system, nor whether more congruent ideologies are somehow superior. To illustrate, if attitudinal incongruence of the magnitudes observed within my analyses *is not* uniquely American and is demonstrated to the same degree in many other states with many other political and electoral systems, then incongruence is as inherent to the human species as being a conservative or liberal. In that case, the political orientations in the minority—libertarianism and populism—should take care to prioritize their beliefs and find ways to vote for the issues that are most important to them and reflective of their belief systems, as the only alternatives are either (1) conformity with one ideology or the other—both of which have attributes that are distasteful to libertarians and populists—or (2) apathy and non-involvement in politics, which would probably lead to their political wants and needs being unmet.

Or, if attitudinal incongruence *is* uniquely American, the alternative political ideologies are, once again, in need of individual-level prioritization of issues. This is due to the fact that, at least for the foreseeable future, both libertarianism and populism will only be reflected in small portions of the electorate.

On one hand, libertarianism will struggle for electoral support as a result of there being no noticeably significant decline in the proportion of the electorate who are social traditionalists and, thus, conservative voters—to illustrate, no significant changes in the

percentage of Americans believing in the necessity of belief in God for morality have been observed since 2002 (Pew Research Center, 2014b, p. 153), and *not even marginal* changes have been observed in the percentage of Americans supporting a federal prohibition of all abortions since 1995 (pp. 166-167); although the sixteen-point swing (from 46% to 62%) toward societal acceptance of gays and lesbians (p. 152), and the thirty-two-point swing (from 22% to 54%) in favor of legalizing marijuana use (p. 161) over the same time period is certainly worth noting, albeit it is a small aspect of traditionalism.

On the other hand, populism is also equally unlikely to gain significant adherents either, as its identity variants (see section 1.2.2) of “socialism” or, in other forms, fuller “authoritarianism,” will remain dirty words—to illustrate, none (n = 0) of the subjects in the experiment in Chapter 5 (and Study 4.3) identified themselves as “socialist” when given the opportunity to do so. This was in spite of the undergraduate sample—a population in which one would expect to find at least a few culturally rebellious and non-conforming subjects by the nature of being an undergraduate coupled with the probability of having some subjects who are low in RWA (see Roets & Van Hiel, 2006, pp. 239-240; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008, p. 250)—and in spite of the fact that a percentage of the sample actually qualified as fairly congruent anti-libertarians/populists/socialists.

All of the above is in spite of the rationalism and logic inherent to the wielding of congruent attitudes in either of those alternative ideologies. Thus, whether or not incongruence is uniquely American, if—as has been claimed since the dawn of the republic in, as one example, James Madison’s 1788 Federalist 39—societal progress and legitimate representation of the interests of the body politic constitute *the* democratic

ideal, then attacking others for incongruence is an impediment to that ideal. By understanding the necessity of incongruence, and acting accordingly, it is not a pipe dream to assume that democracy will be more fully functional and effective than the alternative of *not* understanding incongruence's important role to play. It is only by taking into account the fact that incongruence is not inherently a bad characteristic—and may even be a net positive, all things considered (see section 7.3.1)—that the political war that has waged for centuries between the two primary political species can advance *beyond* the personal and *toward* policy debates that are heterogeneous in nature and origin, and not predicated on an axis of government-involvement to advance the civilization for the betterment of the *entire* species.

7.3.1. Attitude Structures as the Millay Candle

Believing, as many do, that the government should be completely limited in one area but unlimited in another does seem, at first glance, irrational and specious. It is logical and perfectly valid to ask why one would want government action in one realm versus no action in another. Why so many people brandish logically inconsistent attitudes is a question I have asked since my first real exposure to political attitudes in high school. And, as noted by Hurwitz and Peffley (1987, p. 1099), logical consistency and the avoidance of personal hypocrisy should be our end-goals as citizens, should they not?

On one hand, *logically speaking*—and at the risk of going off of the figurative and descriptive deep end in the hopes of eventually elucidating a larger point about people, their politics, and their governments—the poem that serves as this chapter's epigraph (see Millay, 1922) is a metaphor for my conclusions about attitudinal incongruence. The

wielding of attitudes that are incongruent with one another is burning a candle at both ends: the length of time for which the candle will burn is certainly less than one with only one end lit; there is only so much wax, after all—in this case, there is only so much wax *and* brain matter between the ears that can be burned.

But on the other hand, and in the remaining words of Millay (1922), the burning is “lovely,” indeed. By burning the candle of attitude structures at both ends, scholars and the general public alike are better able to understand the way their attitudes and others’ attitudes fit within the political system in which they reside. This is because being attitudinally incongruent, if it has any effect on people, can *only* lead them to think more carefully about where they stand on issues, where others stand on issues, and what, exactly, the policy consequences and ramifications of those stances may be.

Moreover, this is an especially important systematization because of the fact that most Americans’ attitudes are *necessarily* illogical and irrational by virtue of the way the system works. Again, by and large, voters are only able to vote for candidates who exhibit incongruent belief systems themselves. On top of that, if every American were to attempt to be perfectly logically congruent in their attitudes, and if every issue were truly distilled—or even *able* to be truly distilled—to the libertarian-authoritarian, either/or axis of government involvement, the end result would be a hyper-rationalistic realm of issues in which emotion and humanity were not directly included in the deliberation of issue stances and the execution of the respective politics. When the political world is reduced to the axis and lens into which I forced them in Chapter 1, through which I forced participants in Chapter 5 to conceive of them, and into which other people force them when—as one example—attacking others for incongruence/hypocrisy of their political

positions, then emotion is uninvolved in attitudes, and this is not an inherently good thing.

Humans *have* emotions because **emotions are necessary for surviving and thriving as a species** (see Hatemi, 2007, pp. 166-167), let alone a *political* species, and thus, emotion *should* play a role in our politics. When the requirement for policy-making is purely rationalistic, logical, and emotionless, the end result is often societal harm, as evidenced by the oft-observed-throughout-modern-history ultimately *negative* and dangerous results of both purely laissez-faire—and, eventually, monopolistic, oligarchic, and corporatocratic—systems (see Ames, 2013), and, on the other side, fully-regulated totalitarian-authoritarian systems (see Greenberg & Jonas, 2003).

Beyond that, the amount of wax that *can* be burned is *not* actually very limited in magnitude. People are able to have attitudes about hundreds of political issues, and assuming that there exists a limit to the wax also assumes that there is a limit to the number of issues and respective stances. If the limit *is* actually reached—in spite of the regular vacillation between issue stances that a majority of people exhibit (Converse, 1964)—then the hyper-rationalist, unemotional view of the world is the new norm, and emotion becomes uninvolved in making decisions about other people. By ridding our belief systems of the supposedly irrational factors that hold them together—the wax of the candle—we are ridding our belief systems of the people *affected by* the political output of our belief systems. It does not require a background in philosophy to understand that *harming people is a bad thing*, and the centuries-long right-left debate is necessary for the marketplace of ideas to thrive.

Thus, the question I came to face in high school of why people do not have more congruent attitudes—a question to which scholars are not strangers (see Lakoff, 2008, p. 75; Nie & Andersen, 1974, p. 564)—was, in spite of the supposed normative benefits (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987, p. 1099), not actually a reflection of heightened logic on my part, but rather, ignorance about the **necessary and fruitful mechanism by which political attitudes must formulate and operate within a given system.**

Thinking of attitudinal incongruence as akin to burning a candle at both ends is an interesting idea, and a metaphor employed by those who assert the need for congruence for a healthy democracy (e.g., Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987), but it is fallacious for one key reason: it assumes that the end result is that the candle, in the words of Millay, “will not last the night.” But, the candle has lasted a long time already, and it will continue to last for the foreseeable future. Moreover, while it burns, the light will be beautifully illuminating of what makes us who we are as political animals.

7.3.2. Exceptions to this Picture of our Politics

There are limits to my sunny picture of the ostensibly irrational and illogical behavior on the part of hundreds of millions of Americans, however, and they go beyond the mere notion of the negative side of irrationality and illogic. The same internal and external processes that go on to drive incongruence for conservatives and liberals also interact with the political system to inform attitudes on both sides that are not only *not helpful* for the polity, but are, in many respects, socially, economically, and environmentally harmful. Those who wield those attitudes *would*, in fact, benefit society and themselves by exercising their muscles of logical deliberation. There are two sets of

clear examples of these harmful attitudes that, though rooted in uncontrolled processes, do not excuse those who hold the attitudes from hindering civilization.

First are harmful prejudicial attitudes, which are almost entirely limited to conservatives' belief systems and their accordant attitudinal incongruence. Unless the respective ultimate policy goals of prejudices are limited only to prejudicial policies against individuals who are proven to be looking to do *legitimate* damage to others and/or society—for example, convicted violent criminals and pedophiles—who need to be removed from society and/or rehabilitated at the very least, the end result of prejudice is toxic for humankind. To discriminate against a class of people—through supporting anti-Black or anti-LGBT laws—is objectively a bad thing and contrary to American ideals, even if it is the product of uncontrolled processes, and even if being incongruent is *largely* a normative positive for society and individuals. Ultimately, in these cases, rationalistic behavior and *thinking through* one's attitudes would be helpful.

Second are attitudes reflective of science denialism, which, again, data indicate are most prevalent among conservatives. In fact, a strong majority (over 70%) of substantive conservatives—including moderate conservatives *and* traditionalists—deny not only that human activity is causing global warming, but that global warming is happening at all (Pew Research Center, 2014b, p. 69). These denialist stances are in spite of the mountains of empirical and observable data that wholly contradict them and that warn of the cataclysmic and direct dangers of global warming (see IPCC, 2013; National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2014)—including but not limited to, by the end of this century, directly causing millions of deaths (DARA, 2012; Smith et al., 2013) and hundreds of billions of dollars *annually* (DARA, 2012; IPCC, 2013)—but nevertheless,

these conservatives do not think public- *or* private-sector steps should be taken to curb pollution (Pew Research Center, 2014b, p. 70), likely as a result of these beliefs. The incongruence that accords with these attitudes does not give off a lovely light—*especially when the flame may be extinguished by seawater if the oceans continue to rise as a result of human activity and pollution* (see IPCC, 2013).

Though it is more difficult to find widespread examples of it (Haelle, 2014; Mooney, 2012), liberals are not innocent of harmful science denialism either, with some prominent liberals and liberal-leaners—Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., and in 2008, prior to correcting himself later on, Senator Barack Obama (Haelle, 2014, para. 14)—erroneously claiming that vaccinations and genetically-modified foods are inherently unsafe (see Bailey, 2011), the former claim being the one espoused by Kennedy. However, *these* anti-science stances, as societally dangerous as they may be—with refusals to vaccinate, for example, not only causing easily-preventable disease outbreaks (Atwell et al., 2013), but likely causing unnecessary deaths as well (see Whitney, Zhou, Singleton, & Schuchat, 2014)—are not nearly as widespread as the stances wielded by conservatives, and in the case of anti-vaccination beliefs, according to the data, are actually just as prevalent among conservative identifiers (Kahan, 2014). Although, as postulated by Haelle (2014), the lack of anti-science homogeneousness among liberals in the electorate, compared to conservatives, could simply be because conservatives are somewhat naturally (see Mooney, 2012)—and perhaps somewhat due to comparatively stronger financial backing—better organized and coordinated than liberals and are able to have science denialism proliferate and promulgate as a result (Haelle, 2014, para. 8).

Thus, while a concoction of uncontrolled and illogical motivations is actually a necessary function of individuals in the electorate—and incongruence being a side-effect thereof—not every eventuality of those motivations is benign or positive. It is up to the body politic's anatomical system and the heart that pumps its democratic debate to ensure that the albeit limited number of wholly malignant eventualities are (1) not reflected in political action, (2) surgically removed, and (3) cauterized to avoid their regrowth and the dangers that follow therefrom.

In other words, burning the attitude candle at both ends is lovely, but there is absolutely and definitively a limit to how incongruent one can be, and there are legitimate societal costs of incongruence.

7.4.1. Research Proposal: Unconstrained by Reality

Frankly, because of a combination of data concerns, data availability, and procedural feasibility, the results of this dissertation's several analyses were both weaker than they could have been, *and* lacking in external validity and generalizability to the American electorate at-large. Consequently, neither a broad, definitively accurate illustration nor a full confirmation of my central theoretical framework was achieved.

To compensate for these relative and unfortunate weaknesses, this section proposes a research procedure in which feasibility is *not* a requirement. Instead, this procedure *fuses* what I have demonstrated from all of the preceding analyses and *uses* that fusion to provide a fuller test and, potentially, demonstration of my theory of asymmetry and, ultimately, suggest broader conclusions about its implications.

To crystallize the development of this procedure, I must first restate the fact that the theory of asymmetry was developed as a set of hypotheses related to the fundamental research questions of this dissertation (see Chapter 1); namely, the questions of (1) **what, exactly, drives attitudinal incongruence for the American electorate**—especially **what drives it differentially for conservatives and liberals**—and (2) **how those drivers affect and relate to Americans’ cognizing of the idea of incongruence in themselves and others**. While both of those central questions were addressed and partially answered—especially in the case of this chapter’s cross-study analyses, in which the fullest possible models of incongruence were developed—nevertheless, the weaknesses of the respective analyses (Chapter 4 and Chapter 6) and experiment (Chapter 5) must be taken into account. Once again, with feasibility taking a backseat to pure scientific inquiry and the highest possible data quality, the questions can be fully elucidated and definitively answered in just one multifaceted experimental—albeit far-fetched or, at the very least, expensive and complex—procedure.

The most figuratively and literally direct method would be to directly confront subjects with prompts about the concept of attitudinal incongruence—or, in order to provoke a stronger response, prompts about *personal political hypocrisy*, as was done in Chapter 5. Confrontation of this kind can be achieved through two procedures (see Barbour, 2008, p. 41), both of which will be used in this research: **one-on-one interviews** and **focus groups**. Both procedures allow for the highest quality of data for my purposes in face-to-face, as opposed to online or phone, settings, in which the benefits of highly illustrative data quality and probing (see Barbour, 2008; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002)—which are necessary for both the recording of the dependent variables (see

below) and the answering of my central questions—outweigh the drawbacks of costs and interviewer effects, neither of which should be an issue in this ideal (i.e., non-reality) scenario, since money is not an issue, and, consequently, the interviewers will be well-trained (see Barbour, 2008, p. 111).

The questions asked of participants during either procedure will consist of conceptually identical content to the prompts used in Chapter 5, which, again, were designed to point out the ostensible hypocrisy of, depending on the condition, *either* conservatives' attitudes or liberals' attitudes. Participants will then be asked to respond to those notions and discuss them with either their interviewer or the other members of their focus group, in the interview and focus group conditions respectively. Determining *how* different types of participants and groups of participants **react** to the differing prompts, then, constitutes the focus of this procedure, and necessitates conditions in addition to being in either an interview or focus group setting—again, as in Chapter 5, participants should also be in a condition in which the focus of the prompt is either on conservatives or on liberals. Moreover, to be able to make inter-ideological distinctions, interviews should be conducted on conservative, liberal, and moderate participants; while focus groups should be divided into groups of just conservatives, just liberals, both conservatives and liberals, and, for comparison to the two primary ideologies—and not direct analysis—moderates.

Therefore, the conditions—each of which will be completed in multiple iterations for the purposes of validity—are as follows:

- Interview of a conservative; topic: conservative hypocrisy
- Interview of a liberal; topic: conservative hypocrisy
- Interview of a moderate; topic: conservative hypocrisy
- Interview of a conservative; topic: liberal hypocrisy

- Interview of a liberal; topic: liberal hypocrisy
- Interview of a moderate; topic: liberal hypocrisy
- Focus group of conservatives; topic: conservative hypocrisy
- Focus group of liberals; topic: conservative hypocrisy
- Focus group of *conservatives and liberals*; topic: conservative hypocrisy
- Focus group of moderates; topic: conservative hypocrisy
- Focus group of conservatives; topic: liberal hypocrisy
- Focus group of liberals; topic: liberal hypocrisy
- Focus group of *conservatives and liberals*; topic: liberal hypocrisy
- Focus group of moderates; topic: liberal hypocrisy

To be able to generalize to the American electorate (Barbour, 2008, p. 22), subjects will be selected²³ from a nationally representative sampling pool; and, because money is no object, transported to any location with the appropriate accommodations for either a personal interview with an independent interviewer or a focus group led by an independent and trained moderator who will follow a simple protocol that is, again, analogous to the prompt in Chapter 5. From here, the number of participants selected will be dictated by the number required to able to ensure statistical power of the eventual results in a given condition.

In order to acquire a political and psychological profile and, subsequently, make inferences and draw conclusions about others who fit those profiles, all study participants will be given political questionnaires and psychological factor batteries—consisting of internally valid administration of all of the survey metrics utilized in this dissertation (see Appendix), and the regrettably unused-until-now Rotter (1966) “I-E” locus of control scale—which will be administered at varying points in the procedures, depending on the condition to which they are assigned, and used for statistical control in post-hoc analyses. Although, all participants—prior to being brought to a location to participate in the

²³ Because this procedure is unconstrained by reality, the assumption of the subject selection phase is that all selected subjects will agree to participate—an implausible assumption in the real world of participant recruitment.

procedure into which they are randomly assigned—will be pre-screened in order to discern their political orientation, which will be discerned by using their self-identified ideology in concert with their substantive ideology, the latter of which will be discerned in the same fashion used throughout this dissertation. This will be accomplished using the updated WPAI from Study 4.3 and Chapter 5 alongside their stated ideological identity: those who score in the top quartile on the conservatism scale **and** identify as conservative (and *only* those who meet both qualifications) will be classified as conservatives, those who score in the bottom quartile **and** identify as liberal will be classified as liberals, and in the interest of full control and post-hoc comparison, those who score in the middle ten percent and identify as moderate will be classified as moderates. In case the oft-observed issues with responding to attitude questionnaires surface (see Zaller & Feldman, 1992), the fact that there will be multiple iterations of each condition *and* the ability to control for potential outliers and confounds through the use of post-hoc inclusion of the psychological trait batteries—which should be measuring traits too abstract to be subject to survey effects (Tourangeau, 1987; Tourangeau et al., 1991)—will at least constitute steps toward eliminating those issues.

The key aspect of this procedure is that, in addition to the psychological information gathered about the participants, during each interview or focus group, participants will be affixed with equipment as unobtrusive to conversation as possible that measures EDA. Thus, the variation in the activation of their sympathetic nervous system—and, consequently, very objective measurements of discrete and logically disentangleable emotions and behaviors (Dawson et al., 2007)—over the course of the procedure and in response to the various questions and prompts therein will be available.

The **dependent variables** of the study, then, are (1) qualitatively, participants' verbal responses and, (2) *more importantly*, and quantifiably, participants' SCL responses. Both of these can be tied to individual participants by recording the video and audio of the interviews and focus groups; although, the empirical focus is on the latter of the two, with the former included only for illustrative purposes (see section 5.4.2).

7.4.2. Hypothesized Results

The central results I would expect from this procedure vary dramatically by condition and ostensible sub-condition because of what the tenets of the IEM and corresponding theory of asymmetry would estimate inter-ideologically. Before presenting the hypotheses, however, it should be noted upfront that the focus group conditions with conservatives and liberals *together* will necessitate their own larger hypothesis given their comparative uniqueness as conditions.

- Hypothesis 1a: In the interview conditions, responding to the conservative prompt will elicit the strongest SCL reaction from conservatives, followed by liberals, followed by moderates. These reactions will be qualitatively reflected in angry and defensive verbal responses for conservatives, while amused responses will be reflected for liberals.
- Hypothesis 1b: In the focus group conditions, responding to the conservative prompt will elicit the same pattern of results as above, but to a lesser magnitude, with liberals in particular demonstrating a stronger reaction than in the one-on-one condition.

This general pattern of hypothesized results follows logically from this dissertation's earlier hypotheses and findings. People, naturally, are likely to stand up for their beliefs and viewpoints at least in terms of their defensive physiological reactions and likely also in terms of their verbal expression when they are accused of a supposedly unwanted trait—in this case, being accused of hypocrisy.


Central to this hypothesis is the notion that conservatives will have a stronger reaction than liberals in both conditions—that is, the interview and focus group conditions—but that this effect will be strongest overall in the one-on-one interview. This is because of the link between conservatives’ stronger physiological reactivity *in general*²⁴ and especially to a threatening stimuli (Hibbing et al., 2013; Oxley et al. 2008; Smith & Hibbing, 2011) and conservatives’ strong penchants for the need for individual autonomy, what they consider the value of individualism, and the trait of personal independence, each of which are both automatic (Dodd et al., 2011; Jost et al., 2003a) and regularly *explicitated* by conservatives (see Chapter 3). In other words, their greater inherent and deep-seated support for the initiative of the individual—in likely concert with their regularly-observed perceived internal locus of control (Gurin et al., 1978; Sweetser, 2014)—should **cause a stronger essential fight-or-flight activation to an idea here that threatens the self and the self-image**, *rooted* in that inherent and deep-seated support (see Kreibig, 2010).

However, I do not expect the same magnitudes of inter-ideological SCL *differences* that should be observed in the interview conditions to be observed in the focus group conditions. While, to my knowledge, **no** research has recorded skin conductance during any group settings—most likely because of the monetary costs of multiple pieces of unobtrusive EDA recording equipment *and* the introduction of

²⁴ This effect is far from absolute, with a number of negligible, null, and even inverse effects observed throughout the lifespan of the young biology-and-politics discipline—one of many reasons why Hibbing et al. (2013) titled their book on the subject *Predisposed*. The focus here is on general dispositions toward stronger reactivity, and those who are substantively conservative and especially those with conservative *attitudes* on social and cultural issues—*necessarily* most conservatives, and by my quartile operationalization, one would have to indicate *at least mostly* socially conservative attitudes to be classified as a conservative—tend to be more physiologically reactive to stimuli that would provoke a reaction (Smith & Hibbing, 2011).

multiple confounding and uncontrolled variables (i.e., other people)²⁵—thereby eliminating at least directly *well-founded* pontification on my part, it logically follows that being around other like-minded people will have a different effect than not. I expect, in fact, that the effect of being around other liberals will increase the degree of SCL response from liberals, compared to being alone, as a result of liberals *inverse-individualism* penchants—that is, the comparative and relative importance of *other people*, however unknown those people may be, to liberals, which is, again, largely automatic (Choma, 2008; Dodd et al., 2011) *and* explicitly stated (see Chapter 3). Their increased SCL response in this case should be a product of amusement and joy at the expense of conservatives, both of which elicit a positive SCL response, albeit a weaker one than that elicited by threat (Christie & Friedman, 2004; Demaree, Schmeichel, Robinson, & Everhart, 2004; Tsai, Levenson, & Carstensen, 2000; cited by Kreibig, 2010).

In any case, the hypothesized results are pictured in Figure 7.11.



²⁵ Hence the inclusion of the psychological factor batteries in the procedure, which would at least edge toward an ability for post-hoc control.

- Hypothesis 2a: In the interview conditions, responding to the liberal prompt will elicit the strongest SCL reaction from conservatives, followed by liberals, who will be indistinguishable from moderates. Conservatives' SCL reactions will be lower than they were in H1a, however.
- Hypothesis 2b: In the focus group conditions, responding to the liberal prompt will elicit the strongest SCL reaction from conservatives, followed by liberals, followed by moderates.


First, the expectation that the magnitude of the effect will not be as strong for conservatives as it was in H1a is because of the defensive posture needed to be taken by conservatives in H1a.

More important to the crux of H1a, however, is the lack of a difference between liberals and moderates. Liberals should not achieve higher SCL than conservatives here and should have essentially indistinguishable SCL from moderates for a few reasons. First, as explained earlier, conservatives tend to have higher physiological reactivity magnitudes in general (see Hibbing et al., 2013), so an effect would not even be observed by simply comparing liberals to conservatives. Second, and going off of that, liberals, by their high-Openness, contradiction- and disorganization-tolerant nature (Carney et al., 2008), and stated life stories that are much more community-related and even anti-individualistic compared to conservatives (McAdams, Hanek, & Dadabo, 2013), should be so much more accepting of the prompt than conservatives were about *their* prompt that the effect is non-existent when compared to moderates. And, third, conservatives and liberals are—as has been noted frequently throughout this dissertation—not clean inverses at their respective cores (Conover & Feldman, 1981; Feldman & Johnston, 2014), and, thus, a cleanly inverse effect should not be expected for that reason, in spite of the logic of it.

But, for H2b, I expect that this null effect would be negated in a focus group of liberals and, instead, basically identical to what was observed in H1b. If conservatives and liberals were, indeed, similar in their sympathetic nervous system responses, a different result would be expected—likely, then, with liberals having the higher reaction. But they are who they are; I only expect that they will overcome their tolerance of personal contradiction (see Critcher et al., 2009) by the well-trained moderator pushing them to explore the prompt’s ideas, after which, underlying—yet, still external, by my model—processes (see Ispas, 2013), like groupthink, should begin to have an effect and, given the liberal mind compared to the conservative mind, have a stronger proportional effect, but not enough to supersede the *overarching* effect of the aforementioned conservative-reactivity relationship, and the liberal-acceptance-of-incongruence relationship. Although, the gap between the SCL responses of conservatives and liberals in the focus groups reacting to the liberal prompt should decrease—albeit, only slightly—if those liberals’ scores in adherence to the Moral Foundation of Ingroup/Loyalty increase beyond their normally below-average scores (see Graham et al., 2009; 2011). In those cases, the power of that Moral Foundation would increase the effect of the group-cuing external forces and have a physiological effect; however, this effect should be marginal at best, considering the number of steps removed, so to speak, that physiological metrics are from vocalized behavioral output. Because a procedure in which SCL is recorded in a group setting has never been made public, if it has ever even been done, it must be emphasized again that hypothesizing SCL reactions in group settings constitutes shots in the academic dark. But, it is in using the current understanding of the relationship

between attitudes and physiology that these shots can be taken with more than marginal confidence.

The hypothesized results are pictured in Figure 7.12.



- **Hypothesis 3:** Both focus group conditions with conservatives and liberals together will be impossible to responsibly compare SCL responses. However, after the moderator presents the results of this dissertation, SCL responses will decrease for both ideological sides.

H3 represents the primary reasoning for also considering the verbal responses of the participants to be a dependent variable in this study. When in a situation with supposed enemies, people are much too unpredictable to be able to make any legitimate, statistically verifiable hypotheses about their physiological reactions, even in a procedure with ostensibly unlimited control.

However, to put a happy sunflower in my mortarboard, given this dissertation's central conclusions of the societal necessity of incongruence and the net positive effect it has on politics, I expect that the subjects in both conditions will settle down—thus, eliciting a measured decrease in their SCL—upon hearing that, essentially, they may be hypocritical in their attitudes, but that hypocrisy is *not* a bad thing.

7.4.3. Potential Implications

It is a common hope of my fellow students and scholars of the psychology and biology of political attitudes, behaviors, and ideologies (e.g., Hibbing et al., 2013) that, as the public's understanding of our political differences being core to who we are as political animals and largely out of our conscious control increases, so will the public's political understanding and cooperation. That idea is one of several key implications of what this study could and, according to my hypotheses, *would* demonstrate. As noted by Hibbing (2013),

People need to recognize that their political opponents are not necessarily uninformed or unintelligent but rather that, at a very basic level, they experience and interpret the world differently. These sensory and processing differences lead to distinct ideas for the appropriate way to organize mass-scale social life. (p. 484)

It is those “distinct ideas” that, for most everyone, are logically incongruent with other “distinct ideas.” This is most assuredly, at first glance and cognition, a distasteful and aversive thought to most, but not all (see Chapter 5) people with political attitudes, as it probably should be—hypocrisy is not thought to be a very good trait to have, after all (Kurzban, 2010).

But, it is my sincere hope that, upon learning of the fuller picture of this form of that trait—that is, upon **learning** about *the drivers, history, and cognition of attitudinal incongruence in the American body politic*—people will *not* be as threatened by it (as I expect they would be both verbally and electrodermally), *not* be as angered by it (as I expect they would be in most conditions when they were the ones accused), and *not* be as apt to using it as a political attack (as **is** memetically observed in popular culture, and I expect would be observed in the form of an increase in EDA out of amusement at the

expense of the other side in the study conditions). “Most of us are hypocrites,” after all (see section 5.4.2). Accepting one’s own attitudinal incongruence and the universality of it within the electorate could very well be a step *toward* cooperation, compromise, and progress, and *away from* petty argument and regressive mass-scale polarization, neither of which show any signs of going away on their own (Abramowitz, 2012).

7.5.1. Conclusion

No matter how small, any ecosystem or biome is ameliorated and embiggened by increases in species diversity (see Bright, Barro, & Burtz, 2001). The ecology of political attitudes is no different, as the marketplace of ideas upon which a strong populace is stationed is healthiest with a broad diversity of opinions.

However, one of the few axiomatic principles in the political science discipline—colloquially known as Duverger’s Law (see Riker, 1982)—dictates that the plurality-voting structure of the American system *necessitates* only two parties (Duverger, 1959; Riker, 1982). Thus, within this two-party system, the impetus for any congruence would be on the public both directly in terms of them having diverse attitudes themselves and indirectly in terms of them electing legislators, executives, and judges—all but a small number of whom nationwide identify with one of the two parties—who deviate from their respective party platforms.

While the two essentially accordant political orientations *of* the two parties have, according to my analyses in Study 4.1, moved slightly toward more logically congruent attitude structures over the last few decades, whether this slight change is because of pressure felt by people to avoid hypocrisy in their attitudes is unclear and—given the

cognition of *We, the People*—unlikely. What is clear, however, is the small magnitude of this effect.

Thus, in an era of increasingly polarized attitudes in the public (see Pew Research Center, 2014a), the structures of those attitudes still remain logically incongruent. This incongruence exists regardless of the stated or measured ideologies of those who wield the attitudes. It is ultimately up to the public to embrace that fact and recognize that **it is the incongruities of their attitudes that contribute to the vital opinion diversity of the American political ecosystem.**

Accordingly, in spite of the illogic central to attitudinal incongruence, none of what I have asserted, conceptualized, demonstrated, or concluded is meant to shine a wholly negative light on either of the ideologies' incongruities or the differential drivers thereof. If anything, researchers should view these political hypocrisies as opportunities and, as a result, normatively good—after all, logical contradictions are academically useful in that they exemplify the general differences between the ideologies, and do so in a way that allows for representativeness of attitude structures on top of that. This also makes them useful for the public, along with the idea that, perhaps, in understanding both the lack of control over our hypocrisy and the fact that everyone is a hypocrite, we can move beyond the rhetoric, attacks, and anxiety, and toward political and social progress.

So, to co-opt the cliché utilized by the subjects mentioned earlier (see section 5.4.2), **it may not be *logical* to have your cake and eat it too**; but after all, in the words of Pizzolatto and Fukunaga (2014), **what good is cake if you can't eat it?**

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Appendix

Summer 2010
Items Used in Incongruence Scale

Note: An asterisk [] denotes that the item is reverse-scored.*

Please indicate how you feel about each topic [5-point Likert]

- Stop illegal immigration
- Government-arranged healthcare
- Gay marriage*
- Abortion rights*
- Increase welfare spending
- Protect gun rights*
- Increase military spending
- Government regulation of business
- Small government*
- Foreign aide
- Abstinence-only sex education

Which of these captures the way you would most like [the political system] to be?

- 1 = A government that is involved in most every facet of society
- 5 = A government that is only minimally involved in society

Here are a number of statements about politics, policy and leadership that you may or may not agree with. For each statement, we would like you to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree.

Thinking about politics... [5-point Likert]

- the government should try to make sure that every person has a job and a good standard of living.*
- traditional values should be promoted by the government.
- wealth should be distributed more evenly to everyone.
- our defenses should be made stronger.
- people should be required to behave according to accepted societal beliefs on what is morally right and wrong.
- our border should be heavily policed
- government should not interfere with the fact that some people will be naturally more successful than others.*
- we should prevent too many outsiders from moving here.
- competition should be allowed to determine who succeeds and who fails economically.*

Shortened Need for Structure Scale

How accurately do the following statements describe you? [5-point Likert]

- I like to be very organized in day-to-day life and often make lists of the chores I have to do.
- Before making a decision I always weigh the pros and cons.
- I can't relax until I have done everything I had planned to do that day.
- I am not very meticulous when I carry out do-it-yourself projects.

Shortened Big Five Battery

Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if one characteristic applies more strongly than the other.

I see myself as: [7-point Likert]

- Extraverted, enthusiastic
- Critical, quarrelsome
- Dependable, self-disciplined
- Anxious, easily upset
- Open to new experiences, complex
- Reserved, quiet
- Sympathetic, warm
- Disorganized, careless
- Calm, emotionally stable
- Conventional, uncreative

Fall 2013 Items

Note: An asterisk [*] denotes that the item is reverse-scored.

Modified Wilson-Patterson Inventory (Conservatism Scale)

For each of the following items, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.

[5-point, *Strongly Disagree* to *Strongly Agree*]

- Organized school prayer
- Bans on obscene material
- Border wall
- Government-guaranteed women's equality*
- Federal death penalty
- Federal surveillance program
- Ban sodomy
- Ban gay marriage
- Right to an abortion*
- Drone strikes
- Require creationism alongside evolution
- 2003 Invasion of Iraq
- Increase federal welfare spending*
- Tax cuts

Gun control*
 Increase federal military spending
 Torture terror suspects
 Pollution control*
 Small government
 Foreign aid*
 Free trade

The 9-item Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971)

Please indicate your preferences in the use of hands in the following activities by answering left or right. If, in any case, you are COMPLETELY indifferent, mark both.

[*Right, Left, or Both*]

Writing
 Drawing
 Throwing
 Scissors
 Toothbrush
 Spoon
 Striking a match
 With which foot do you prefer to kick? [*Right or Left*]
 Which eye do you use when using only one? [*Right or Left*]

A 15-item political knowledge battery (adapted from Federico, Hunt, & Ergun, 2009)

Please respond to the following questions in the text boxes provided.

What job or political office does [names inserted here listed below] hold?

Joe Biden
 John Roberts
 John Boehner
 Kim Jong-un
 Samuel Alito
 Mike Johanns
 Chuck Grassley
 Hillary Clinton
 Jeff Fortenberry
 Michael Bloomberg
 Jim Suttle

Which political party currently has the most members in the United States Senate?

Which political party currently has the most members of the United States House of Representatives?

How long is the term of office for a United States Senator?

Whose job is it to nominate justices to the United States Supreme Court?

The 18-item Preference for Consistency Scale (Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995)

For each of the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.

[5-point, *Strongly Disagree* to *Strongly Agree*]

I prefer to be around people whose reactions I can anticipate.
 It is important to me that my actions are consistent with my beliefs.
 Even if my attitudes and actions seemed consistent with one another to me, it would bother me if they did not seem consistent in the eyes of others.
 It is important to me that those who know me can predict what I will do.
 I want to be described by others as a stable, predictable person.
 Admirable people are consistent and predictable.
 The appearance of consistency is an important part of the image I present to the world.
 It bothers me when someone I depend upon is unpredictable.
 I don't like to appear as if I am inconsistent.
 I get uncomfortable when I find my behavior contradicts my beliefs.
 An important requirement for any friend of mine is personal consistency.
 I typically prefer to do things the same way.
 I dislike people who are constantly changing their opinions.
 I want my close friends to be predictable.
 It is important to me that others view me as a stable person.
 I make an effort to appear consistent to others.
 I'm uncomfortable holding two beliefs that are inconsistent.
 It doesn't bother me much if my actions are inconsistent. [*]

The 27-item Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994)

For each of the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.

[5-point, *Strongly Disagree* to *Strongly Agree*]

Uncertainty stops me from having a strong opinion.
 Being uncertain means that a person is disorganized.
 Uncertainty makes life intolerable.
 It's unfair having no guarantees in life.
 My mind can't be relaxed if I don't know what will happen tomorrow.
 Uncertainty makes me uneasy, anxious, or stressed.
 Unforeseen events upset me greatly.
 It frustrates me not having all the information I need.
 Uncertainty keeps me from living a full life.
 One should always look ahead so as to avoid surprises.
 A small unforeseen event can spoil everything, even with the best planning.
 When it's time to act, uncertainty paralyzes me.
 Being uncertain means that I am not first rate.
 When I am uncertain, I can't go forward.
 When I am uncertain, I can't function very well.
 Unlike me, others seem to know where they are going with their lives.
 Uncertainty makes me vulnerable, unhappy, or sad.
 I always want to know what the future has in store for me.
 I can't stand being taken by surprise.
 The smallest doubt can stop me from acting.

I should be able to organize everything in advance.
 Being uncertain means that I lack confidence.
 I think it's unfair that other people seem to be sure about their future.
 Uncertainty keeps me from sleeping soundly.
 I must get away from all uncertain situations.
 The ambiguities in life stress me.
 I can't stand being undecided about my future.

The 10 items of the NFCC scale measuring a need for order (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011)

For each of the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.

[5-point, *Strongly Disagree* to *Strongly Agree*]

I think that having clear rules and order at work is essential for success.
 I find that a well ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament.
 I hate to change my plans at the last minute.
 My personal space is usually messy and disorganized. [*]
 I believe that orderliness and organization are among the most important characteristics of a good student.
 I think that I would learn best in a class that lacks clearly stated objectives and requirements. [*]
 I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more.
 I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life.
 I like to have a place for everything and everything in its place.
 I dislike the routine aspects of my studies. [*]

The 12-item Need for Structure Scale (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993)

For each of the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.

[5-point, *Strongly Disagree* to *Strongly Agree*]

It upsets me to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it.
 I'm not bothered by things that interrupt my daily routine. [*]
 I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life.
 I like to have a place for everything and everything in its place.
 I enjoy being spontaneous. [*] [dropped sometimes]
 I find that a well-ordered life with regular hours makes my life tedious. [*]
 I don't like situations that are uncertain.
 I hate to change my plans at the last minute.
 I hate to be with people who are unpredictable.
 I find that a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more.
 I enjoy the exhilaration of being in unpredictable situations. [*]
 I become uncomfortable when the rules in a situation are not clear.

The 10 items of the Big Five battery measuring Openness (John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991)

For each of the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.

[5-point, *Strongly Disagree* to *Strongly Agree*]

[*I see myself as someone who...*]

Is original, comes up with new ideas

Is curious about many different things

Is ingenious, a deep thinker

Has an active imagination

Is inventive

Values artistic, aesthetic experiences

Prefers work that is routine [*]

Likes to reflect and play with ideas

Has few artistic interests [*]

Is sophisticated in art, music, or literature

The 20-item shortened Dogmatism Scale (Troidahl & Powell, 1965)

For each of the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.

[5-point, *Strongly Disagree* to *Strongly Agree*]

In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what's going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted.

My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit they're [changed from "he's"] wrong.

There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth.

Most people just don't know what's good for them.

Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world there is probably only one which is correct.

The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form of democracy is a government run by those who are most intelligent.

The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something important.

I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve my personal problems.

Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the paper they are printed on.

Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.

It is only when a person devotes themselves [changed from "himself"] to an ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful.

Most people just don't give a "damn" for others.

To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.

It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's going on until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects.

The present is all too often full of unhappiness. It is only the *future* that counts.

The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common. [outdated, but will be included]

In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several times to make sure I am being understood.

While I don't like to admit this even to myself, my secret ambition is to become a great person [changed from man], like Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare.

Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups.

It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live coward.

The 18-item Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale (Kirton, 1981)

For each of the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.

[5-point, *Strongly Disagree* to *Strongly Agree*]

There's a right way and a wrong way to do almost everything.

Practically every problem has a solution.

I have always felt that there is a clear solution between right and wrong.

Nothing gets accomplished in this world unless you stick to some basic rules.

If I were a doctor, I would prefer the uncertainties of a psychiatrist to the clear and definite work of someone like a surgeon or x-ray specialist. [*]

Vague and impressionistic pictures really have little appeal for me.

Before an examination, I feel much less anxious if I know how many questions there will be.

The best part of working a jigsaw puzzle is putting in that last piece.

I don't like to work on a problem unless there is a possibility of coming out with a clear cut and unambiguous answer.

I like to fool around with new ideas, even if they turn out later to be a total waste of time. [*]

Perfect balance is the essence of all good composition.

An expert who doesn't come up with a definite answer probably doesn't know too much.

There is really no such thing as a problem that can't be solved.

A good job is one where what is to be done and how it is to be done are always clear.

In the long run it is possible to get more done by tackling small, simple problems rather than large and complicated ones.

What we are used to is always preferable to what is unfamiliar.

A person who leads an even, regular life in which few surprises or unexpected happenings arise, really has a lot to be grateful for.

I like parties where I know most of the people more than ones where all or most of the people are complete strangers.

The 16-item Need to Evaluate Scale (Jarvis & Petty, 1996)

For each of the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.

[5-point, *Strongly Disagree* to *Strongly Agree*]

I form opinions about everything.

I prefer to avoid taking extreme positions. [*]

It is very important to me to hold strong opinions.

I want to know exactly what is good and bad about everything.

I often prefer to remain neutral about complex issues. [*]
If something does not affect me, I do not usually determine if it is good or bad. [*]
I enjoy strongly liking and disliking new things.
There are many things for which I do not have a preference. [*]
It bothers me to remain neutral.
I like to have strong opinions even when I am not personally involved.
I have many more opinions than the average person.
I would rather have a strong opinion than no opinion at all.
I pay a lot of attention to whether things are good or bad.
I only form strong opinions when I have to. [*]
I like to decide that new things are really good or really bad.
I am pretty much indifferent to many important issues. [*]